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ABSTRACT
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has become increasing prevalent in both the
academic and industrial communities. A new class of system built on SDNs, which
we refer to as SDN-Enabled, provide programmatic interfaces between the SDN con-
troller and the larger distributed system. Existing tools for SDN verification and
analysis are insufficiently expressive to capture this composition of a network and
a larger distributed system. Generic verification systems are an infeasible solution,
due to their monolithic approach to modeling and rapid state-space explosion.
In this thesis we present a new compositional approach to system modeling and
verification that is particularly appropriate for SDN-Enabled systems. Compositional
models may have sub-components (such as switches and end-hosts) modified, added,
or removed with only minimal, isolated changes. Furthermore, invariants may be
defined over the composed system that restrict its behavior, allowing assumptions
to be added or removed and for components to be abstracted away into the service
guarantee that they provide (such as guaranteed packet arrival). Finally, compo-
v
sitional modeling can minimize the size of the state space to be verified by taking
advantage of known model structure.
We also present the Verificare platform, a tool chain for building compositional
models in our modeling language and automatically compiling them to multiple off-
the-shelf verification tools. The compiler outputs a minimal, calculus-oblivious for-
malism, which is accessed by plugins via a translation API. This enables a wide
variety of requirements to be verified. As new tools become available, the translator
can easily be extended with plugins to support them.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) in general and the OpenFlow architecture
(McKeown et al., 2008) in particular have emerged as powerful, programmatic tools
for building large-scale distributed systems. Architecturally, SDNs impose a sepa-
ration between the distributed data plane (i.e. per-switch routing rules) and the
control plane (i.e. policies for routing rule updates), logically centralizing the con-
trol plane and providing it a global view of the network via updates from individual
routers. The controller itself is reactive software process running on an independent
machine, which analyzes packets from the data plane and emits rule updates to one
or more routers on how to handle such packets in the future. These updates are
installed in routers via a separate control backplane over cryptographically secure
channels. The SDN architecture has been used for a variety of network-centric op-
timizations, including management and control of the network fabric (Benson et al.,
2011; Al-Fares et al., 2010; Hoelzle, 2012; Niranjan Mysore et al., 2009; Das et al.,
2010; Vestin et al., 2013; Kassler et al., 2012; Trinh et al., 2013), network security
enforcement (Braga et al., 2010; Porras et al., 2012; Shin & Gu, 2012; Shin et al.,
2013; Stabler et al., 2012; Jafarian et al., 2012), and network virtualization (Sherwood
et al., 2009; Gutz et al., 2012; Sherwood et al., 2010; Matias et al., 2011). The risk
associated with programmatic networks, of course, is that software bugs in the (often
Turing-Complete) controller can lead to unexpected and hard-to-reproduce network
2configuration errors. To support these efforts, tools designed to enforce the absence
of bugs via provably correct network programming languages (Foster et al., 2011;
Voellmy et al., 2012, 2010; Reitblatt et al., 2013; Katta et al., 2012) and on-the-fly
invariant checking (Khurshid et al., 2012; Kazemian et al., 2013) have been devel-
oped. A complementary tool suite designed around network simulation Lantz et al.
(2010), debugging (Handigol et al., 2012), and model checking (Canini et al., 2012)
is available for SDNs not amenable to specification in a provably correct language,
or for properties not enforced by those languages’ compilers.
Unfortunately, these tools are not applicable to the two increasingly-common
SDN use-cases considered in this thesis: SDN-Enabled applications and SDNs in-
tegrated into cyber-physical systems. In both cases, the root cause of this incom-
patibility stems from these tools’ treatment of the SDN in isolation, that is, as a
single system with specific, well-defined and unchanging input/output channels. In
both cases this assumption does not hold: the SDN is a single component in a larger
system with many scenario-specific inputs and outputs (e.g. an API provided by the
controller), and the correctness of properties to be checked cannot be defined with
respect to the SDN alone. We will first describe the two cases, and then consider in
more detail what challenges they pose to detecting and eliminating bugs.
SDN-Enabled Applications Software-Defined Networking has not remained only in
the realm network administrators and researchers. The notion of a programmatic
network has extended to networked applications and distributed systems, including
Hadoop optimization (Narayan et al., 2012), server load balancing (Wang et al.,
2011), web server traffic management (Handigol et al., 2009), and VM Migration
(Pisa et al., 2010). In these systems, the application layer is given access to network
layer monitoring and control semantics via communication with the SDN controller.
This notion of a composed network and application layer has recently coalesced into
3the more general notion of SDN-Enabled Applications, in which the network is treated
as another programmable resource for use by the application layer. This is facilitated
by abstraction layers like PANE (Ferguson et al., 2013) and the OpenDaylight stack
(OpenDaylight, 2013), which provide an API to layers above them for network pro-
gramming and monitoring. API calls can be made to reserve future bandwidth,
isolate network flows, route with respect to a particular policy, etc.
From the perspective of a cloud provider, supporting SDN-Enabled applications
(even internally for use by administrators, or in a private cloud) presents both op-
portunities and risks. On the one hand, integration of application logic with network
control can provide substantially more efficient resource management, as well as im-
prove the performance of customers’ (or one’s own) applications. The risk, however,
is an increased opportunity for software bugs to impact network configuration: bugs
may now be present not only in the controller, but in any applications using the API.
Obviously, these application-specific bugs are outside the scope of tools designed to
check for SDN-specific controller problems. Furthermore, the ability to provide such
an API is itself outside the scope of languages which enforce the absence of bugs in
the controller. Thus, even providing an API at all may require the controller to be
written in a less safe, but more expressive language that cannot guarantee bug-free
networks.
From the perspective of an application developer, SDN-Enabled applications
offer another resource dimension along which performance may be optimized. Band-
width can be reserved ahead of time for predictable but delay-intolerant workloads,
or security policies can be enforced before packets ever reach the host (Ferguson
et al., 2013). The associated risk, of course, is that the application developers may
not be experts in network management. This can lead to faulty program logic which
performs worse than simply leaving network management to the network layer, and
4may be difficult to debug since the faulty state resides on network switches outside
the view of program debuggers.
SDNs for CPS SDNs are also moving into the domain of networked cyber-physical
systems (CPS). (Skowyra et al., 2013b; Sydney, 2013; Qin et al., 2014). Traditionally,
CPS have been small systems that are tailor-made to a specific application domain
which, once constructed, changes little over time (e.g. train switching systems, traf-
fic light controllers, physical access control, SCADA systems, etc.). Because of their
relatively static nature and small scale, issues which must be addressed in traditional
networked systems, such as scalability of control and management algorithms, con-
sistent network state, and dynamic changes in scale and topology, have not been
prioritized in CPS deployments.
While this remains true for small and isolated systems, the push for smart elec-
trical grid technologies require large-scale, adaptive, and programmatic infrastructure
to provide the necessary monitoring and control functionality (Farhangi, 2010) . A
critical component of smart grids is an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), a
grid-spanning communications network which automatically provides real-time mon-
itoring data to utilities about energy usage at a distribution end point (e.g. a home
or factory) while also acting as a control plane for those utilities to deploy energy
management policies (e.g. power provisioning or capping). Core AMI functionality
includes the “ability of the AMI to self-register meter points”, and the “ability of
the AMI to reconfigure due to a failure in communications” (Hart, 2008). A strong
contender for AMI implementation are IP networks over existing infrastructures (e.g.
ADSL, WiMAX, or cellular broadband) using existing telecommunications protocols
(e.g. the Session Initiation Protocol) (Wang & Leung, 2011). This grid-wide IP net-
work of dynamically scaling, self-healing monitoring and control links is a far cry
from traditional small-scale, static CPS deployments, and can benefit from exactly
5the kind of programmatic network automation that SDNs provide. In addition to
AMI, (Laverty et al., 2010) discusses the need for a backhaul control network between
utility control points and distribution points in order to govern flow of power both to
and from end-points, due to the rising popularity of distributed and local generation
(e.g. rooftop solar, co-generation, and backyard wind power). This network must
use existing infrastructures to “accommodate rapid growth alongside demand for
throughput and real-time performance” across a large geographic area, which again
requires scalable, self-configuring infrastructure.
Of course, integration of SDN into cyber-physical systems is not without
risk. Software bugs in this context can not only cause network downtime or mis-
configuration, but may have substantial economic and safety impacts (e.g. power
outages, equipment failure or damage from surges or underflows etc.). Furthermore,
real-time demands on network latency and routing must be taken into account. Any
controllers operating an SDN integrated into smart grid systems must not only be
error-free, but capable of guaranteeing that packet loss and delay are within rigor-
ously defined boundaries for all possible system states. Checking that this kind of
guarantee holds often requires advanced logics (e.g. PCTL*, see Section 5.1) that are
not supported by existing SDN verification tools. To furthermore complicate mat-
ters, CPS must often up-hold system-wide guarantees that do not easily decompose
into requirements over individual components which can be checked in isolation (e.g.
requirements based on feedback loops between sub-systems). When the SDN is such
a component, guaranteeing (via the tools mentioned above) that network-specific
properties hold may be a necessary step, but it is not a sufficient one.
61.2 Challenges
Software-Defined Networks can enable applications to manage their own net-
work needs and enable cyber-physical systems to gracefully scale and adapt to chang-
ing network conditions. Unfortunately, SDNs also introduce risk in these systems
(which we will refer to from here on as SDN-Enabled) in the form of software bugs
which can impact system performance and correctness.
Interactive Control Plane In SDN-Enabled systems, the controller may be interacted
with by other system components via channels other than dataplane packets (via,
e.g. an API). This poses a challenge for existing SDN-verification tools, many of
which are predicated on the assumption that the network is an isolated entity with
well-defined, unchanging interfaces to the outside world. For example, the SDN pro-
gramming languages Frenetic (Foster et al., 2011) and FatTire (Reitblatt et al., 2013)
provide compile-time guarantees about controller composition and fault-tolerance,
respectively. Unfortunately, both are defined over a model in which the controller
receives input only from the data plane and not from out-of-band events like an
API call from an application. This prevents controllers which can be interacted
with from being written in such languages and necessitates the use of more general-
purpose SDN programming languages like NOX (Gude et al., 2008) or Floodlight
(Floodlight, 2013). Tools for analyzing controllers written in these more expressive
languages, such as the NICE model checker (Canini et al., 2012) or the ndb network
debugger (Mai et al., 2011) must cope with a related problem, in which state data
that impacts possible controller execution paths resides not in the network (which is
visible) but in the applications using the API (which are not). In the case of model
checking, this can impact soundness: a bug may be found in the model which does
not exist in the application, as the necessary execution path relies on a sequence of
API calls that will never actually be made.
7Monolithic Verification Interactive control planes create a need for whole-system veri-
fication, in which each component of the system is included in the model and require-
ments are defined over both individual components and the system as a whole. Tools
built for verification of arbitrary software systems can meet this need (see Section 6.1
for an overview), but have been utilized mainly in the verification of designs for tra-
ditional cyber-physical systems (e.g. gearbox controllers (Lindahl et al., 1998), flood
control algorithms (Kars, 1996), avionics (Garavel & Hautbois, 1993)) or the proto-
cols used by hardware systems to communicate (e.g. SIP (Zave, 2008), IEEE 802.3
(Hartmanns & Hermanns, 2009), IEEE 1394 (Kwiatkowska et al., 2003)). Perhaps
because the system being modeled is often tailor-made and largely static in structure
once deployed, the modeling languages provided by these verification platforms are
best suited to a monolithic approach for creating one-off (i.e. non-reusable) models.
This approach is infeasible when applied to SDN-Enabled systems for four rea-
sons. First, such systems necessarily span domains of expertise. The application-layer
components (e.g. the AMI, Hadoop, or a host-level IDS) have a semantics and spec-
ification which draw on different fields of knowledge than the networking expertise
required to design and implement an SDN, for example. A monolithic model has no
mechanism to separate these concerns, leading to a situation where the modeler must
either be an expert in all aspects of the system, or risk introducing errors due to a lack
of understanding of component semantics. Second, SDN-Enabled systems often con-
tain incomplete specifications or background assumptions that must be taken into
account. For example, a replication component provided as Software-as-a-Service
may offer a guarantee about consistent replicas, but have an unknown implementa-
tion. Similarly, a transport layer may ensure that all packets are eventually delivered
without needed to be explicitly modeled. These assumptions or invariant behaviors
are impossible to capture in existing monolithic tools, which focus on a model of
8what can happen and a set of requirements about what should (not) happen. Third,
SDNs contain a variety of standardized components such as programmable switches.
Monolithic approaches provide no facility for re-usable models, however, essentially
requiring that each model be implemented from scratch even it overlaps substantially
with previous models 1. Models of switches should be re-usable across system mod-
els and not require manual re-implementation, nor should changing, e.g. the version
of specification supported by a switch require changes to other model components
(unless the new specification modified the protocol itself). Finally, SDNs contain sig-
nificant state with respect to switches, packets, and the orderings over them (Canini
et al., 2012). General tools are subject to state-space explosion, in which the space
of possible system states scales exponentially with the number of bits in its state
vector (see Section 5.1). Without some facility for pruning the search space based
on domain-specific knowledge, verification is going to be intractable.
Need for Multiple Calculi SDN-enabled systems, especially those integrated with
CPS, have requirements spanning multiple domains: concurrency properties (no
deadlocks), reachability properties (no forwarding loops), continuous-time proper-
ties (packet loss rate and delay), linear-time properties (liveness), etc.. In order to
automatically check whether these properties hold, it is necessary to encode them
in a formal logic which the verifier is capable of checking. Unfortunately, the ma-
jority of verification tools both specific to SDNs and intended for general software
verification support only a small set of such calculi (see Section 6.1 for a specific
breakdown by tool). It is infeasible to write n models of the same system in order
to check requirements written in n logics, so any verifier for SDN-Enabled systems
must support, in an extensible way, multiple logical calculi.
1This is not to say that reusable components are impossible to write in existing tools. Doing so,
however, often goes against standard design techniques for models in that language (e.g. heavy use
of global variables).
9Causes The problems discussed above are a byproduct of the fact that SDN-Enabled
systems (and the verification thereof) are in a unique space. They are not purely
network-centric (as demonstrated in the first challenge), but they do share common
structures across models (e.g. as compared to a gearbox controller vs. an avionics
system). As there remain system components whose structure is unpredictable, e.g.
application layer software, a general-purpose language is needed to model the system.
However, leveraging common model structures could be used to make more accessible
modeling environments and more efficient verification strategies, but it is not clear
how to add this domain-specific information to general-purpose tools.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
This thesis addresses these problems by presenting Verificare, a general-purpose
modeling and verification platform which can be augmented with domain-specific
information. Verificare provides, in contrast to the monolithic approach, a compo-
sitional modeling framework for agile verification, which provides capabilities that
are infeasible or impossible using monolithic tools. These capabilities are especially
applicable to SDN-Enabled systems, which can be naturally represented as systems
of interacting components. In addition to the modeling framework itself, Verificare
provides a tool chain for agile verification of real-world systems. It consists of lan-
guage for writing compositional models, a compiler from models in this language to
a minimal, calculus-oblivious formalism, and an extensible translation API for writ-
ing plugins from the formalism to models in the language of off-the-shelf verification
tools.
Verificare is intended to be used by network administrators and system designers
who are utilizing an SDN as an interactive component of a larger distributed system.
These could range from smart grid designers verifying properties of AMI networks or
10
backhaul control networks, cloud providers offering an SDN control API to customers,
or by a network administrator attempting to integrate an SDN into a larger system
for domain-specific optimizations, such as Big Data or High Performance Computing.
1.3.1 Compositional Modeling and Agile Verification
The Technique We present a new compositional approach to the modeling and
verification of systems, which provides capabilities not present in monolithic model-
ing. In this paradigm, a system is modeled as a composition of agents and environ-
ments. The former are active processes, while the latter are stateful communications
channels that are used by agents to communicate with the rest of the system. In-
teraction is restricted: agents may communicate with the system only via atomic
message passing with certain environments. Environments are passive, define a set
of messages which they can carry, and change state only when acted upon by agents.
There are no shared variables, no global variables, or any other system state which
is independent of its components. Furthermore, interaction is nondeterministic: be-
cause the system is a black-box from the perspective of each component (agents and
environments), any communication must consider all possible messages.
After all components are defined, a larger system is modeled by defining an
architecture, or topology, of interaction by specifying which agents share which en-
vironments. This fixes control and data flow, since all interaction occurs via agents
updating the state of environments. Finally, adaptive invariants, or assumptions,
are added as constraints over possible states of the system by restricting variable
valuations. Note that these do not add any new variables or other global state: they
merely restrict possible values of existing variables. While this approach is likely intu-
itive and familiar for those with an object-oriented background, it provides powerful
properties for building new tools for modeling and verification.
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The Benefits A key benefit of a compositional approach, which is infeasible in any
monolithic system, is that new system components can be added, or existing ones
removed, at any time without changing anything but the system configuration (i.e.
the number of components and their topology). This kind of flexibility is critical
when, e.g., servers may be added or removed from a SDN-Enabled system. Mono-
lithic approaches require substantial updates throughout the entire model, making
even simple architectural changes tedious and error-prone. On a larger scope, it also
allows existing models (i.e. topologies of agents sharing environments) to be com-
posed with one another, so long as each system has at least one agent which can
share an environment with the other. Compositionality also enables separation of
concerns. Individual model components can be defined by domain experts qualified
to do so in isolation of the rest of the system (which is treated as a black box). These
experts need not know anything about the larger system, other than the interfaces
that the component interacts with (i.e. the environments it uses). Once all com-
ponents have been defined by their respective experts, the system can be composed
simply by specifying which agents share an environment.
The distinction between agents and environments is not only useful for speci-
fying models, but also for verifying them. Composition of two agents over a shared
environment can only restrict (or leave unchanged) the set of possible interactions:
it cannot introduce the possibility of new message types. This, combined with the
fact that agents and environments interact atomically, allows us to establish an upper
bound on reachable model states (and thus on verification time) which is independent
of any complexity added by environments. This kind of structural optimization is
impossible in monolithic approaches, which have no awareness of modeling semantics.
Finally, adaptive invariants introduce a capability not provided by any existing
monolithic tools: the ability to introduce constraints on reachable system states.
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This is very different from introducing requirements, whose truth is being checked
and a counter-example to which halts verification and is reported to the user. The
truth of an adaptive invariant is definitional: if a counter-example is found, the state
containing that counter-example is simply not explored and verification continues
along other paths. Thus, adaptive invariants limit the reachable state space to only
those states where they are true. This provides a powerful tool: the implementation
of components which provide a guarantee (e.g. a transport layer) can be abstracted
away into an adaptive invariant encoding the guarantee they provide, assumptions
can be made in the face of incomplete information (e.g. that replication is consistent,
or more generally that a relationship always holds between certain variables), and
system requirements can be discovered by progressively tightening constraints until
no counter-examples to requirements are found.
These benefits can be combined into a new paradigm of agile verification, in
which system models are verified incrementally as part of the development cycle.
Separation of concerns allows experts to concentrate on the components they under-
stand. Networking experts can develop the SDN controller, using adaptive invariants
to represent services provided by other components. Simultaneously, application-
layer experts can take the same approach when developing their SDN-enabled appli-
cation. Adding or removing adaptive invariants can be used to abstract components
into the guarantees they provide, or to change the assumptions about the behavior of
system components. Furthermore, components can be added, removed, or changed
with minimal modifications to the system model. They may even be reused across
models, allowing, for example, an SDN switch to be modeled once and reused many
times. Invariants and requirements also benefit: by quantifying over a reusable com-
ponent, they may be written by an expert in that domain and reused in future models
even when that expert is not available.
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Fig. 1.1: Verificare Architecture
1.3.2 Verificare Platform
Figure 1.1 presents the software architecture of Verificare. As can be seen, our
system consists of three components: the Verificare Modeling Language (VML), a
compiler from VML to an intermediate representation, and a translator from the IR
to an extensible suite of existing off-the-shelf verification tools.
The Verificare Modeling Language (VML) is based on two core concepts: non-
deterministic concurrent agents (e.g. stateful processes) interacting via nondetermin-
istic passive environments (e.g. queues, mailboxes, stacks, etc.), and separation of
specification from implementation. The former concept drives the language’s seman-
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tics of interaction, while the latter drives its syntax for specifying interaction. A
VML model consists of a list of component definitions and a system configuration.
Components may be either agents, which are stateful, asynchronous processes that
interact with each other by modifying a shared environment, or environments, which
are passive data-structures that mediate agent interactions 2. The mapping of spe-
cific agents to specific environments defines which components can interact (e.g. two
agents sharing a queue), and is given in the system configuration. Agents initiate
interactions (e.g. sending a packet) by invoking a transformation rule in their envi-
ronment. Because the binding of agents to environments may change over different
model iterations, Verificare uses interface-like constructs called signatures to sepa-
rate the specification of an environment (i.e. its transformation rules and associated
typings) from the specific component definition implementing that specification. Be-
cause of this separation, individual model components (e.g. AMI end-hosts and the
SDN controller) can be developed and verified in isolation by domain experts, as
long as the environment interfaces are agreed upon ahead of time. This also enables
model components (e.g. OpenFlow switches) to be re-used across models, and for a
library of common sub-components to be built up over time.
The Verificare Compiler translates each component into a Labeled Transition
System (LTS), which is a graphical structure that represents model states as nodes
and the transitions between them as edges. These are composed into a single,
whole-system model using the mapping defined by the user in the system config-
uration. Users may additionally specify adaptive invariants as a first-order formula
over system-wide state variables. The compiler interprets the formula as a constraint
on system behavior, as opposed to an assertion about that behavior. If a particular
system behavior (state change) would violate an adaptive invariant , that behavior
2Environments serve a similar role to channel systems in processes-algebraic verification systems,
but are user-defined rather than being limited to FIFO queues
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is not modeled. This allows users to prune the reachable portions of the state space,
and enables incremental model development. For example, if a model of a transport
layer which ensures no packets are dropped due to queue overflows is verified inde-
pendently (or is not yet developed), it could be replaced with an adaptive invariant
stating that no queue is ever full. Similarly, requirements could be refined or discov-
ered by beginning with a very loose adaptive invariant (e.g. in a mobile network, any
number of end-points may share an access point) and tightening it over time until
no counter-examples to requirements (e.g. with respect to packet loss) are generated
(e.g. no more than half the nodes can share an access point).
Finally, the Verificare Translator provides a standardized API with which to
access the transition system generated by the compiler. This API can be used by
plugins from off-the-shelf verification tools (see Section 6.1 for examples) which sup-
port checking for a specific requirement calculus. Plugins can also register annotation
syntaxes that can be used by model developers to label control flow transitions in
a VML model. These annotations are treated by Verificare as uninterpreted strings
attached to edges in the LTS. The plugin can use these annotations for logic-specific
semantics, such as transition rates and probabilities in probabilistic logics. We have
already written plugins for SPIN and PRISM, model checkers which support checking
of requirements written in the LTL and PCTL* logics, respectively.
1.3.3 Application to SDN-Enabled Systems
We argue that Verificare’s compositional approach, combined with its calculus-
oblivious translator, make it very well-suited to verification of SDN-Enabled systems.
Agents and environments map naturally to the setting: end hosts, switches, con-
trollers, etc. are clearly agents, and interaction is well-defined as communication via
network queues, APIs, and other environments. The lack of global variables is not
a problem, and VML is expressive enough to capture arbitrary software processes,
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unlike SDN-specific tools. The separation of concerns afforded by compositional mod-
eling can be used to define networking components in isolation of the larger system,
and vice versa, which is critical due to the variety of applications that might be SDN-
Enabled (CPS, high-performance computing, etc.). Adaptive invariants can capture
properties provided by services which are not explicitly modeled but assumed to be
present, such as SaaS components, software stack layers, or physical limitations on
system components. Finally, the compilation of VML to a calculus-oblivious formal-
ism ensures that the widely differing requirements that each component might have
can still be captured in a single formal model, and automatically translated to the
necessary back-end verifiers.
This close fit between SDN-Enabled systems and compositional modeling with
Verificare makes it a much more suitable platform than monolithic verification tools.
Not only are the system models easier to write and more extensible, but the ver-
ification process is itself optimized with adaptive invariants and the use of known
agent/environment structure. Both of these are impossible to capture with existing
tools, leading to state spaces which may be both too large and unsound.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis presents a detailed description of Verificare’s mod-
eling language, compilation process, and translation framework.
Chapter 2 discusses how Labeled Transition Systems (LTS) can be used to model
interaction, and presents an assembly language for writing LTS using higher-level
operators and control flow instructions. This language is used as an intermediate
representation by the Verificare compiler, but can also be used independently to
programmatically generate LTS.
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Chapter 3 presents the Verificare Modeling Language (VML), which uses object-
oriented modeling techniques to enable composable, re-usable models. Models are de-
fined as topologies of sub-components, where links in the topology are between asyn-
chronous agents and passive environments. This approach enables sub-components
to be developed in parallel by experts in the domain of the sub-component (e.g. AMI
experts writing end-host agents and networking experts writing the SDN controller).
Because internal component state is treated as a black-box and interfaces between
components are well-defined, components may be written once and re-used across
future models. This is especially useful for SDN-Enabled Systems, which all share
common SDN sub-components such as OpenFlow Switches.
Chapter 4 presents the Verificare Compiler, which transforms the high-level
VML model into a finite transition system. LTS edge semantics are used to compose
individual components with one another during compilation, but the end result has
only uninterpreted, verifier-specific annotations as edge-labels. If annotations are
ignored (as they will be by any tool which does not support their semantics), the
transition system can be translated into any formalism at least as expressible as
Boolean logic Baier et al. (2008).
Chapter 5 discusses several common specification calculi and the current model-
checking techniques which allow for their verification. It then presents our calculus-
oblivious translation framework. This tool provides an API and supporting data
structures for automatically converting the output of the Verificare compiler to a
model in the input language of a tool which supports one or more specification
calculi. The API hides the exact format of the compiler output from verification
plugins, ensuring that compiler-specific changes will not require re-implementation
of any plugins. These plugins may also provide support for annotations which can
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be used in model development to tag control flow transitions with verifier-specific
semantics, such as probabilities or acceptance conditions.
Chapter 6 provides a taxonomy of existing formal verification tools across dimen-
sions of domain-awareness, extensibility, modularity, support for incremental model
development, and obliviousness to the requirement calculus being used. It also com-
pares and contrasts Verificare to these related tools, and outlines the context of our
work in the larger space.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and presents directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Modeling Interaction
2.1 Labeled Transition Systems
Interaction between two (or more) processes is an inherently dynamic process in
terms of both local space and global time. Whatever form it takes (e.g. message pass-
ing, modification of a shared medium, etc.), interaction is characterized spatially by
a local state transition, in which the assignment of values to a process’ local variables
changes from a pre-interaction state to a post-interaction state. The exact semantics
of the transition will depend on the interaction. For example, a counter which tracks
the number of times a button is pressed may change only a single variable, while
a programmable network switch may substantially alter its entire local memory if
new rules are installed. These local state transitions effectively capture the effect of
an interaction: its impact on the process given the state of that process when the
interaction occurred. Interaction is also characterized by synchronization in global
time, in which local state transitions occur with a particular ordering. These may
be fully asynchronous (i.e. all processes are completely parallel), fully synchronous
(in which all local transitions occur in lockstep), or a combination thereof. Temporal
synchronization captures the cause of an interaction: the semantic meaning which
defines why the interaction occurred, and what relationship should exist between
the local state transitions of each interacting process. For example, a model with
two processes communicating via a shared state variable might consider their asyn-
chronous composition, in which all possible interleavings of all process executions
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are considered. Alternatively, a ‘setter’ and ‘checker’ process might be composed
synchronously, such that every time the former sets the value of a shared variable,
the latter simultaneously checks to make sure that value satisfies some requirement.
In order to model and automatically reason about interaction, it is necessary to
choose a formalism which mathematically captures the model specification and the
dynamics of interaction. Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs) are a standard mech-
anism for modeling interacting processes, and are highly expressive. Furthermore,
LTS are structurally supported by a wide variety of formal verification tools includ-
ing SPIN (Holzmann, 2005), PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011a), CADP (Garavel
et al., 2011), NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 2002), UPPAL (Behrmann et al., 2006), and
SAL (De Moura et al., 2004) 1. A LTS is a Kripke structure (Kripke, 1963) (that
is, a directed graph of labeled nodes) augmented with edge labels. In a LTS, states
correspond to snapshots of process variables, directed edges between states represent
transitions from a pre-state to a post-state, and labels on those edges denote se-
mantics associated with a transition (e.g. program input, timer expiration, message
forwarding, etc.). Formally:
Definition 1. A Labeled Transition System M is the 5-tuple (S, i, F, A, T ) where S
is the set of states, i ∈ S is an initial state, F is a (possibly empty) set of final states,
A is a set of edge labels, and T ⊆ S × A → S is a transition relation mapping a
pre-state and edge label to a post-state.
The unordered set of states S captures the statespace of the model, that is, all
possible combinations of variable valuations. States in an LTS represent a snapshot of
all mutable system variables (e.g. the instruction pointer and memory in a program,
the color of a traffic light, the mapping of packets to queues in a network, etc.).
1Much of the expressive power in Labeled Transition Systems comes from the semantics of edge
labels. All of these tools support different (though partially overlapping) semantics, but Verificare’s
semantics are simple enough to enable translation to all of these verifiers. See Section 5.3 for
specifics
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Given a set of possible values for each variable V0, ..., Vn, the statespace is defined as
the Cartesian product of these sets: S = V0× ...× Vn. The initial state i is the state
in S where process execution begins, and F is a set of terminal states that represent
‘correct’ terminating behavior. Note that F may be empty, which indicates that any
termination should be considered an error. A webserver, for example, should never
stop handling requests and terminate. The label set A contains all valid labels which
may be applied to edges. The semantics of these labels may be arbitrarily complex, to
the point that many formal languages have been developed around different labeling
semantics (e.g. process calculi). This complexity arises from the use of labels in
composing multiple LTS and from verifying requirements over the reachable states
of an LTS, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, the transition
function T maps labeled edges to states, and captures the valid execution path of
a process being modeled. Note that, depending on the semantics associated with
edge labels, a LTS with one or more states that have more than one possible post-
state may behave probabilistically or non-deterministically. In general, deterministic
behavior can be guaranteed only if ∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ A, |T (s, a)| < 2.
This work considers only LTS which have finite sets of states and actions. Ver-
ification of infinite-state systems is in general undecidable without using interactive
theorem-proving methods (Bertot & Caste´ran, 2004; Paulson & Wenzel, 2002) or by
reducing the infinite state space to a finite set of equivalence classes (e.g. via abstract
interpretation (Cousot & Cousot, 1977) or manual analysis).
Figure 2.1 presents a simple system of two LTS, each of which has a sin-
gle variable in its state space. The formal definition for the top process is T =
(S, i, F, A, T ) where S = {x0, x1, x2}, i = x0, F = ∅, A = {(inc, x), (dec, x)}, and
T = {(x0, ((inc, x), x1), (x1, ((inc, x), x2), (x2, ((dec, x), x1), (x1, ((dec, x), x0)}, where
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Fig. 2.1: Two Simple Labeled Transition Systems
xn denotes the value n assigned to the variable x. The bottom process is defined
similarly.
Note that this system consists of two independent LTS, neither of which interact
directly with the other. In order to formally reason about the system as a whole, it
is necessary to compose these individual processes into a single unified LTS.
2.2 Composing Labeled Transition Systems
As discussed previously, interaction is characterized by local state transitions
and global temporal synchronization. Composition of LTS fixes both a spatial or-
dering over local transitions (that is, constrains each LTS’ transition relation) and
a temporal ordering over the sequence of process executions (that is, constrains the
concurrency of the global transition relation). Note that this ordering is not guar-
anteed to be safe with respect to any model-specific semantics (e.g. message receipt
may precede message transmission) unless the composition function explicitly refer-
ences them. Together, these two dynamics determine the valid subset of all possible
states that the composed model can be in. In this way, composition of LTS defines
their interaction.
We now present the four LTS composition operators which are commonly used
in modeling interacting processes. Three of these are generic, in that no model
semantics are required to compose the LTS (specifically, the definition of T does not
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quantify over A). As will be shown in the fourth operator, these can be combined
with one another to derive more advanced operators that work over scenario-specific
composition semantics.
Cartesian Product The least restricted form of temporal composition is the
Cartesian product:
Definition 2. L = Cart(N0, N1) where:
• S = N0.S ×N1.S, I = N0.I ×N1.I, F = N0.F ×N.F , A = N0.A×N1.A
• T = {(x0x1, a0a1, y0y1)|a ∈ A ∧ ∃i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(xi, ai, yi) ∈ Ni.T}
In this notation (x0x1, a0a1, y0y1) represents, for the composed LTS, the individ-
ual pre- and post- states x0, y0 ∈ N0.S and x1, y1 ∈ N1.S, and the individual labels
a0 ∈ N0.A and a1 ∈ N1.A. Dot notation is used to represent a sub-component of a
formal structure, e.g. N0.T denotes the transition relation T of LTS N0.
The Cartesian product represents all possible combinations of model states and
transitions, and is the most unrestricted form of composition in that all transition
dynamics are possible. Transitions may happen in any order and with any degree
of simultaneity. This is apparent in the definition of T : a tuple (x0x1, a0a1, y0y1) is
in T if either component tuple is in its respective LTS (asynchrony), or if both are
(synchrony): ∃i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(xi, ai, yi) ∈ Ni.T . The Cartesian product is is rarely
representative of real-world system, and is unlikely to preserve correctness except for
fully parallel systems which run independently of one another. In any system based
on communicating processes, the fact that two component LTS may transition both
simultaneously (i.e. in synchrony) or concurrently (i.e. in asynchrony) for any
interaction makes the semantics of interaction extremely challenging to define.
Asynchronous Product Rather than considering all possible transitions of the
component LTS, an operator can be defined to create a system which represents
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Fig. 2.2: Asynchronous Product of Two Labeled Transition Systems
all possible interleavings (i.e. non-simultaneous transitions) of component process
execution. This is the asynchronous product, which is defined as:
Definition 3. L = async(N0, N1) where:
• S = N0.S ×N1.S, I = N0.I ×N1.I, F = N0.F ×N.F , A = N0.A ∪N1.A
• T = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|a ∈ A∧ ∃i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(x0, a, y0) ∈ Ni.T ∧ ∀j(0 ≤ j ≤ 1)j 6=
i→ xj ≡ yj}
The asynchronous product is a restriction of the Cartesian product that con-
strains the transition relation to transitions in which only a single component process
changes state. This is apparent from the definition of T : there must exist a compo-
nent LTS that changes state (∃i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(x0, a, y0) ∈ Ni.T ), while the pre-state and
post-state of all other components remains the same (∀j(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)j 6= i→ xj ≡ yj).
This effectively models all interleavings of the executions of the component processes.
Figure 2.2 presents the asynchronous product of the two simple LTS from Fig-
ure 2.1. Note that at every transition, only a single state variable changes. The
state space is the Cartesian product of the individual statespaces, but edge labels
are drawn from the set union of the component label sets. This is because the asyn-
chronous product models interleavings in which only a single component changes
state per transition, as opposed to synchronization in which multiple components
change state simultaneously. All states that were reachable in their component LTS
remain reachable in the asynchronous product.
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Fig. 2.3: Shared-Variable LTS
Fig. 2.4: Shared-Variable Communication
So far, composition has created a new LTS but not provided any channel for
interaction between its components. Shared-variable communication can be used to
model communication between asynchronous LTS. Consider the two LTS presented
in Figure 2.3. Unlike in previous examples, each component LTS shares the state
variable x. Their asynchronous composition, depicted in Figure 2.4, ‘collapses’ all
edge labels which begin or end at a shared variable in a component onto the same
state in the composed LTS. Because each transition represents a single step by a
single component, shared-variable communication can be used to effectively model
concurrency in software and hardware systems. This technique has historically been
used to verify properties of mutual-exclusion systems, shared-memory systems, and
synchronization primitives (Holzmann, 2005; PRISM, 2013).
Synchronous Product Two LTS can also be composed such that each component
moves in lockstep. This is the synchronous product, defined as:
Definition 4. L = sync(N0, N1) where:
• S = N0.S ×N1.S, I = N0.I ×N1.I, F = N0.F ×N.F , A = N0.A×N1.A
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Fig. 2.5: Synchronous Product
• T = {(x0x1, a0a1, y0y1)|a0a1 ∈ A ∧ ∀i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(xi, ai, yi) ∈ Ni.T}
Figure 2.5 presents this graphically with respect to the basic system defined in
Figure 2.1. Simultaneous transitions of component LTS are enforced by universal
quantification over all components in the definition of T : ∀i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(xi, ai, yi) ∈
Ni.T . Note that xi and yi may be equivalent, if there is a self-loop for state xi (i.e.
xi, ai, xi ∈ Ni.T ). States which were reachable in the component LTS’ may not be
reachable in the composed LTS. Specifically, those which are reachable only if one
(or more) LTS do not transition in synchrony are no longer considered to be valid
states. Note that simultaneous transitions also require the set of action labels A to
be the Cartesian product of the component sets, as opposed to the union as was used
in the asynchronous product.
Interactions between LTS via synchronous products can also use shared variables
to communicate, though a simultaneous write to a shared variable is undefined.
Synchronous products cab be used to model systems in which one process writes to a
shared variable, and one or more others read that variable as it is written. In SPIN,
for example, this operation is used to compose an LTS representing an invariant (e.g.
a formula in Linear Temporal Logic) and an LTS representing a system being verified
with respect to that invariant (Holzmann, 2005). A transition in the composed system
exists only if both the writing LTS and the checking LTS can transition. This creates
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an equivalence between deadlocks (i.e. the lack of an outgoing state in the composed
system) and counter-examples to invariants (Somenzi & Bloem, 2000).
Synchronous Message Passing Asynchronous and synchronous composition can
be combined to model interaction as synchronization, in which two or more compo-
nent LTS transition in synchrony to model the exchange of a message. This is also
referred to as handshaking or partial synchronization, and is defined formally:
Definition 5. L = psync(N0, N1, R) where R is a set of actions to synchronize on
and:
• S = N0.S ×N1.S, I = N0.I ×N1.I, F = N0.F ×N.F , A = N0.A ∪N1.A
• T = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|a ∈ A ∧ a ∈ R ∧ C1 ∨ (a /∈ R ∧ C2)
• C1 = ∀i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(xi, a, yi) ∈ Ni.T )
• C2 = ∃i(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)(x0, a, y0) ∈ Ni.T ∧ ∀j(0 ≤ i ≤ 1)j 6= i→ xj ≡ yj
The definition of T can be read as conditioning the choice of composition oper-
ator on membership of an action label in the set R. If both component LTS have an
outgoing edge labeled with an a ∈ R, they synchronously transition to their respec-
tive post-states. Otherwise their execution is interleaved, and only one transitions.
Informally, this composition operator is used to model message passing because it
temporally synchronizes message receipt with message transmission: a correct pro-
cess model should not allow messages to be received which were never sent (i.e.
transitioning from a pre-receipt to post-receipt state) or for messages that are sent
but never received 2.
Figure 2.6 presents two LTS which model communicating processes. They share
the labels (m,A,B) and (m,B,A), intended to represent a message being sent from
one process to another. These will be the set of labels R over which they compose
2This is not to say that message dropping cannot be modeled for systems in which that makes
sense. Only that the composition operation isn’t the place to do so.
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Fig. 2.6: Message Passing LTS
synchronously. Each LTS also has a set of action labels restricted to it (foo, bar,
and baz. The top LTS (A) sends a message to B, and can then (depending on the
semantics of foo and bar transition between two states while awaiting a response.
When one is received, it transitions back to the initial state and begins again. The
bottom LTS, B, waits for a message to be received. It then transitions to a state from
which it may either respond and transition back, or stay in that state (depending on
the semantics of baz).
Composition using synchronous message passing is depicted in Figure 2.7. When
a label a ∈ R is used to transition, both A and B change state accordingly. This
effectively captures the temporal semantics of message passing, in that unsound
transitions (such as a message being received prior to its transmission) will not appear
in the composed model. When a label a /∈ R is transitioned over, component actions
are instead interleaved. This allows the composed model to capture all possible
orderings of individual component executions, except where those executions are
synchronized in time due to interaction. Note that synchronous message passing
can create disconnected components in the transition relation T . This is due to the
combination of asynchronous composition (which preserves all reachable states) and
synchronous composition (which preserves only those states which are reachable via
simultaneous transitions). Only the connected component which is reachable from
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Fig. 2.7: Synchronous Message Passing
the initial system state is considered valid with respect to the original system being
modeled.
2.3 A Language and Toolset for Constructing and Compos-
ing Labeled Transition Systems
While LTS are expressive and can capture many kinds of interactions, they are
also difficult to manually work with due to the large number of states and edges in any
non-trivial system. As a model of computing that is inherently concurrent, individual
high level actions (e.g. variable assignment) often result in multiple transitions being
generated in the underlying LTS.
In order to enable the modeling of non-trivial systems, we developed a language
for building LTS that model the two kinds of behavior in Verificare: concurrent
processes and passive data-structures. Internally, this language is used as an inter-
mediate form between VML and transition systems. While some of the language
elements are specific to our platform, the majority of operators are appropriate for
any application working with Labeled Transition Systems. We also provide a toolset
for extending the language with new operators, and composing LTS with one another
using the operators described in Section 2.1.
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2.3.1 Language Syntax and Semantics
Figure 2.8 presents the syntax for a simple Domain-Specific Language (DSL) de-
signed to enable the simple construction of composable LTS. Our implementation is
embedded in Haskell and based on a series of monadic combinators over instances of
the State monad. For specific implementation details, see our source code. Each in-
stance encapsulates a ‘type’ of LTS, along with its supporting datastructures (where
type refers to the kind of system that it is intended to model). Note that all LTS,
once constructed, share the same structure. The difference between LTS types is in
the edge semantics, provided combinators, and datastructures needed during con-
struction.
The first type of LTS, which is used to represent Agents in Verificare, models the
execution of a reactive (i.e. non-terminating, event-based) process with a distinct
control flow through a sequence of commands. In addition to local state, it maintains
an instruction pointer for each state tracking its position in the control flow. These
LTS may conditionally and non-deterministically branch, iterate over ranges of a
variable, and (deliberately) never terminate. The second type models a datastructure
which contains local state variables and method-like parameterized rules consisting
of pre- and post-conditions on local state, and an optional return value. These are
used to represent Environments in Verificare. These LTS do not have distinct control
flow, as they are not executable processes. Rather, their transition relation is defined
by the application at all states of all rules whose pre-condition holds in that state. At
the risk of overloading the term, we will refer to each of the LTS types as Agents and
Environments, respectively. Before continuing, it is important to note that language
this is not a notation for writing an LTS. Rather, it allows for writing programs
whose symbolic execution results in the incremental construction of an LTS. Thus,
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〈root〉 ::= *(〈decl〉〈eol〉) 〈block〉
〈decl〉 ::= ‘declare’ 〈var〉 〈type〉
〈block〉 ::= ‘(’ ‘do’ 〈eol〉 1*(〈stmt〉〈eol〉) ‘)’
〈stmt〉 ::= ‘assign’ 〈var〉 〈exp〉
| ‘annot’ 〈string〉
| ‘invoke’ *1(〈var〉 〈type〉) 〈string〉 ‘(’ *1〈exp list〉 ‘)’ *1〈value〉
| ‘invocable’ 〈string〉 ‘[’ *1〈par list〉 ‘]’ *1〈type〉
| ‘if ’ 〈exp〉 ‘$’ 〈block〉
| ‘for ’ 〈var〉 〈integer〉 〈integer〉 〈block〉
| ‘loop <block>’
| ‘select’ *1(〈exp〉 〈block〉)
| ‘try’ 〈var〉 〈type〉
〈exp〉 ::= 〈value〉 | 〈var〉 | 〈exp〉 〈binop〉 〈exp〉 | 〈uop〉 〈exp〉
〈binop〉 ::= ‘+’ | ‘-’ | ‘*’ | ‘<’ | ‘<=’ | ‘>’ | ‘>=’ | ‘==’ | ‘!=’ | ‘&&’ | ‘||’
〈uop〉 ::= ‘~’
〈exp list〉 ::= 〈exp〉 ‘,’ 〈exp list〉 | 〈exp〉
〈par list〉 ::= ‘(’〈var〉‘,’ 〈type〉‘)’ ‘,’ 〈par list〉 | ‘(’〈var〉‘,’ 〈type〉‘)’
〈type〉 ::= ‘TyInteger’ 〈DIGIT 〉
| ‘TyBoolean’
| ‘TyArray’ ‘[’ DIGIT *(‘,’ DIGIT) ‘]’ 〈DIGIT 〉
〈var〉 ::= 〈string〉
〈value〉 ::= 〈bool〉 | 〈integer〉 | 〈string〉 | 〈array〉
〈bool〉 ::= ‘true’ | ‘false’
〈array〉 ::= 1*〈integer〉 | 1*〈bool〉 | 1*〈array〉
Fig. 2.8: LTS Assembly Language Syntax
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the toolset provides a compilation environment whose output is an LTS and whose
input is a program written in the embedded DSL.
Common Structures Both kinds of LTS that our toolset includes share some
common data structures and functionality, including the representation of the LTS
itself. We use slightly different syntax for the formalism that in other chapters, but
have equivalent semantics. An LTS is defined as a tuple M = (S, i, E) where:
• S is a set states representing a unique assignment of values to local variables.
At minimum, for all local variables in the process each s ∈ S contains a pair
(n, v) where n is the variable’s name and v is its value in that state.
• i ∈ S is an initial state representing the initial value of all local variables
• E is a list of edges, where an edge (s ∈ S, l, s′ ∈ S) ∈ E connects a pre-state s
to a post-state s′, and l is a finite-length string encoding a label.
Note that in this notation, the standard transition relation T ⊂ S × A × S is
represented by the edge list E. The set of labels A is implicit to E, rather than an
independent set that is mapped over. This change in design is to facilitate automated
incremental construction of the LTS, via the gradual adding of edges after defining
an initial state space. Our toolset includes standard composition operators over this
representation, including the asynchronous and synchronous composition functions.
The toolset constructs an LTS incrementally and in two distinct stages: decla-
ration of variables (which defines the state space) and execution of commands (which
defines the list of edges). The former stage will eventually progress to the latter once
all variables are declared, but execution will never progress to a declaration stage.
This would represent adding a dimension to the state space once edges have already
been inserted, potentially violating both soundness of the model semantics and com-
33
pleteness due to the new disconnected elements of the state space. The basic context
used to encapsulate the construction of an LTS is defined as follows 3:
Definition 6. An LTS Builder is defined as the 3-tuple B = (T,M,X) where each
element is as defined below:
• T = [(String, Type) is a type environment mapping named variables to their
respective types. In Verificare, a variable type may be a boolean value, a
bounded integer, or a finite-length, n-dimensional array of either of these,
e.g.array<bool> foo[2][3]. See Chapter 3 for details on the datatypes sup-
ported by Verificare.
• M = (S, i, E) is the (initially empty) LTS under construction
• X ⊆ M.S is a set of currently executable states. Since non-determinism in
variable valuation and control branching may cause the system to be in many
possible states at a given execution depth, it is necessary to treat the current
system state as a set of states representing all valid paths originating at the
initial system state.
As previously mentioned, the language is implemented using monadic combi-
nators over instances of the State monad. This enables simple composition of one
monad (representing an LTS in some stage of construction) with another. In or-
der to focus on the issue of LTS creation from language elements, we will abstract
from the details of the State monad and monads in general. These constructions are
well-studied and covered in introductory literature, e.g. (O’Sullivan et al., 2008).
Note that, in keeping with the notion of monadic combinators, each statement
in our language is a monadic value which represents an LTS and associated context.
By applying these to one another (i.e. binding a series of monadic values) a program
3For clarity, datastructures not directly related to LTS construction are not included here.
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can be written. After the final statement is executed the LTS is considered to be
fully constructed, and the LTS can be safely extracted from the monad. For clarity,
we will explicitly address the current LTS builder instance using β. The current type
environment, for example, would be denoted β.T
Table 2.1: LTS Assembly Language
Operator Signature Effect
Shared
declare v t Variable → Type
→ LTSB
β.T = β.T ∪ {(v, t)}
annot s String →
LTSBuilder
X0::[State]
X0 = [incCtrl(x)|x ∈ β.X]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ {(x0, s, x1)|(x0, x1) ∈
zip(β.X,X0)}
β.X = X0
loop b AgentLTSB →
AgentLTSB
L0::LTS
L0 = β.M
X0::[State]
X0 = normCtrl(β.X)
β.X = X0
runBlock(b)
L1::LTS
L1 = β.M
if L0 6= L1:
loop b
select ebs [(Exp, AgentLTSB)]
→ AgentLTSB
T0::[([AgentLTSB], Block])
T0 = [([x|x ∈ β.X ∧ eval(e, x)], b)|(e, b) ∈ ebs]
X0::[State]
X0 = mapM(runBlock(b), T0
β.X = X0
Agent
assign v e Variable→ Exp→
AgentLTSB
V0::[Value]
V0 = [eval(e, s)|s ∈ β.X]
X0::[State]
X0 = [incCtrl(updState(v, w, x))|(w, x) ∈
zip(V0, β.X)]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ {(x0, τ, x1)|(x0, x1) ∈
zip(β.X,X0)}
β.X = X0
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invoke n p String → [Value]
→ Type
X0::[State]
X0 = [incCtrl(x)|x ∈ β.X]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ {(x0, (n, p), x1)|(x0, x1) ∈
zip(β.X,X0)}
β.X = X0
invoke v n p r Variable → Type
→ String →
[Value] → Type
T0::[Value]
T0 = allByType(r)
X0::[State]
X0 = [incCtrl(updState(v, w, x))|(w, x) ∈ T0 ×
β.X]
L0::[Label]
L0 = [(n, p, w)|w ∈ T0]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ zip(β.X,L0, X0)
β.X = X0
try v t Variable → Type
→ AgentLTSB
T0::[Value]
T0 = allByType(t)
X0::[State]
X0 = [incCtrl(updState(v, w, x))|(w, x) ∈ T0 ×
β.X]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ zip(β.X, τ,X0)
β.X = X0
if s e b String → Exp
→ AgentLTSB →
AgentLTSB
T0::[State]
T0 = [x|x ∈ β.X ∧ eval(e, x)]
F0::[State]
F0 = [x|x ∈ β.X ∧ ¬eval(e, x)]
β.X = T0
annot(s)
runBlock(b)
β.X = normCtrl(F0 ∪ β.X)
for v k n b Variable →
Integer →
Integer →
AgentLTSB →
AgentLTSB
if k < n :
assign(v, k)
runBlock(b)
for(x, k + 1, n, b)
Environment
assign v e Variable→ Exp→
EnvLTSB
list V0 = [eval(e, s)|s ∈ β.X]
list E0 = [updS(v, w, e)|(w, e) ∈ zip(V0, β.X)]
β.M.E = β.M.E∪{(x0, τ, x1)|(x0, x1) ∈ zip(E,E0)}
β.X = E0
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invocable n p b e String → [(Type,
Variable)] →
[(Variable, Exp)]
→ Exp → En-
vLTSB
T0 = β.T
V0 = [(var, val)|(ty, var) ∈ p|allByType(ty)]
S0 = [(x, vars)|x ∈ β.X|vars ∈ V0]
S1 = [addToStateSpace(s, (var, val))|(s, vs) ∈
S0|(var, val) ∈ vs]
X0 = [(assignBlock(x, b)|x ∈ S1]
R0 = [(x, eval(e))|x inX0
L0 = [(n, [v], r)|(,(,v))|S0|r ∈ R0]
β.M.E = β.M.E ∪ zip(β.X,L0, R0)
β.X = filterByTypeEnv(X0)
Table 2.1 defines the type signatures and pseudocode-level semantics of each
statement, with respect to operations over an LTS Builder. Some brief notes on the
notation used in the table may be helpful. All variables are immutable. Logical vari-
ables are denoted with sub-scripts and single capital letters (e.g. X0) and represent a
free local variable in the scope of that execution. Typewriter face is used to denote
an executable function, and any such function which ends in an underscore denotes
the ‘standard’ semantics, as opposed to any operators of the same name that are
defined in our language. The semantics of most of these functions are clear from
their name, but Appendix B provides a glossary of their effects. Finally, standard
convention is to denote an unlabeled edge with τ , a stand-in label that indicates the
transition should be enabled under any edge semantics.
Because the structure of and combinators for Agents and Environments differ,
each will be discussed in its own section. The only shared functionality between each
is the declare operator and annot statement:
Definition 7. declare v t adds a new variable and its typing to the current type
environment.
Declare adds a new variable, and initialized it to the default (lowest) value for
that type. All uses of this operator must be at the start of the program. Internally,
the LTSBuilder monad is in one of two stages: a declaration phase in which this oper-
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ator is enabled, and an execution stage in which it is not. Any instance of a command
associated with the execution stage will end the declaration phase, prompting the
toolset to generate a minimal state space from the current type environment using
the Cartesian product of the ranges of all variables. Formally:
Definition 8. At the start of execution:
1. β.M.S is initialized to V0× ...×Vn, where Vi represents the range of values (as
specified by the type) of variable i;
2. β.M.i is set to the state representing the initial value of all variables, either as
defined by the user or as their default;
3. β.X is set to {β.M.i}.
This construction illustrates why declaration during execution is forbidden. As
each state is defined as a tuple in the Cartesian product of all variable ranges, in-
troduction of a new variable would create another dimension in the state space over
which no states are actually defined. This could impact both soundness of the model
(since correctness constraints may not be quantified over this new dimension) and
completeness (since previously defined states do not include the new dimension).
Definition 9. annot s adds the string s to the label from the current state(s) to the
next state(s)
The annot statement is used to enable user-specified annotations on high-level
VML models to be incorporated into the low-level LTS. The exact semantics depend
on whether the statement is executed as part of an Agent or Environment builder. In
the former case, annot can be used prior to a conditional branch. For those current
states in which the condition holds, the label is added from these states to a dummy
state, and an unlabeled edge is added from that dummy state to the first state in the
block being executed. In the latter case, annot can be used to label an invocable
block. In this case, the annotation is added from the current state(s) in which the
block’s predicate holds to the post-state(s) of that block.
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Agent Language
Recall that agent-style LTS are intended to model ‘standard’ reactive programs,
which maintain an instruction pointer to indicate their position in a control flow as
well as a collection of local state variables. To capture this, we augment the user-
defined state of an agent LTS with an instruction pointer that is maintained by
the LTS Builder. Agent-like programs may also (un)conditionally branch during
execution based on predicates defined over their local state as well as communicate
with their environment, either receiving input or providing output. To this end, we
provide the operators defined in the Agent section of Table 2.1. All of these operators
are defined as part of the execution stage, meaning that any variable declarations
will have already been processed (and a state space generated) by the time they are
handled.
Definition 10. assign v e represents the assignment of a value reached by evalu-
ation of the expression e to the variable identified by v.
Because the system may be in many possible current states, the expression is
evaluated at each state in the set of executable states β.X. For each of these states,
an edge is added from that state to the state in which the identified variable has
the computed value, and the instruction pointer is incremented by one. The edge is
labeled with τ , which denotes a semantics-agnostic, unconditional transition.
Definition 11. invoke n p represents one-way communication from the agent to
an environment LTS, in which the rule n is invoked on a list of parameters p.
As there is no return value (and thus no non-determinism), a single edge is added
from each state in β.X to a state in which the instruction pointer is incremented,
but all other state variables remain the same. The edge is labeled with the rule
invocation: its name and all parameter values. As discussed in Section 4.3, these
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edge labels are used by the compiler to compose the invoking agent LTS with the
environment LTS being invoked.
Definition 12. invoke v n p r represents two-way communication with an envi-
ronment LTS, in which the rule n is invoked on a list of parameters p, and a return
value of type r is written to a variable v of the same type.
Unlike in the previous case, the presence of a return value creates non-
determinism. Any value supported by the return type may be written to v, depending
on the (unknown) semantics of the rule implemented by the environment. Because
of this, it is necessary to create an edge from each current state to all possible next
states, where each state increments the instruction pointer and assigns v one value
from the return type’s allowed values.
Definition 13. try v t represents testing of a non-deterministic variable v, whose
possible values are defined by its type t. The variable must have been declared nor-
mally.
This statement is used to non-deterministically assign a value to a variable, such
that the value is anything in its valid range. Its execution causes the execution path
to branch into as many states as there are variable values, almost identically to the
behavior in invoke when used with a return value. The only difference is that all
edge labels in this case are basic τ -transitions with no Verificare-specific semantics.
Definition 14. if s e b represents the conditional evaluation of an annotated block
of statements. Depending on the valuation of the expression e, the statement block b
will be either ignored or executed.
As usual, we must consider all possible current states of the LTS. The expression
e is evaluated at each state in β.X. For those in which it holds, the block is executed
on the current LTS and the resultant new set of executable states is recorded. The
union of these with the false states (those in which the predicate does not hold)
is then set to be the next set of states, after adjusting control pointers to all have
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the same (maximial) value. This last step is necessary to ensure that all executable
states are at the same depth of execution, regardless of any conditional evaluations
of guarded blocks.
Definition 15. select [(s e b)] is a non-deterministic control flow construct.
Each tuple of (annotation, expression, block) in the list is treated as an if statement,
but all such statements are evaluated in parallel.
The select statement is used to capture non-deterministic behavior. Each
element of the list is treated as an if statement, including annotation with the string
s. Each of these statements is evaluated on the set of current states (semantically)
simultaneously, that is, on the same set of current states, not on the set of current
states following the evaluation of the element preceding it. The union of the new
edges added via each block’s execution is added to the LTS, and the union of each
set of executable states is set to be the next set of executable states.
Definition 16. for v k n b represents a for loop, in which the variable v is set
to the initial value k, and statement block b is iterated over. Each iteration v is
incremented, and checked against the maximum value n. Iteration ceases once v=mx.
The for statement is a derived operator, using assign and the runBlock to
maintain an increasing counter variable while iteratively executing a block of state-
ments. Prior to each execution the counter variable is compared to its maximum
value. If it is less, the block is executed on the current LTS Builder and for is
recursively called on an incremented counter variable.
Definition 17. loop b creates an infinite loop in control flow, such completing the
execution of the block b will redirect control flow to the start of the block.
The loop statement is used to model, e.g., reactive systems which should never
halt. In terms of the underlying LTS, loop causes the statements in b to be applied
until a fixpoint is reached and no new edges are added to the system. Since all LTS
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in Verificare are finite (as all variables have a finite set of possible values), either this
fixpoint will eventually be reached or a variable will be assigned a value outside of
its allowed range and execution will abort.
Environment Language
Recall that environment-style LTS are intended to model passive datastructures
which form a context for interaction between agents. To this end, they are modeled
as a collection of local state variables and conditional rules for modification of those
variables. After declaration of variables, the execution stage of an environment LTS
consists entirely of atomically-executed rules whose pre-condition, if true, results
in a new assignment of values to variables. Because of this atomicity and lack of
branching operators, there is no notion of control flow in an environment LTS. To
this end, we provide only two operators for the creation of an environment LTS,
defined in the relevant section of Table 2.1. All of these operators are defined as part
of the execution stage, meaning that any variable declarations will have already been
processed (and a state space generated) by the time they are handled.
Definition 18. invocable n p b e represents a communication from an agent LTS
to the environment LTS, in which the identified rule n executes the statement block
b that quantifies over the parameter list p and returns the value of the expression e.
As can be seen in the grammar (Figure 2.8), the invocable rule operator may
only be used in the context of a predicate (its precondition) defined in a select
statement inside of a loop. This is because environments are purely nondeterministic
and lack any control flow. At any executable state, all invocation rules which may be
executed, over all possible parameters, are executed in a nondeterministic ordering.
This is enforced by the reactive nondeterministic control statements surrounding
the invocable itself, which represents a single environment update rule. As in an
agent LTS, an environment has a set of current states β.X which represents the
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current state of all paths originating at the β.M.i. Because the parameters used
in an invocable are not themselves variables in the the type environment β.T , the
current set of states does not contain any reference to them. Thus, invocable first
creates an augmented state space in which the product of β.X and each possible
combination of parameter values is set as the next set of executable states. In this
set, the expressions in b are evaluated and assigned to their respective variables,
which are part of the original state space. The expression is e is also evaluated
at each of these states, and used to build the edge label linking the previous set of
execution states to the current set. These labels are set to contain the identifier of the
LTSBuilder, the n string representing the rule name, the parameter value tuple, and
the value of the return expression e. Finally, the temporarily added parameter values
are removed from the type environment and the un-augmented states and edges are
added to the LTS. as thee variables are present in the current set of executable
states. Thus, in an environment LTS non-determinism from interaction is in the
possible input parameters, rather than in the possible output value, as is the case
with an agent LTS. The label added to each edge is used to compose the environment
LTS whose rule has been invoked with an agent LTS invoking that rule. See Section
4.3 for details on this composition.
Definition 19. assign v e represents the assignment of the value of an expression
e to the variable v. This operator can only be used in the statement block of an
invocable operator.
Assignment in an environment is similar to that defined for an agent, with two
differences. First, there is no instruction pointer to increment and thus the new state
is determined entirely by the assignment. Secondly, assignments in environments may
take place only inside of invocable statements, and are treated as atomic operations.
Thus, given an initial state s, execution of the block assign x (y+3); assign y
(x+3) would create an edge from s to a state in which both statements have already
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been executed. Actual evaluation remains deterministic sequential, with edges being
added incrementally, but the edge from the initial state points only to the final state
in that sequential execution. This, when assigning x to be the value of y + 3, the
expression is evaluated for the value of y prior to the statement in which y is assigned
a value based on x.
Definition 20. return v represents a one-way communication from the environ-
ment LTS to an agent LTS. It may only be used as the last statement in an invocable
statement’s block.
The return statement indicates to the LTSBuilder that the specified value should
be appended to the label on the edge from the current state to the next. It is used
during composition to write the value into the local state of an invoking agent LTS.
Sources of Reachable State Space Explosion
The language described above is implicitly concurrent, in that a program written
in either the Agent or Environment sub-languages defines a directed multigraph of
execution states rather than a single execution path. At any point during execution
there is a set of current states (β.X) which represent all possible states the system
could be in given the current execution depth. Thus, any statement in the language
defines a transition from each current state to each of its possible post states, the
union of which determines the next set of currently executable states. For statements
using purely deterministic operators (e.g.assign) this creates |β.X| new edges in the
graph, which point to the next set of states to be executed. For non-deterministic
operators (e.g.invoke), the number of new edges is the product of the cardinality of
the current set and the cardinality of the set of values which could be assumed by
the nondeterministic variable(s). For example, invoke uses a single nondeterministic
return value. If that value is a int(0,5), the number of edges added to the graph is
|β.X||{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}|. Similarly, invocable uses a list of nondeterministic parameters.
44
The set of non-deterministic values in this case is the Cartesian product of all possible
parameter values. For example, if there are two parameters int(0,3) x and bool
y, the set of possible values is {((0, true), ...(3, false)} and |β.X| ∗ 6 edges will
be added. In the case of select, non-determinism is over the number of branches
which are executable. Of course, the blocks to be executed may themselves contain
non-determinism in data or control flow.
While non-determinism causes a rapid explosion in the number of edges, this
does not always correspond to an explosion in the number of reachable states. An
LTS transition function is a directed multigraph, allowing multiple edges between
the same two nodes. In some cases, the edges added due to non-determinism fall
into this category. Consider, for example, an update rule in an environment of the
form bool foo(bool x, bool y). Execution of this rule adds |β.X| ∗4 edges to the
graph. However, if the internal state of the environment is modified deterministically
(e.g.foo checks a predicate over the parameters, increments a counter, and returns
the result), then all of the edges at each current state will point to a single next state.
Finally, if the non-determinism which caused a branching in execution (and all
side-effects thereof) is resolved, the set of reachable states can collapse due to edges
from multiple current states pointing to the same next state. For example, the return
value from an update rule invocation may assigned a concrete value (e.g.invoke x
foo.bar bool; assign x true), In this case, the nondeterministic edges generated
by the invocation (in which x is true or false) point to different post-states. After
the assignment, however, both of these states have edges pointing to the same next
state (x is true). Other than discarding unnecessary return values, we have found few
‘natural’ uses of this property. In cases where non-determinism has no side effects and
is deterministically resolved, the model can often be simplified to remove it entirely.
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2.3.2 Examples
In this section, we provide several examples of programs written in our language,
as well as the LTS that results from execution of that program. Because this language
is embedded in Haskell and used only by the VML compiler, we have not implemented
a syntactic sugar layer to hide the monad syntax used by Haskell. Also, due to state-
space explosion, these examples are necessarily quite small. Longer examples are
certainly feasible but will produce state spaces and edge lists far too large to be used
educationally.
build $
do declare "x" (TyInteger 3)
declare "y" (TyInteger 3)
assign "x" 1
if_ (Just "@myannot")(Var "x" ‘Lt‘ 2) $ (do
assign "y" 3
assign "x" 2)
States:
([("#control",Control 4),("y",N 3),("x",N 2)])
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 3),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 0),("y",N 0),("x",N 0)])
Edges:
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 3),("x",N 1)]) -- [] --> ([("#control",Control
4),("y",N 3),("x",N 2)])
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)]) -- [] --> ([("#control",Control
3),("y",N 3),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)]) -- [Annotation "@myannot"] -->
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 0),("y",N 0),("x",N 0)]) -- [] --> ([("#control",Control
1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
build $
do declare "x" (TyInteger 3)
declare "y" (TyInteger 3)
assign "x" 1
invoke_ Nothing ("E1", "foo", [2,3, true])
invoke_ (Just ("x", TyBoolean)) ("E1", "bar", [1,2,3])
States:
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 0),("x",B False)])
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 0),("x",B True)])
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([("#control",Control 1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 0),("y",N 0),("x",N 0)])
Edges:
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)]) -- [Interaction
("E1","bar",[Value (N 1),Value (N 2),Value (N 3)]) (Just (B False))] -->
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 0),("x",B False)])
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)]) -- [Interaction
("E1","bar",[Value (N 1),Value (N 2),Value (N 3)]) (Just (B True))] -->
([("#control",Control 3),("y",N 0),("x",B True)])
([("#control",Control 1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)]) -- [Interaction
("E1","foo",[Value (N 2),Value (N 3),Value (B True)]) Nothing] -->
([("#control",Control 2),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
([("#control",Control 0),("y",N 0),("x",N 0)]) -- [] --> ([("#control",Control
1),("y",N 0),("x",N 1)])
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Chapter 3
Modeling Systems of Interacting
Components
3.1 A Language for Modular Composition of Interacting
Components
The Verificare modeling language is a simple imperative language which can be
compiled to the LTS assembly language introduced in Section 2.3, and is designed
to easily capture the behavior of non-deterministic event-based systems composed
of communicating processes. Models written in VML have two parts: a list of com-
ponent definitions describing system dynamics, and a system configuration which
describes their static composition and invariant behavior.
A component definition introduces a new composable module (which may have
multiple instances) into the system. This module, once defined a single time, can be
re-used in any other model which includes the API methods (if any) that the module
uses. Verificare already includes definitions for common networking primitives (e.g.
queues, message-passing networks) and SDN constructs (e.g. OpenFlow switches and
basic controllers).
Components in VML can be one of two types: agents, active asynchronous pro-
cesses which initiate component interactions (e.g. clients and servers); and environ-
ments, passive collections of state and methods which mediate interactions between
agents (e.g. queues and networks). Agents interact by invoking API-like constructs
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called update rules on a shared environment (e.g. writing and reading to a shared
memory). The binding of agents to environments establishes the data- and control-
flow between system components, and is assigned during system configuration. Note
that since agents only communicate over environments, changing the implementation
of one agent prompts no changes to other components as long as it communicates
over the same set of update rules as before. Similarly, environment implementations
can be changed as long as they export the same set of update rules to agents.
3.1.1 Component Definition
A full syntax for VML is presented in Appendix A. The language currently
supports only bounded integers and boolean datatypes, and arrays thereof. We
intend to expand this support with user-defined record types and objects in the next
iteration of the language. An integer is declared as int name(min,max), where min
corresponds to the lowest (inclusive) value that variable can hold, and max refers to
the highest (exclusive). Variable bounds are treated as assertions over the model:
assignment of an out-of-range value violates that variable’s bounding assertion, and
constitutes a requirement violation that will halt verification.
Some verification back-ends (e.g. PRISM) may support more expressive models
which allow extra information to be attached to a non-deterministic branch (e.g.
probabilities or rates). Verificare allows annotations to be added to control flow
branches, specifically if statements and select guards in agents and rule declara-
tions in environments. An annotation is placed on the line directly above the state-
ment to be annotated, and takes the form @<verifier>: <data>. If the named
verifier is used to check any requirements, the translation module will use the an-
notation when generating a model for that system (See Section 5.3. The precise
semantics of an annotation are defined by the translator plugin for each tool, as are
the available annotation syntaxes. The PRISM translator, for example, currently
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1 agent end_host:
2 int(0,5) pkts_in_flight
3 sig procom<bool> q_out
4 sig procom<bool> q_in
5 #0: Ack, 1: Message
6 int(0,1) pkt_in
7 int(0,1) pkt_out
8 loop:
9 select:
10 pkts_in_flight < 5:
11 pkt_out = 1
12 q_out.put(pkt_out)
13 pkts_in_flight = pkts_in_flight + 1
14 not q_in.empty():
15 pkt_in = in.get()
16 if in==0:
17 pkts_in_flight = pkts_in_flight-1
18 if in==1:
19 pkt_out=0
20 q_out.put(pkt_out)
Fig. 3.1: A Nondeterministic End Host Agent
allows a branch to be annotated with a rate (e.g. @prism: r-2.0) for continuous-
time systems. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of how translation to
derived models is performed.
Active Agents
The first type of component in VML is the agent, which is intended to represent
an asynchronous process or thread of execution. An agent can be used to model,
e.g. network devices, principals in a cryptographic protocol, or an embedded system
in a CPS. Figure 3.1 presents an example agent, which we will refer to throughout
this section. It models a simple network end-host which sends and receives messages
(treated as a simple boolean variable for now, but we will expand on it later in the
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chapter). On message receipt it responds with an acknowledgment, and will block
after sending five un-acknowledged messages.
Agents are declared using the agent type identifier and a unique name. Once
defined, any number of agents of that type can be instantiated in a model by declaring
its cardinality in the system configuration (section 3.1.3). An agent’s definition
always begins with a list of local variable declarations and the signature variables used
by that agent to interact with its environment(s). Signatures and environments are
addressed below, but environments can be thought of as configurable communications
channels and signatures as interfaces for those channels. The procom signatures
declared in lines 3 and 4 represent a producer-consumer environment for boolean
variables, which allow data to be put into the environment or retrieved via get.
Because Verificare is intended as a platform for modeling and verification, agents
lack the computational power of a full-fledged generic software program: basic arith-
metic operations on integers are possible (though should be used sparingly) but the
focus of VML is on modes of interaction rather than on simulations of sophisticated
internal states or, e.g., factoring numbers. This also means that VML supports
control flow constructs not normally found in traditional programming languages,
such as deliberate infinite loops via the loop keyword (line 8) and non-deterministic
conditional evaluation via the select construct (line 9). The former creates an un-
conditional control flow branch from the end of the loop body to the beginning,
ensuring that the agent will never halt. The latter is used to specify a series of
guarded blocks of code. If a guard is true, that code is executed. This differs from
a standard switch statement in the fact that multiple guards may be true, in which
case execution proceeds non-deterministically.
In the standard model of computation, the execution of a program can be rep-
resented as a single path through that program’s control flow graph, with associated
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assignments of values to variables over time. Non-determinism in such a system is
generally an indication of a bug, as it implies that a single input may induce different
behaviors in an uncontrollable way. Similarly, infinite loops are rarely seen as desir-
able in actual software deployments. In a verification setting, however, a system’s
behavior is being analyzed over all possible control flow paths and variable valua-
tions. In this environment, non-determinism can be useful to represent the influence
of unquantified or under-specified effects on the model. For example, the network
host in Figure 3.1 may be able to either send a message (line 10) or process a received
message (line 14). In reality the decision to prioritize one over the other may involve
a variety of complex factors, from application-layer performance concerns to network
congestion control. Since Verificare is investigating all possible behaviors, however,
all that matters is that both options can be taken: over the course of verification all
schedulings of message transmission and receipt will be examined.
Similarly to non-determinism, the loop keyword can be used when modeling
reactive systems (e.g. servers, routers, operating systems, etc.) that respond to
events from the environment around them. These systems may never halt or halt
only on an error. When modeling such systems, it can be useful to ensure that some
point in the model’s control flow is always returned to (e.g. the start of the loop).
Mediating Environments
The second type of component in a Verificare model is an environment, which
is intended to represent a shared context or communications medium. Environments
can be used to model, e.g. receiver queues, shared memory, or a noisy channel. Figure
3.2 presents an environment which acts as a noisy FIFO queue, non-deterministically
choosing to drop or store a received message. If it is full, the message is always
dropped.
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0 environment[procom<T1>] dropping_queue:
1 const int MAX_LEN = 5
2 T q[MAX_LEN]
3 int head(0, MAX_LEN)
4 int size(0, MAX_LEN)
5 T ret
6
7 rule bool put(a):
8 pre: size < MAX_LEN
9 post:
10 q[(head+size) % MAX_LEN] = a
11 size = size + 1
12 return: true
13
14 rule bool put(a):
15 pre: size < MAX_LEN
16 post: none
17 return: true
18
19 rule bool put(a):
20 pre: size >= MAX_LEN
21 post: none
22 return: false
23
24 rule T get():
25 pre: size > 0
26 post:
27 ret = q[head]
28 head = (head+1) % MAX_LEN
29 size = size - 1
30 return: ret
Fig. 3.2: VML Noisy Queue Environment
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Environments mediate interactions between agents. Whenever an agent inter-
acts with another (e.g. sends a message), it first causes a change of state in an
environment that it shares with that agent (e.g. a queue or mailbox).
An environment is declared using the environment type identifier, the signature
that it provides to agents, and a unique name. Signatures are conceptually similar
to Java interfaces or Haskell typeclasses: they specify a set of API-like update rules,
along with parameters and return types, which must be defined in the environment.
Unlike interfaces or typeclasses, however, an environment can only provide one sig-
nature. The procom signature included in Figure 3.2 requires that at least one put
and get rule is defined for a generic type T.
An environment definition begins with a list of local variables which represent
its internal state. These may be read from or written to by agents using update
rules, which are declared following the list of local variables (lines 7, 14, 19, and
24). Each rule has four components: a rule signature, a precondition represented by
a binary predicate, a postcondition represented by a series of variable assignments,
and a single return value that is written back to the invoking agent after transitioning
to the post-condition.
Rule signatures identify the return value type, if any, as well as the rule’s name
and any parameters that it uses. Conditional evaluation and non-determinism can be
introduced to an environment by overloading rule names and parameters. If multiple
rules can be triggered by an invocation, all of those rules’ preconditions are evaluated.
If more than one is true, a single rule is chosen non-deterministically for execution.
Both of these uses are illustrated in Figure 3.2. The rules defined on lines 7 and
14 share both names and pre-conditions, ensuring that both will be valid targets
for execution of a put invocation. The first faithfully adds an element to the FIFO
queue, while the latter gives the appearance of doing so (returns true) while actually
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discarding the element. The rule defined on line 19 is used to introduce conditional
evaluation. On any invocation either this rule’s precondition will be true (i.e. the
queue is full) or one of the other rules will be true (i.e. the queue is not full). As
coverage is exhaustive, we are guaranteed that put will always return some value.
The pre-condition of a rule can be defined over any local variables and environments,
and can be any boolean expression. The precondition must be free of side-effects,
however (i.e. checking the predicate should not have any effect on system state).
If a pre-condition evaluates to false, that rule is not considered executable for this
invocation. If no rule matching the invocation signature is executable, execution is
halted 1.
One should keep in mind that while non-determinism can be introduced using
the above techniques, it is already present in the sense that an environment’s rules
have no control flow or execution ordering. All sequences of update rules with valid
pre-conditions are executed nondeterministically, that is, an environment’s transition
function is defined by applying all rules at each executable state, until a fixpoint is
reached and no new transitions are added to the system. Such purely nondeterminis-
tic behavior has been explored before in the Unity language, which our environments
have much in common with (Chandy & Misra, 1988). Unity’s semantics are not de-
fined on labeled transition systems, but are instead intended to compile to executable
machine code.
3.1.2 Composition Over Signatures
In Verificare, a model consists of concurrent agents interacting with one another
through shared environments. The kind of interaction available to an agent is defined
by the environment mediating its interaction (e.g. a queue environment allows data to
1More specifically, this path of execution will not have any reachable next state. Other execution
paths may still be capable of transitioning.
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signature procom<T1>:
bool put(T1)
T1 get()
Fig. 3.3: Producer-Consumer Signature
be inserted and retrieved in FIFO order, while a bulletin board might allow random
access). Because components may be developed separately, changed during modeling,
or switched with a different component, a mechanism must exist which abstracts the
specification of an interaction from its implementation.
This can be accomplished with signatures, which provide a means to specify
the protocol used by components (i.e. the rules provided by an environment) while
hiding the the effects of those rules (i.e. the state transitions) from all but the
implementing component. Signatures define what rules environments must provide
for use by agents. Specifically, an environment providing a particular signature in its
declaration (as in line 0 of Figure 3.2) must implement at least one rule matching
each rule header in the signature 2. An environment can provide only one signature,
due to the compositional semantics associated with compilation to an LTS. Section
4.3 discusses these semantics at length.
Agents, respectively, bind to signatures using accessor variables rather than
directly to environments (see lines 3 and 4 of Figure 3.1). From an agent’s per-
spective, signatures provide access to the rules which they define using a simple
signature.rule notation (lines 12,14,15, and 20).
While hiding the implementation of a rule allows easy composition over signa-
tures, many environments can take advantage of a second level of indirection in the
2Multiple rules with the same header are used to implement conditional evaluation and non-
determinism. See Section 3.1.1
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binding of agents to signatures. Environments can be one of two types. Type-agnostic
environments store and manipulate data inserted by agents as a black box, treating
all data types equally. These include queues, stacks, etc.. Type-aware environments
operate over the expected structure of data, and are bound to a specific data type.
These include corrupting channels which flip bits in a bit vector, noisy environments
which modify integer values, etc.. For many applications, type-agnostic environments
are sufficient to capture the desired system semantics. Network queues rarely make
any assumptions about packet structure, for example. Even in situations where some
level of insight into a datatype is needed, it is often easier to encode this functionality
in a man-in-the-middle agent rather than the environment itself.
For this reason, component signatures support parametric polymorphism in rule
headers. In Figure 3.3, the T1 parameter signifies a type variable which can be han-
dled agnostically. Any agent which uses this signature must instantiate it with a
specific type (e.g.sig procom<bool>, as in lines 3 and 4 of Figure 3.1. An environ-
ment which provides this signature need not provide a separate implementation for
each possible datatype, instead it simply uses the type variable to refer to the object.
At compile time, Verificare will automatically generate type-aware implementations
of type-agnostic environments for each distinct type instantiated by agents. Note
that two agents using the same type-agnostic environment with different instanti-
ated types cannot interact with one another using that environment. Each instance
of that environment is treated as a distinct environment type.
3.1.3 System Configuration
So far, modeling in Verificare has focused on the dynamics of individual pro-
cesses (component definitions) and on how to specify modes of interaction (signa-
tures). The system configuration describes how to link these individual processes
together into a composed system and how that system behaves, following user-
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1 configuration:
2 2 end_host, 2 dropping_queue
3 x:end_host1 | y:end_host2 | x.q_in = y.q_out and x.q_out = y.q_in
4 inv:
5 all x:dropping_queue | x.size < x.MAX_LEN
Fig. 3.4: Example System Configuration
specified constraints on which components may interact and what states the system
may reach. Verificare can then automatically perform component linking, and will
generate an instance of the system that meets all specified constraints. Informally,
the system configuration defines a topology for interaction of agents via shared envi-
ronments. Figure 3.4 shows a configuration using the above-defined end host and
dropping queue components.
A configuration consists of a cardinality constraint (line 2 in the figure) which
specifies exactly how many instances there are of each component, zero or more
binding constraints (line 3) which impose restrictions on the topology, zero of more
adaptive invariants (line 5) which constraint system states, and zero of more initial-
izers which provide initial values to the specified variables in the specified component.
If a component is defined but not given any cardinality in this declaration, Verifi-
care assumes there are zero instances of that component, and will not include it in
the system model. When the model is compiled, Verificare finds an instance of the
system which meets all of the listed constraints (or returns an error, if no satisfying
instances exist) and performs verification over this instance. In this case, an instance
must meet the requirement that the environment used by each end-host’s q in vari-
able must be the same as that used by the other’s q out variable. The compiled
model will be limited to states in which no queue is full, due to the adaptive invariant
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on line 5. If initializers are present, the stated initial values will be used for that
verification run.
Configuration Language The formal grammar for a configuration is given in
Figure 3.5. Syntactically, it is very similar to the Alloy specification language (Jack-
son, 2002a). This is no coincidence: Verficare uses Alloy as an engine to perform
automatic instance-finding (see Section 4.2). As can be seen in the figure, a binding
constraint has two components: a list of quantified variables and a boolean formula
consisting of (in)equalities connected by either conjunction or disjunction. Equalities
are defined with respect to specific signature variables of two or more agents, and
state whether those agents share an environment via the respective variables. Note
that variables of differing types (e.g. a stack and a queue, or a queue of bools and
queue of integers) will never share an environment. A constraint of this form would
cause no satisfying instance to be found.
Variables may be quantified in one of three ways: universally or existentially
over the set of all agents of that type (e.g., the end host agents in the figure),
or explicitly over specific instances of that agent type. Explicit quantification uses
unique, unordered instance identifiers assigned automatically to each agent, which
range from one up to the specified cardinality of that agent. All of these quan-
tifiers may be freely mixed in a binding constraint. For example, the constraint
all x:client | y:server[4] | x.in = y.out would bind the in variable of all
client instances to the out variable of the server agent with an instance id of 4.
Note that if the requirement being captured is only that all clients share some server,
the constraint can be rewritten more clearly as all x:client | exists y:server
| x.in = y.out.
Unlike the standard universal and existential quantifiers, Alloy doesn’t natively
support the notion of explicit quantification. Its semantics are based on relations
59
〈root〉 ::= 〈card〉 〈eol〉 〈form〉 *(〈eol〉 〈form〉)
〈card〉 ::= 〈cinst〉 *(,, 〈cinst〉)
〈cinst〉 ::= 〈natural〉 〈domain〉
〈form〉 ::= 〈expr〉 | *(expr |) 〈aform〉
〈expr〉 ::= 〈qexpr〉 | 〈eexpr〉
〈qexpr〉 ::= 〈quant〉 〈var〉 *(, 〈var〉) : 〈domain〉
〈eexpr〉 ::= 〈var〉 *(, 〈var〉) : 〈domain〉 [ 〈id〉 ]
〈quant〉 ::= all | exists
〈domain〉 ::= 〈ident〉
〈aform〉 ::= 〈pred〉 *(〈op〉 〈pred〉)
〈pred〉 ::= 〈atomic〉 | ( 〈aform〉 )
〈atomic〉 ::= 〈sigref 〉 〈cmp〉 〈sigref 〉
〈sigref 〉 ::= 〈var〉 . 〈signame〉
〈natural〉 ::= 〈NZERO〉 *〈DIGIT 〉
〈id〉 ::= 〈DIGIT 〉 *〈DIGIT 〉
〈signame〉 ::= 〈ident〉
〈var〉 ::= 〈ident〉
〈cmp〉 ::= = | !=
〈op〉 ::= && | ||
〈ident〉 ::= 〈ALPHA〉 *(〈ALPHA〉 | 〈DIGIT 〉 | _ | ’);
〈ALPHA〉 ::= a-Z | A-Z
〈NZERO〉 ::= 1-9
〈DIGIT 〉 ::= 0 | 〈NZERO〉
Fig. 3.5: Configuration Syntax
60
between sets of uninterpreted atomic objects, and many of its optimizations (e.g.
symmetry-breaking predicates) exploit this fact to (usually) substantially reduce the
time needed to find an instance of a model (Jackson, 2011; Torlak & Jackson, 2007).
Verificare gets around this at the model level (pre-optimization), by treating any
explicitly constrained agent as a named, universally constrained singleton subset of
the set of agents of that type (see Section 4.2). Because of this, explicit constraints
are a syntactic convenience for users more comfortable with an array-like notation
for configuring connections, and do not augment Alloy’s semantics.
Throughout this chapter, environments have been treated a second-class citi-
zens in many ways: they are purely reactive, change state only at the behest of an
agent, and have a more restricted syntax for specifying behavior. It should come
as no surprise then that this trend continues into the system configuration. Beyond
specifying how many of each environment type to instantiate the system with, en-
vironments cannot be constrained or quantified over. This design decision has two
motivations. First, it simplifies the automated mapping of agents to environments
by treating the latter as, for each environment type, an uninterpreted set of atoms
(whose cardinality is specified by the user). Constraints can then be easily written
as restrictions on a relation mapping signature variables of the same type to each of
these atoms. Secondly, it reinforces the notion that environments are interchange-
able parts of the background. Which queue instance a switch port is assigned to
should have no bearing on the system’s behavior, since all queues of the same type
behave the same. All that matters is which other ports share that queue, as it is this
which determines the allowed interactions in a system. Similarly, one type of queue
can easily be switched for another by modifying the cardinality declaration without
having to change anything in the binding constraints.
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Underspecfication and Completeness The use of binding constraints in a sys-
tem configuration encourages underspecification, in which there are multiple possible
instances of a system configuration that meet all of the constraints. This is power-
ful and enables incremental development of a configuration, but is also potentially
dangerous.
A fully unspecified configuration (i.e. one in which there are no binding con-
straints at all, only a cardinality declaration) will offer only two guarantees about the
instance returned by Verificare: 1. each bound environment provides the signature
associated with the variable it is bound to (i.e. it the binding is well-typed) 2. every
agent has either zero or one binding to every environment (i.e. no two signature
variables of the same agent are bound to the same environment) . These constraints
are automatically added by Verificare when it builds the Alloy model of the system,
and described formally in Section 4.2. The former requires little explanation, but
the purpose of the latter may not be clear. Recall that an agent uses an accessor
variable to communicate with an environment, and that the specific environment it
uses is not bound until compile-time. Semantically, each signature variable in an
agent represents a separate, unique connection to an environment. Two signature
variables of the same type will therefore always be bound to two different instances
of that environment.
Even a fully specified configuration such as that in Figure 3.4, in which all
agents are explicitly quantified and all signature variables are used in a conjunction
of equalities, can still have multiple instances. Figure 3.6 presents the two possible
instances of the example system, where a line denotes a binding from a signature
variable (e.g.q in, q out) to an environment including that signature (e.g.Queue1,
Queue2). Note that in both cases the constraint is satisfied: the only difference is
which environment instances satisfies each equality.
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Fig. 3.6: Possible Instances of the Example System]
Verificare will non-deterministically select one satisfying instance with which
to perform verification. If the only source of multiple instances is interchangeable
environments (as in the example), completeness of the system will be preserved due
to the symmetry of uninterpreted atoms (Torlak & Jackson, 2007).
Underspecification can be used to represent domain-specific knowledge about
the equivalence of system configurations. An un-structured peer to peer net-
work, for example, may have many possible initial topologies. It may be counter-
productive to manually assign an initial set of neighbors to each node in the network,
when a binding constraint like all n:node | some n’,n’’:node | n.n1=n’ and
n.n2=n’’ could serve the purpose in a single line.
Note, however, that this may impact the completeness of any results. All ver-
ification is performed with respect to the instance generated by Verificare. It is the
user’s responsibility to ensure that all possible instances behave equivalently with
respect to the property being checked. See Section 4.2 for a more detailed discussion
of how an instance is found.
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Adaptive Invariants Although written in the same syntax as the binding con-
straints, adaptive invariants serve a very different role in system configuration. These
serve as behavioral constraints, limited the possible states that a system may as-
sume. An adaptive invariant may address any local, non-signature variable in any
component, and may use the same quantifiers used by the binding constraints. The
requirements imposed over a variable are enforced by the compiler, i.e. the system
will never enter a state in which any adaptive invariant does not hold, even if it
otherwise could. This prunes the reachable state space that is explored during verifi-
cation and means that requirements will be verified only on system states where the
adaptive invariants hold. Obviously, adaptive invariants impacts the completeness of
model checking if used indiscriminately. There are several cases in which these can
be leveraged safely, however.
Adaptive Invariants can be used to perform incremental modeling by abstract-
ing components into the guarantees that they provide. For example, a rate-limiting
or congestion-control component might ensure that no queue is ever full. The compo-
nent itself may be quite complex and generate a large state space if included explicitly
in the model. Instead, if it’s behavior has already been verified as (or is known to be)
correct, it can be removed from the model and replaced with an adaptive invariant
like that in line 4 of Figure 3.4. Similarly, adaptive invariants can ‘fill-in’ for compo-
nents which have not yet been implemented, or whose implementation is unknown,
so long as the effects of that component on the system are known and quantifiable.
For example, a content replication service might ensure that all replicas of an object
are consistent (or at least are consistent once they are accessible to the system). The
details are proprietary to the service provider, but the guarantee can be quantified
and included in the model (e.g.inv: all x,x’:server | x.object=x’.object).
In this case, completeness is maintained because the states which were not explored
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are those states which would (in the real system’s execution) not be reachable due
to that component’s influence. Furthermore, without this constraint soundness may
be impacted, i.e. false positives may be reported. A bug (counterexample to a
requirement) may be found in a state which is never reached due to the abstracted
component’s guarantee. For example, a database application may fail if content
replicas are inconsistent. This is not a true bug, however, since the SaaS replication
component is providing consistency.
Second, adaptive invariants can be used to search for pre-requisites to system
correctness by progressively tightening a constraint until no counter-examples are
generated. For example, a system with mobile end-hosts may have a requirement
that packet loss or delay (both are expressible in PCTL*) not exceed a threshold.
Certain sub-component behaviors, such as the speed of end-hosts or their trans-
mission rate, may be constrained loosely at first (e.g.all x:vehicle | x.speed <
100). If counter-examples to the requirement are found, the constraint may be tight-
ened (all x:vehicle | x.speed < 90) until verification succeeds. Note that in
this case, adaptive invariants are being used to discover limitations or requirements
that must be upheld for the system to maintain correctness. It should not be thought
of as a way to discard ‘unlikely’ edge-cases, as it is exactly this kind of unexpected
behavior that is at the root of many system bugs. Instead, it can be used during
system design to reveal the properties that certain sub-components must have if the
system is to perform correctly. The sub-components can then be implemented with
this as part of their specification.
As a final note on adaptive invariants , recall that model components can be
reused in different models. This holds true for invariants quantifying only over that
component as well. Thus, a networking expert can can not only create, e.g. spe-
cialized queue or API environments, but also define sets of invariants over those
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environments. These can then be used by non-experts working with a networking
component, even if their semantics are not understood by those non-experts.
3.2 Models in VML
In this section, we present two larger models of systems implementing non-
trivial network management and control behavior. The first, a security application,
updates network state in response to end-host authentication. The second maintains
an updated network state in the face of mobile end-hosts.
While examining these models, it should be noted that VML is in the kernel
phase of development, in that all novel features have been implemented but derived
convenience operators and macros have not yet been included. We intend to rectify
this in future iterations of the language, especially support for generic objects (e.g.
a queue object within an agent or environment, as opposed to a queue that is an
environment), more expressive data-types, and moving of constant declarations to a
global configuration file.
3.2.1 SDN-Enabled Network Access Controller
In this section, we will model a simple SDN-Enabled application which dynami-
cally drops or forwards traffic from end-hosts based on the determination of a security
agent. We have considered the application of such systems to networks in hospital
and factory settings in the past, where the security agent is a physics model govern-
ing possible movement paths as detected by the network (Skowyra et al., 2013a). In
this case we will consider a slightly different scenario, in which the security agent is
a physical access control system, such as a smart card reader. Unless an end-host
first authenticates with the card reader, all network traffic originating at that host
should be dropped by the switch. In order to keep the modeling code accessible and
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concentrate on language features, we will limit the network to a single switch with
four hosts. The next example considers larger network sizes with an inter-connected
switch topology.
Controller
The SDN Controller is presented in Figure 3.7 is a fairly simple process which
manages the flow table of a single switch. The flow table is a sorted table of rules
which pattern-match over a packet header and trigger an associated action on that
packet. In this scenario, the flow table is structured such that every host has two
entries on its switch: a (possibly disabled) banning rule which will cause all packets
from that host to be dropped is installed in the ‘top’ half of the table, which ensures
it is triggered before any forwarding rules are applied. In the bottom half of the
table, routes to each host from any host are stored.
To improve readability and mitigate state-space explosion we are currently only
modeling flow rules which match over the origin and destination of a packet. That
said, these could easily be replaced by a bit-vector long enough to capture all fields
defined in the OpenFlow specification (Foundation, 2013). If the extra bits are not
relevant to the problem, however, they will contribute nothing to verification while
increasing the number of states that must be searched.
After setting up a static network topology (dynamic topologies are explored in
the next example) the network controller begins execution. Since the controller is a
reactive system, the loop statement (line 22) is used to cause control flow to return
to the start of its event-handling block after executing it. Every iteration of this
infinite loop, the controller non-deterministically (due to the usage of select) emits
a flow rule in response to a switch request, and updates its list of banned or enabled
end-hosts. The results of this update are emitted as flow rules to the switch.
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0 agent api_ctrl:
1 const int N_NODES = 4
2 const int DROP_PORT = -2
3 const int ALL_IDS = -1
4 const int EXPIRE = 0
5 const int NOEXPIRE = 1
6 const int DEL = 2
7 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES[3])> in_port
8 sig procom<int(DROP_PORT,N_NODES*2)[5]> out_port
9 sig sec_api security_api
10 //Forwarding rule: slot, to, from, port, expire/noexpire/delete
11 int(DROP_PORT,N_NODES*2) nrule[5]
12 //Packet Representation: Origin End-Host, Origin Port, Destination End-Host
13 int(0,N_NODES) pkt[3]
14 //Routing Table: End-host -> Switch Port
15 int(0,N_PORTS) routes[N_NODES]
16 //Static Routes
17 routes[0] = 0
18 routes[0] = 1
19 routes[0] = 2
20 routes[0] = 4
21 //Begin execution
22 loop:
23 select:
24 //Install a route
25 if !in_port.empty():
26 pkt = in_port.get()
27 nrule[0] = N_NODES+i
28 nrule[1] = pkt[3]
29 nrule[2] = ALL_IDS
30 nrule[3] = routes[pkt[3]]
31 nrule[4] = EXPIRE
32 out_port.put(nrule)
33 //Update ban list
34 if true:
35 for i in (0..N_NODES):
36 nrule[0] = i
37 nrule[1] = ALL_IDS
38 nrule[2]= i
39 nrule[3] = DROP_PORT
40 if security_api.banned(i):
41 nrule[4] = NOEXPIRE
42 if security_api.enabled(i):
43 nrule[4] = DEL
44 out_port.put(nrule)
Fig. 3.7: SDN-Enabled Security Controller
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In the case of a switch request for a route (line 25), the controller creates a flow
rule field-by-field. The first field is the table slot in which the rule will be installed.
Since this is a forwarding rule, it will be place in the bottom half of the table, hence
at N NODES + i, where N NODES is the number of nodes in the system and i is
the unique identifier for that node. Since the controller is responding to a request
for a route to the packet’s destination, that field of the packet is looked up in the
routing table and assigned to the to field of the flow rule. The from field is set to
be universal, such that any origin can use that route to the destination. The port to
route over is installed in the next field, and finally the rule is set to be able to expire
after some time has passed 3.
In the case that the list of banned and enabled nodes is updated, the controller
sets up a rule which would be placed in the top half of the table (line 36), apply to all
destinations (line 37) of packets which it originates (line 38). All traffic which triggers
that rule is dropped rather than being forwarded to its destination. The controller
then checks the current list of banned and enabled nodes via the API shared between
it and the security agent. If the node currently being checked is banned, the flow
rule is set to never expire (line 41 ). If it is enabled, the rule is instead set to be
deleted if it is already present (line 43) in the switch’s flow table (i.e. was previously
banned). The rule is then emitted, and execution returns to the top of the block.
API Environment
The security API used by the controller and security agent is quite simple: it is
merely an array whose state is checked and modified by the Verficare equivalent of
getters and setters from object-oriented languages. Despite its simplicity, non-queue
environments are actually somewhat complex to implement in tools like SPIN, which
3Because Verificare has no notion of time, all this means is that the rule may at some point
expire, not that it will expire at a certain point
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environment[sec_api<T1>] banning_api:
bool banned[N_NODES]
rule ban(T1 i):
pre: true
post: banned[i]=true
return: none
rule enable(T1 i):
pre: true
post: banned[i]=false
rule bool banned(T1 i):
pre: none
post: none
return: banned[i]
Fig. 3.8: Security API
are based on channel systems between processes (Holzmann, 2005). It can be done
using rendezvous communication between an active process containing the array, or
via global variables, but these are less semantically intuitive.
Security Agent
The SDN Security agent controls authentication in the system. It may be a
smart card reader, a Kerberos server, etc.. The security agent nondeterministically
processes an authentication message (lines 7-12) and bans a nondeterministically
chosen user (lines 13-15). In the former case, the message may be either an authenti-
cation which enables network access (line 9) or a deauthentication which disables it
(line 11). In the latter case, a nondeterministically chosen user is banned regardless
of their previous state. This may represent expiry of an authentication token, manual
policy updates, etc..
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0 agent security:
1 const int N_NODES
2 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[2]> auth_q
3 sig sec_api<int(0,N_NODES)> api
4 int(0,N_NODES)[2] node
5 loop:
6 select:
7 if !auth_q.empty():
8 node = auth_q.get()
9 if node[1]==0:
10 api.ban(node[0])
11 if node[1]==1:
12 api.enable(node[0])
13 if true:
14 try node[0]
15 api.ban(node[0])
Fig. 3.9: SDN Security Agent
SDN Switch
Figure 3.10 presents a standard SDN switch with a programmable flow table.
The flow rules and table have the same structure as that described in the controller
model: a top half which contains ban rules, and a bottom half which contains forward-
ing rules. The loop statement establishes this as a reactive system, which first checks
to see of control-plane messages are available (line 15), then non-deterministically
routes a data packet and expires a flow rule.
Processing a control plane message is straight-forward. The rule is installed
field by field, but if the rule is marked for deletion, it is tagged as already expired.
Next, the switch non-deterministically routes a packet and expires a rule. In
the case of the former, the try statement on line 26 ensures that the execution state
branches to consider all possible switch ports. The packet (if any) is progressively
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0 agent sdn_switch:
1 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)> in_ports[4]
2 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)> out_ports[4]
3 int(0,4) c_port
4 sig procom<int(-2,N_NODES)[5]> ctrl_in
5 sig procom<int(-2,N_NODES)[3]> ctrl_out
6 //slot, to, from, port, expire/noexpire/del
7 int(0,10) rules[N_RULES][5]
8 int(-2,N_NODES) n_rule[N_RULES]
9 int(0,N_NODES) pkt[2] //[src, dest]
10 int(0,N_NODES) pkt_ctrl[4]
11 bool match
12 bool expire
13 int c_rule
14 loop:
15 if !ctrl_in.empty(): //Message from controller
16 n_rule = ctrl_in.get()
17 rules[n_rule[0]][0]=n_rule[1]
18 rules[n_rule[0]][1]=n_rule[2]
19 rules[n_rule[0]][2]=n_rule[3]
20 rules[n_rule[0]][3]=n_rule[4]
21 if n_rule[4] == DEL:
22 rules[n_rule[0]][4] = 1
23 select:
24 if ctrl_in.empty(): //No control packers, route data plane
25 match = false
26 try c_port
27 //to, from, port, expire
28 if !in_ports[c_port].empty(): //Packet arrival
29 pkt = in_ports[c_port].get()
30 for r in (1..N_RULES):
31 //No match so far, and rule not expired
32 if match == false and rules[r][4] == 0:
33 //Check To
34 if rules[r][0]==pkt[0] || rules[r][0]==ALL_IDS: //To
35 //Check From
36 if rules[r][1]==pkt[1] || rules[r][1]==ALL_IDS:
37 match = true
38 if rules[r][2] != DROP_PORT:
39 ports[rules[r][2]].put(pkt)
40 if match == false:
41 pkt_ctrl[0]=pkt[0]
42 pkt_ctrl[1]=c_port
43 pkt_ctrl[2] = pkt[1]
44 ctrl_out.put(pkt_ctrl)
45 if true: //Expire a rule
46 try c_rule
47 if rules[c_rule][3] != NOEXPIRE:
48 rules[c_rule][4] = 1
Fig. 3.10: SDN Switch
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0 agent end_host:
1 int(0,N_NODES) id
2 int(0,N_NODES) dest
3 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[2]> to_sec
4 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[2] q_in
5 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[2] q_out
6 int(0,N_NODES) dest
7 int(0,N_NODES)[2] sec_msg
8 int(0,N_NODES)[2] net_msg
9 sec_msg[0]= id
10 net_msg[0]= id
11 loop:
12 select:
13 if true:
14 try sec_msg[1]
15 to_sec.put(sec_msg)
16 if true:
17 try dest
18 net_msg[1] = dest
19 q_out.put(net_msg)
20 if !q_in.empty():
21 net_msg = q_in.get()
Fig. 3.11: Authenticating End-Host
checked against each rule in the table. If a match is found and the rule has not
expired, the forwarding action is applied and the packet is place in the respective
queue (or it is dropped, if a ban rule is triggered). If no rules match the packet, it is
forwarded to the controller.
In the case of rule expiry, a try statement is used to non-deterministically
expire one rule. Expired rules are not counted when matching packets, and are this
effectively deleted from the table.
End-Hosts
End-hosts in this system communicate with both the network switch via the
q in and q out environments, as well as with the security agent via the to sec
environment. This is significant, as it establishes an indirect control link between the
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0 configuration:
1 4 end_host, 1 security, 1 api_ctrl, 1 sdn_switch, 1 banning_api, 11 queue
2 a:end_host0 | b:end_host1 | c:end_host2 | d:end_host3 | sw:switch1 |
a.q_in=sw.in_ports[0] and a.q_out=sw.out_ports[0] and
b.q_in=sw.in_ports[1] and b.q_out=sw.out_ports[1] and
c.q_in=sw.in_ports[2] and c.q_out=sw.out_ports[2] and
d.q_in=sw.in_ports[3] and d.q_out=sw.out_ports[3]
3 all a:end_host | some sec: security | a.to_sec = sec.auth_q
4 all sw:sdn_switch | some ctrl:api_ctrl | sec:security |
sw.ctrl_in = ctrl.out_port and sw.ctrl_out = ctrl.in_port and
ctrl.security_api = sec.api
5 init:
6 end_host0.id=0
7 end_host1.id=1
8 end_host2.id=2
9 end_host3.id=3
10 inv:
11 all q:queue | q.size < q.MAX_LEN
Fig. 3.12: SDN-Enabled System Configuration
end hosts and the SDN controller. This kind of communication cannot be directly
modeled in tools that assume the controller acts in isolation to the rest of the system.
Note on line 1, an id variable is declared. During system configuration each
agent will be assigned a unique id during its initialization. During every execution
block, end hosts nondeterministically send a message, receive a message, or (de)
authenticate. Note that because this determination is nondeterministic, it should
not be read as doing ‘one’ of the above. Rather, all of the possible ordering block
executions are explored simultaneously. The execution state branches into all possible
states given the range of nondeterministic data and control-flow values.
System Configuration
Figure 3.12 presents the system configuration needed to finish modeling the
SDN-Enabled application. Line 1 establishes the number of components to be in-
stantiated in the system, and line 2 creates an explicit topology between end hosts
and switches. While this is much more time-consuming than looser binding con-
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straints, it is necessary when modeling a static network with a known, unchanging
topology. Lines 3 and 4 link all end hosts to the security agent and the controller to
the security agent and switch, respectively. Lines 6-9 establish unique identifiers for
each end host. In systems where this is a priori information, it is time-consuming but
currently necessary to explicitly assign a value to each variable. In principle, this can
be automated using disjointness constraints if the range of possible variable values
is known ahead of time, but we have not yet added such functionality. Finally, on
line 11 enforce an adaptive invariant which restricts the state space to those states
where no queues overflow, as we assume the existence of a transport layer governing
congestion control.
3.2.2 Mobile Learning Network
In this example, we construct a learning switch network (LSN) which dynami-
cally reconfigures the routing topology as mobile end hosts connect, exchange com-
munications, disconnect, and reconnect elsewhere. LSNs are network-wide general-
izations of common MAC-learning switches, which build a view of network state by
recording the originating identifier and switch port of a message. In (Skowyra et al.,
2013b) we used an early version of Verficare to explore this model with respect to
linear-temporal and continuous probabilistic properties such as the presence of for-
warding loops and the packet loss rate as a function of vehicle speed and transmission
rate.
The SDN switch from the previous model can be used here without modification.
As such, we need only provide a learning controller, a model of a mobile end host,
and a system configuration. In this model we use multiple switches, which can be
scaled arbitrarily. Doing so will of course increase the state space size, but will
not impact model correctness. To focus on presentation of the language, we again
limit the number of components in the model. The reader is encouraged to adjust
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0 agent lsn_ctrl:
1 const int N_NODES = 5
2 const int N_PORTS = 8
3 const int OPF_FLOOD = 0
4 const int N_SWITCHES = 2
5 const int ALL_IDS = -1
6 int(0,N_NODES) routes[N_NODES][N_NODES]
7 int(0,N_NODES) pkt[3]
8 int(0,N_NODES) n_rule[5]
9 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[3]> in_ports[N_SWITCHES]
10 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)[5]> out_ports[N_SWITCHES]
11 int(0, N_SWITCHES) c_switch
12 loop:
13 try c_switch
14 if !in_ports[c_switch].empty(): //Message from switch
15 pkt = in_ports[c_switch].get()
16 for i in (0..N_NODES): //Update origin location
17 if routes[i]==c_switch: //If switch is origin switch
18 routes[i][pkt[0]]=pkt[1] //Set route to origin port
19 if routes[i] != c_switch: //Switch is not source
20 routes[i][pkt[0]]=routes[i][c_switch] //Set route to origin switch
21 n_rule[0]=pkt[1]
22 n_rule[1]=pkt[2]
23 n_rule[2]=ALL_IDS
24 n_rule[4]=routes[pkt[0]][pkt[2]]
25 n_rule[4]=EXPIRE
26 out_ports[c_switch].put(n_rule)
Fig. 3.13: Learning Switch Network Controller
these limits and test the model code against their own topologies to investigate the
behavior of such systems at different scales.
Controller
Figure 3.13 presents the LSN controller. As if by now familiar, the loop state-
ment makes the model a reactive system which never halts. In the repeated block,
the controller nondeterministically receives a packet from a connected switch (lines
13-15). Recall that these packets are sent only when the switch has no matching flow
rule for the packet. The packet’s origin is used to update the global network state,
by assigning a route from the origin switch to the origin port (line 18) or by assigning
a route from another switch to the origin switch (line 20). After the global state is
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0 agent all_end_hosts:
1 const int N_PORTS 8
2 const int N_NODES 10
3 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)> in_ports[N_PORTS]
4 sig procom<int(0,N_NODES)> out_ports[N_PORTS]
5 bool connected[N_PORTS] //Port used or free
6 int(0,N_PORTS) locs[N_NODES] //Node locations
7 int(0,N_NODES) pkt[2]
8 int(0,N_PORTS) c_node //Current node
9 int(0,N_PORTS) d_node //Dest node
10 bool found
11 loop:
12 try c_node
13 if connected[locs[c_node]]:
14 select:
15 if true: //Send message
16 try d_node
17 pkt[0]=c_node
18 pkt[1]=d_node
19 in_ports[locs[c_node]].put(pkt)
20 if true: //Receive message
21 pkt = out_ports[locs[c_node]].get
22 @prism: r-0.2
23 if true: //Move
24 connected[locs[c_node]] = false
25 if !connected[locs[c_node]]: //Pick an empty port and connect
26 found = false
27 for i = 0..N_PORTS:
28 if !found and !connected[i]:
29 locs[c_node] = i
30 connected[i] = true
31 found = true
Fig. 3.14: Agent for all mobile end-hosts
updated, the LSN controller creates a flow rule which installs a route in the switch
for all senders to the packet’s destination (lines 21-25). Note that the destination
may be unknown, in this case, the routing table contains (and is initialized to) a port
which is interpreted by the switch as an instruction to flood the packet.
End-Hosts
End-hosts in this network are mobile, and may change the switch ports on which
they communicate. This, unfortunately, is somewhat awkward to do using Verificare.
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Intuitively, mobility would be expressed as changing the environment which is bound
to a signature variable. Since Verificare computes a single static binding, however,
this is impossible. One solution (and the one taken here) is to create a single agent
which models all end-hosts in the system and has an array of environments linking
to all ports in the system. The model is presented in Figure 3.14. This approach
works, but it creates exactly the kind on monolithic, difficult-to-modify model that
agents, signatures, and environments attempt to avoid. For example, if a new kind of
end-host were to be added to the system, it would be impossible to simply compose
the existing all-end-hosts component with this new agent. Multiple end hosts could,
for example, end up sharing the same switch port.
System Configuration
System configuration is very similar to the prior example, except the individual
elements of the in and out port arrays in the all end hosts agent must be mapped
to the out and in port arrays in the sdn switch agents. Currently this must be done
explicitly, as Verificare does not support quantification over variable arrays during
system configuration. Doing so is certainly possible however, and will be added to a
future iteration of the tool.
3.3 Unsuitable Problem Domains
While VML (and Verificare as a whole) aim to be a general platform for mod-
eling programmatic systems, the design of the platform is less suitable from some
applications than others. Specifically, three design decisions which define the tool
may also make it unsuitable for certain domains.
Dynamically Interacting Systems VML divides the world into a static com-
ponent (the system configuration) and a dynamic component (the component def-
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initions). This constrains a verification run to a specific topology of interaction,
e.g.end host3 will always communicate with switch4 over queue2. The separation
of static configuration from dynamic behavior enables modular and scalable compo-
nent design, in the sense that the internal state definition of any system component
is independent from the number of components in the system: it has no impact on
end host3 if another host or switch is added to the system.
Unfortunately, this separation of system configuration and component dynamics
begins to break down in models where the set of targets for interaction is itself
dynamic. Consider the mobile learning network referenced above: because any host
might communicate with any port on any switch, no host can be bound to a specific
queue during system configuration or mobility will be effectively eliminated. To
model such a system, it is necessary to manually compose all targets for dynamic
interaction into a single component. In the above example this was done by creating
a single end-host agent which emulated all hosts in the system. Another approach
would have been to create a network environment with a large number of queues,
each of which could be communicated with using a parameterized put or get. This
eliminates two of the main advantages to Verificare, which is protection of internal
component definitions from changes in system configuration and safe composition of
components via common, generic environments.
In general, systems which are predicated on dynamic physical topologies are
difficult to model in such a way that the main benefits of Verificare are realized.
Systems predicated on dynamic logical topologies, such as most SDNs, are much
better targets for the platform.
Deeply Continuous or Probabilistic Systems Despite supporting multiple cal-
culi (including the probabilistic and continuous PCTL*), Verificare itself is based on
discrete non-determinism. Annotations on non-deterministic branches containing
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probabilities and rates can certainly be added to a user’s model, but more advanced
data types (e.g. floating-point numbers outside of annotations) and semantics dealing
with stochastic timed systems (e.g. clocks and rewards) cannot be represented using
the current annotation syntax.
Single-Calculus Requirements and Single-Domain Systems Finally, if a sys-
tem’s requirements actually do fit cleanly into a single logical calculus, and any new
requirements are expected to do the same, then Verificare may not be an optimal
choice. In order to provide a common intermediate syntax, Verificare translates all
VML models into Labeled Transition Systems, where edges are annotated with tool-
specific labels. These annotations can rarely capture the full expressive power of a
verifier designed around a particular logical calculus. Furthermore, model structure
which the back-end verifier might use to optimize its own state-space is lost during
compilation into a single transition system. While this penalty is difficult to quantify,
it at best has no effect and at worst may be slower than a model written in its native
language, using its expected semantics.
Similarly, if the system being modeled or requirements being checked can be
completely expressed in a domain-specific tool like NICE (Canini et al., 2012) or HSA
(Kazemian et al., 2012), then those tools should be employed. Verificare is intended
to be used when system models span problem domains and requirement calculi. As a
general platform, it is necessarily more expressive and thus more vulnerable to state-
space explosion than tools which can leverage known domain-specific semantics to
optimize verification.
Chapter 4
Compiling a Verificare Model to a
Labeled Transition System
In order to check whether a model written in VML violates some requirement,
it is necessary to first compile it into a lower-level formalism suitable for automated
verification. In this section we present a compiler from VML to a Labeled Transition
System, which uses the LTS Assembly Language introduced in Section 2.3 as an
intermediate representation, and a new LTS composition operator, which formalizes
VML’s rule invocation semantics as partially synchronous transitions between an
agent and environment LTS. Figure 4.1 presents a schematic view of the compiler,
which consists of three components:
• A process compiler which translates each component definition into the abstract
syntax of LTSAL, and emits a list of these intermediate representations. This
module also adds Verificare-specific edge labels which are used by the system
compiler to soundly compose agents and environments.
• A configuration picker which uses the user-defined system configuration to cre-
ate a binding relating signature variables in agents to specific environments.
It encodes the relationships between components as a model in the Alloy lan-
guage, and uses the Alloy model-checker to find a satisfying instance of the
system configuration.
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Fig. 4.1: LTS Compiler Architecture
• A system compiler which creates a single LTS from the LTSAL component list
and the system binding, and emits it to disk. In the process all Verificare-
specific edge labels are removed, and the state space is pruned based on any
domain-specific invariants supplied by the user. This module implements the
composition semantics that Verificare is based on, and captures interactions
(state changes) between an agent and environment as a synchronous transition
by the two components.
In the following sections we describe each module in detail, as well as formalizing
its inputs and outputs.
4.1 Process Compiler
The Verificare process compiler is responsible for creating an LTS out of each
component in the model. Thus is accomplished by translating VML to the LTS
assembly language presented in Section 2.3. The translation is straightforward and
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largely syntactic sugar, a translation chart is presented in Appendix C and our imple-
mentation can be referenced for specific details. If any initializers (e.g.agent1.id=2)
are present in the system configuration, these are translated to simple assign state-
ments and inserted at the start of the LTS definition program.
As each LTS is created from system components, the process compiler main-
tains separate lists of Agent and Environment LTS’. Once all components have been
compiled to transition systems, each list is folded into a single LTS via application of
the the asynchronous composition operator provided by the LTS assembly language’s
toolset. These two LTS are then passed to the system compiler, which will perform
the final composition using the Verificare-specific asymmetric composition operator.
4.2 Configuration Picker
A Verificare model consists of individual components, which are composed with
one another to enable interaction. Specifically, agents invoke environment rules in
order to change the state of an environment. Other agents sharing this environment
can then register and respond to this change, facilitating environment-mediated in-
teraction. The question, then, is which agents share which environments. This is
the fundamental decision which determines sound interaction: only certain mappings
of agents to environments represent correct and realistic system behavior. Section
3.1.3 presented a language by which users can specify which mappings are sound,
both explicitly (e.g. host4 and host5 share a queue) or and in terms of quantified
first-order constraints (e.g. all clients are connected to some server). In this section,
we formalize exactly what this mapping is, what inputs are needed to compute it,
and how computation takes place using the Alloy model checker. We conclude with
notes on our implementation of the algorithm.
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The Configuration Problem We must begin with some definitional notation
concerning agents, environments, and signature variables. For an alphabet Σ∗:
• Let the tuple (A ⊆ Σ∗, E ⊆ Σ∗) denote the set of unique agent and environment
types present in the system model (e.g. the end host agent type and procom
environment type).
• Recall that the cardinality declaration defines the number of instances of each
agent and environment. Then for each agent (respectively environment) we
can create a set Ai = {Ai ∈ A} s.t. |Ai| = Card(Ai), where Ai denotes the ith
element of A and Card(Ai) denotes the number of instances of that element
present in the model. That is, each element Ai ∈ A becomes a set of elements
of that type, whose cardinality is equal to that specified in the declaration.
Finally, we can define the set of agents AGT =
⋃
iAi, i.e. the set of all sets of
agent instances. A similar set ENV can be computed for environments, using
the same approach.
• A signature variable instance V : AGT×ENV is a per-signature variable binary
relation mapping all agents which declare that variable to an environment which
that variable provides access to. These relations can be represented as sets of
tuples AGT ×ENV , where membership of some (a, e) ∈ AGT ×ENV denotes
that the relation is enabled on that pair. Using this notation, let V AR be the
set of all signature variable instance sets in the system.
Then we can formalize the problem as follows:
Definition 21. The configuration problem C = (AGT,ENV, V AR, φ), where φ is
a well-formed formula in Alloy defined over the universe of AGT ∪ENV ∪ V AR, is
to compute a witness w mapping the domain and range of each V ∈ V AR to atoms
in AGT and ENV respectively, such that w |= φ.
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Informally, the configuration problem is the task of finding a mapping for each
signature variable from each agent declaring that variable to an environment which
that variable provides access to, subject to the constraints in φ. These constraints are
of two kinds: either user-defined binding constraints from the system configuration
(see Section 3.1.3) or automatically generated soundness constraints.
Soundness constraints provide two guarantees. First, that each signature vari-
able is well-typed. The range of the associated relation should be only those envi-
ronment types which match its type, and the domain should only be those agent
types which declare it. In addition, all agents declaring a signature variable should
be bound to some environment providing that signature (i.e. no unbound signa-
ture variables). Third, all signature variables declared in an agent must be non-
overlapping: no two variables in that agent should provide access to the same envi-
ronment. Formally:
Definition 22. A configuration problem is well-typed if:
1. ∀V ∈ V AR , domain(V) = {a ∈ AGT |DEC(a, V )}
2. ∀V ∈ V AR , range(V) = {e ∈ ENV |PRV (e, V )}
3. ∀A ∈ AGT ∀V ∈ V AR DEC(a, V )→ ∃e ∈ E(a, e) ∈ V
where DEC is a boolean predicate which is true if the agent type a declares the
signature variable type V , and PRV is a similar predicate indicating whether an
environment type e provides the signature variable type V .
Definition 23. A configuration problem is non-overlapping if ∀V, V ′ ∈ V AR∀a ∈
AGT∀e ∈ ENV (a, e) ∈ V ∧ (a, e) ∈ V ′ → V ≡ V ′
Throughout this section, we will use a running example of a network of buffered
queues connecting five clients to two servers. The VML component definitions of each
are presented in Figure 4.2. Since we are only interested in finding a configuration,
only code stubs are included.
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Each client has four signature variables of type queue, denoting an in and out
connection to the servers. Each server has a single in and out queue. We can define:
• AGT = {client0, client1, client2, client3, client4, server0, server1}
• ENV = {queue0, queue1, queue2, queue3}
• V AR = {s1 in, s1 out, s2 in, s2 out, qin, qout :} where for each V ∈
V AR, V ⊆ AGT × ENV
A satisfying instance of this configuration problem is an assignment of AGT ×
ENV tuples to the sets in V AR, such that φ holds. The constraint φ can be initialized
with the binding constraint in Figure 4.2 (after some minor translation), but this is
clearly not enough to capture the semantics of the system. The constraint must also
define which signature variables are declared in which agent (e.g. the relation s1 in
should only have agents of type client in its domain). Fortunately, these kinds of
constraint come for ‘free’ when building an Alloy model: the engine generates them
automatically based on the model’s static context, via a hierarchy of typed sets and
constraints over their membership.
Alloy Language Before we describe how to construct a static context from a
Verificare model, a brief primer on Alloy is necessary. For a much more thorough
treatment of the tool, see the canonical Alloy book (Jackson, 2011).The Alloy lan-
guage combines set theory, first order logic, and relational calculus under a unified
semantics of relations over uninterpreted atoms (Jackson, 2002b). While undecid-
able in general, Alloy uses the notion of scoping (defining maximum cardinalities on
sets of uninterpreted atoms) to create a finite universe amenable to verification by
reduction to SAT solving. Predicates can be defined over this universe which repre-
sent a desirable (or not) system state, and Alloy (via the Kodkod relational model
finder) can exhaustively explore possible assignments of atoms to relations in order
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signature procom<T1>:
...
environment queue[procom<T1>]
...
agent client:
sig<procom<bool>> s1_in
sig<procom<bool>> s1_out
sig<procom<bool>> s2_in
sig<procom<bool>> s2_out
...
agent server:
sig<procom<bool>> qin
sig<procom<bool>> qout
...
configuration:
5 client, 2 server, 4 queue
all x:client | some y,y’:server |
x.s1_in=y.qout && x.s1_out=y.qin &&
x.s2_in=y’.qout && x.s2_out=y’.qin
Fig. 4.2: VML stubs for a simple system of five clients connected to two servers via
queues
to determine whether the predicate can ever hold true (Torlak & Jackson, 2007).
This places Alloy, like most model-checkers, in the class of tools which are sound but
incomplete. If the SAT instance is satisfiable, it encodes a mapping of atomic ele-
ments to relations which satisfy the predicate. If no satisfying SAT instance is found,
however, it is not a proof of non-existence in general, only non-existence within the
finite universe.
Alloy’s basic unit of organization is the signature. This should not to be con-
fused with signatures in Verificare, which regrettably share the same name and some
notation. When there in any ambiguity between the two, we will denote in parenthe-
87
0 sig genericAtom{}
1 sig specificAtom extends genericAtom{}
2 abstract sig Base {}
3 sig A, B extends Base {}
4 sig C extends A{
5 someAtoms: set genericAtom
6 }{#someAtoms >2}
Fig. 4.3: An Example of a Simple Alloy Model
ses which version is intended. An Alloy signature which represents a named set of
uninterpreted atoms 1. Figure 4.3 presents a simple Alloy model demonstrating how
signatures can be used. An empty signature, as in line 0, simply creates a named
set of uninterpreted elements. A signature can be extended (line 1), which creates a
named subset of the extended signature (that is, specificAtom ⊆ genericAtom).
A signature can also be abstract (line 2), which denotes the fact that there are no
elements of the set which are not also elements of a named subset (line 3). Formally,
an abstract signature is defined as the union of its sub-types Base = A ∪ B. All
named subsets of a set are disjoint, i.e. A ∩B = ∅. Signature extensions effectively
create a tree of sets, with children being subsets of their parent and the root of the
tree, which Alloy denotes as univ, defined as the set of all uninterpreted atoms in
the model (Jackson, 2011). Signatures can be augmented with fields (line 5). A
field is a named relation whose domain is the signature in which it is declared, and
may be of any arity. The range of the relation is defined as an expression following
its name, and may include multiplicity constraints on each element (e.g.one, lone,
set). The field in line 5 creates a relation someAtoms : C × {genericAtom}, which
maps each atom in C (a subset of A) to a set of genericAtom elements (which may
1A set is in Alloy is actually treated as a unary relation, but the two are semantically inter-
changeable.
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Verificare Alloy
init abstract sig Agent, Env{}
signature <name> abstract sig <name> extends
Env{}
environment <name> [s] sig <name> extends s {}
agent <name>:
sig vt1 v
n
1
...
sig vtn v
n
n
sig <name> extends Agent{
vn1 : one v
s
1,
...
vnn : one v
s
n
}{∀ v, v′ ∈ Fields s(v) = s(v′)∨(t(v) =
t(v′)→ v! = v)′}
var : <name>[<number>] in
explicit binding constraint
one sig <name> <number> extends
<name>{}
configuration:
n0 c0,...,nn cn
run phi for for exactly n0
c0,...,exactly nn cn
Table 4.1: Translations from Verificare to Alloy model statements
include specificAtom elements). Finally, a signature may be constrained by one or
more invariants, as in line 6 (which specifies that the cardinality of the set someAtoms
must be greater than 2). These constraints are implicitly universally quantified over
all fields in the signature.
Building the Alloy Model Given these semantics, we can define a simple match-
ing algorithm for building a static context in Alloy from a Verificare model, using
the translations presented in Table 4.1. As we will show, this context correctly cap-
tures an instance of the configuration problem defined above. The algorithm simply
proceeds from the top row of the table to the bottom:
1. Initialize the Alloy model by declaring two top-level abstract signatures, Agent
and Env. These will represent the set of all agents and environments, respec-
tively.
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2. For each (Verificare) signature declaration, create an abstract (Alloy) signature
which extends Env.
3. For each environment, create a concrete Alloy signature extending the (Alloy)
signature of the (Verificare) signature s which the environment provides.
4. For each agent create a concrete Alloy signature extending the set of Agents.
(a) Within the agent (Alloy) signature, declare a field for each (Verificare)
signature variable which shares the variable’s name n, and maps to a
single element of the set s ∈ Env. This is the (Verificare) signature type,
and corresponds to one of the (Alloy) signatures declared in step 2.
(b) Add a signature constraint which specifies that all fields of the same type
are disjoint (i.e. they map the agent to different environments. This is
implicitly true for fields of different types, but must be stated for fields
sharing the same range. This is stated in the table as a higher-order
constraint over all fields v and v′, where the t function returns the field’s
type and the n function returns its name. Unfortunately, Alloy does not
allow such higher-order formulas so we cannot simply quantify over the set
of fields in a signature. Instead, the translator unrolls the quantification
and explicitly writes the constraint as a conjunction of inequalities (e.g.
for three variables n1,n2,n3 of the same type, n1!=n2 and n1!=n3 and
n2!=n3 would be added as a constraint).
5. For each agent explicitly quantified over, create a singleton (Alloy) signature
which extends the agent type. Name it by concatenating the agent type and
user-specified identifier.
6. Create an Alloy scope which is exactly bounded (i.e. has exactly as many ele-
ments per set) by the cardinalities given in the Verficare system configuration.
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In addition to the static context, it is necessary to translate the binding con-
straints in the system configuration into constraints on the Alloy model. Binding
constraints are translated to Alloy facts, which are treated by the tool as invari-
ants. That is, they constrain the state space of possible solutions only to those in
which the fact holds true. A model can have any number of facts, and all must
hold at all times. Recall that there are three kinds of quantification in Verficare:
universal, existential, and implicit. Translation of the first two to Alloy is trivial.
All instances of && are replaced by and, and || is replaced by or. The syntax is
otherwise identical. For explicit quantification, recall that the static context includes
a named singleton subset of any agent which is explicitly quantified (e.g.host[4]
in a constraint creates an Alloy sig one sig host 4 extends host). This lets the
translator simply re-write an explicit quantifier as a universal quantifier over the
singleton subset declared in the static context.
As an example of the translation algorithm, consider the simple model in Figure
4.2. When executed on that Verificare model, the Alloy code shown in Figure 4.4 is
produced.
Note the predicate phi in the Alloy model, which should correspond to the
binding and soundness constraints described above, is empty. This is because all
constraints in the system have already been expressed as invariants (either signa-
ture constraints, facts, or membership constraints based on set extension and field
declaration). The conjunction of these is automatically added to any user-defined
predicates by Alloy. Since the model is generated only to analyze a single instance
of a static configuration, these predicates are unnecessary. phi is declared simply to
give Alloy an initial (empty) formula to conjunct with the invariants.
Instance Finding Once an Alloy model is constructed, the Kodkod relational
model finder is invoked to translate the it into a SAT instance, which is then passed
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abstract sig Agent, Env{}
abstract sig procom extends Env{}
sig queue extends procom {}
sig client extends Agent{
s1_in : procom,
s1_out : procom,
s2_in : procom,
s2_out : procom
}{s1_in!=s1_out and s1_in!=s2_in and s1_in!=s2_out and s1_out!=s2_in and
s1_out!=s2_out and s2_in!=s2_out}
abstract sig server extends Agent{
qin : procom,
qout : procom
} { qin!=qout }
fact{all x:client | some y,y’:server | x.s1_in=y.qout and x.s1_out=y.qin and
x.s2_in=y’.qout and x.s2_out=y’.qin}
pred phi(){}
run phi for exactly 5 client, exactly 2 server, exactly 4 queue
Fig. 4.4: Alloy Model of the 5-client, 2-server system
to an off-the-shelf SAT solver. If a satisfying valuation is found, the SAT instance is
translated back into an assignment of uninterpreted atoms to the sets and relations
defined by the model. Figure 4.5 presents the output of Alloy on the above model,
augmented with some annotations for readability 2.
Note that the disjoint Agent and Env sets, defined in the first two lines of the
figure, correspond exactly to the AGT and ENV sets of the configuration problem
defined. In lines 5-8 and 10-11, each V ∈ V AR is instantiated with a concrete set
2Some unrelated results have not been included in the figure, as they are purely artifacts of the
model-finding process.
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0 this/Agent={client$0, client$1, client$2, client$3, client$4,
server$0, server$1}
1 this/Env={queue$0, queue$1, queue$2, queue$3}
2 this/procom={queue$0, queue$1, queue$2, queue$3}
3 this/queue={queue$0, queue$1, queue$2, queue$3}
4 this/client={client$0, client$1, client$2, client$3, client$4}
5 this/client<:s1_in={client$0->queue$3, client$1->queue$3,
client$2->queue$3, client$3->queue$3,
client$4->queue$3}
6 this/client<:s1_out={client$0->queue$2, client$1->queue$2,
client$2->queue$2, client$3->queue$2,
client$4->queue$2}
7 this/client<:s2_in={client$0->queue$1, client$1->queue$1,
client$2->queue$1, client$3->queue$1,
client$4->queue$1}
8 this/client<:s2_out={client$0->queue$0, client$1->queue$0,
client$2->queue$0, client$3->queue$0,
client$4->queue$0}
9 this/server={server$0, server$1}
10 this/server<:qin={server$0->queue$0, server$1->queue$2}
11 this/server<:qout={server$0->queue$1, server$1->queue$3}
Fig. 4.5: Alloy Instance of the 5-Client 2-Server model
of tuples of the form AGT ×ENV . The soundness of Alloy and Kodkod guarantees
that this assignment is sound with respect to the validity of of φ.
Implementation We conclude with a brief paragraph on the implementation of the
Configuration Picker. Alloy is distributed as a Java Archive and provides API access
to its language compiler and the Kodkod engine (Jackson, 2013). This motivated
our choice of the Java language, as it allowed us to avoid writing Alloy models to
disk and importing them into a separate Alloy wrapper. Parsing of Verificare code is
carried out using the Java APG, a well-developed parser generator for Java (Thomas,
2013). The APG consumes a user-specified grammar in Augmented Backus-Naur
Form (defined in RFC 5284) (Crocker & Overell, 2005). It emits a parser class
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written in Java, which outputs an abstract syntax tree (AST) for any well-formed
input. Translation to Alloy code is carried out by callback functions invoked by
traversal of the AST.
4.3 System Compiler
Once the process compiler has generated a set of individual LTS and the config-
uration picker has generated a mapping for each signature variable from an agent to
an environment, the system compiler is invoked to compose the individual LTS over
those mappings. Specifically, agents and environments must be composed such that
agents can transition internally, but agents and environments transition in synchrony:
an agent invoking a rule via a signature variable should transition synchronously with
the environment to which that agent is bound (for that variable). Since rules have
parameters and may return information, composition must also ensure that the agent
and environment transition using the same parameters and the same returned data.
To enforce these semantics we derive a new composition operator, referred to
as the asymmetric product of two Labeled Transition Systems. This operator uses
the labels generated by the process compiler and the mapping generated by the
configuration picker to define a composed transition relation. Informally, the operator
uses a combination of asynchronous composition and synchronous message passing
to enable one of the component LTS (the agent LTS) to transition freely, while the
second LTS (the environment LTS) may only transition in synchrony with the first
given a composition semantics over the labels between the two components pre- and
post-states. Formally, given two LTS N0 and N1 the asymmetric product is defined
as:
Definition 24. M = asym(async(A0...An), async(E0...EN)) where async denotes
the asynchronous composition of a set of LTS and :
• S = (N0.S×N1.S), I = (N0.I×N1.I), F = (N0.F×N1.F ), A = (N0.A∪N1.A)
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• T = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|a ∈ A ∧ (a ∈ R ∧ F1) ∨ (a /∈ R ∧ F2)}
• R ⊆ A is a set of synchronization labels
• F1 = ∃a′ ∈ A cmp(a, a′) ∧ (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T ∧ (x1, a′, y1) ∈ N1.T
• F2 = (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T ∧ x1 ≡ y1
• cmp : a ∈ R× a′ ∈ A→ {0, 1} is a Boolean predicate matching synchronization
labels to all labels. This function can be used to capture arbitrary label semantics
which govern synchronization.
The asymmetric product differs from standard synchronization in two important
ways. First, the first term to the operator (N0) is given more freedom (i.e. is a less
constrained transition relation) than the latter. This is apparent in formula F2,
where for all a /∈ R N0 may freely transition from state x0 to state y0, while N1 is not
permitted to transition to a new state (x1 ≡ y1). In Verificare these less-constrained
LTS are agents, which may asynchronously transition along internal control-flow and
data-flow branches such as those generated by if, select, and try.
Second, synchronous transition is governed by a relation over sets of labels
rather than by inclusion in a single set of labels, via the cmp predicate. We use this
predicate in Verificare to capture relationships among agents and environments, but
it can be used to encode arbitrary semantics relating labels in the synchronization
set R to labels in the complete label set A. Note that cmp can easily be defined as the
identity function in order to remove the operator’s dependence on label semantics
(i.e. ∀a, a′cmp(a, a′)↔ a = a′).
Verificare’s composition of agents with environments relies on synchronous invo-
cations, in which an agent invoking an environment update rule transitions in concert
with the environment whose rule was invoked. In order to reduce this high-level de-
scription to an instance of the cmp predicate, a series of mappings and label syntax
must be defined:
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• AI = {(pid, var)} is the set of Agent identifiers (e.g. process ids) and signature
variables (i.e. the local sig variables declared by each agent. This set is
generated by the VML compiler prior to converting each component to an
LTS.
• EI = {pid} is the set of Environment identifiers, and is generated in the same
way.
• bind : AI × EI → {0, 1} is a function mapping agents and their variables to
environments. It is generated from the output of the configuration picker: for
an agent identifier (pid, var) and environment identifier e, bind is true if and
only if var ∈ V AR ∧ (a, e) ∈ var.
• L0 = (r, p, v) is an invocation label type. These labels appear only as sub-
components of labels generated by the process compiler. Invocation labels
capture one invocation of a specific rule, for a specific input and specific output.
A label of type L0 is defined as:
◦ r ∈ {0, 1}∗ identifies an update rule
◦ p = p0, ...pn is a sequence of parameter values, used by the specified rule,
where each value is a well-typed instance of a datatype.
◦ v is the value of the return variable for that rule.
For, e.g., an invocation of an add rule on the numbers 5 and 2 and a result of 7,
the L0 label is (add, (5, 2), 7). Note that no rule semantics are attached to this
label: the Cartesian product of all possible inputs and outputs (bounded by
the types of the parameters and return values) must be considered both by an
agent (which cannot predict the output) and by an environment, which cannot
predict the input.
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• L1 = (i ∈ AI, r ∈ L0) is an agent label type, which uniquely identifies the agent
invoking the rule described in r. These are generated by the process compiler
every time an agent invokes an update rule.
• L2 = (i ∈ EI, r ∈ L0) is an environment label type, which uniquely identifies
the environment in which r is being invoked. The process compiler generates
these labels whenever a transition in an environment is created.
We can now define R ⊆ A and cmp for the asymmetric composition of agents
with environments:
Definition 25. R = {a ∈ A|a ∈ N0.A ∩ L2} is the set of all labels denoting an
agent invoking an environment rule. Note that this restricts all synchronization to
that initiated by agents.
Definition 26. cmp(a ∈ R, a′ ∈ A) = a′ ∈ N1.A ∩ L1 ∧ bind(a.i, a′.i) ∧ a.r ≡ a′.r
is a predicate designed to establish the two sides of an interaction between an agent
and environment.
The cmp predicate is designed to to formally capture the informal requirement
that a synchronous transition may only occur between an agent (N0) and environment
(N1) such that when a specific agent (a.i) invokes a rule (a.r) with a specific set of
parameters and return value, a specific environment (a′.i) executes the same rule
(a′.r), on the same parameters to get the same return value (a.r ≡ a′.r). The specific
environment which executes the rule is determined by the configuration mapping
agents and signature variables to an environment (bind(a.i, a′.i)).
4.3.1 Soundness of Asymmetric Composition
Soundness of an algorithm is a statement about the absence of incorrect or
undesirable output, given correct input. In type-theoretic settings, for example,
soundness is defined as rejecting all invalid programs (where validity is with respect
to a language semantics). In model checking, soundness is defined as the absence of
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counter-examples which exist only in the formalism, and not in the model itself (i.e.
false positives). With respect to the asymmetric composition operator, a proof of
soundness should guarantee the absence of invalid outputs (the composed LTS) given
correct inputs (the agent and environment LTS). It is similar to the model-checking
notion of soundness, in that we are concerned with not introducing behavior in the
formal model which is not already present in the user model. Thus, validity is defined
with respect to the intended semantics of agents and environments. In VML agents
are active and asynchronous, that is, their executions can have any interleaving. En-
vironments are passive, and change state only when an agent invokes an update rule
on them. Updates rules have similar semantics to imperative procedures: they are
called on parameters and return a value, both of which may be empty (that is, there
may be no arguments or return value). Side-effects may change the internal state of
the object whose method is being invoked. We can begin to formalize soundness as
the absence of behaviors which violate these (informal) semantics. Given a composed
LTS M = asym(N0, N1), where N0 is the asynchronous composition of all agents in
the system and N1 is the asynchronous composition of all environments, the following
behaviors should hold:
• M should not have any ‘new’ edges, in the sense that all transitions should
be drawn from the transition functions of the component LTS. We must be
careful when defining the formal notion of a new edge, as Verificare performs
label re-writing during composition. This re-writing is purely syntactic, how-
ever. Because synchronous transitions occur based on a binary relation between
labels, rather than on equality between labels, one of the two labels must be
chosen as the representative label in the composed model. The semantic com-
ponent of that label (the message content) is identical in each label, all that
differs is the no-longer-needed unique LTS identifier. We refer to this represen-
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tative label as being semantically equivalent to the one which was not included,
as it encodes the same behavior as each component label did.
• No environment in M should change state unless an agent invokes an update
rule. Such state changes would make environments active participants in the
system, rather than structured contexts for mediating interaction. In terms of
the LTS, no environment in N1 should change state without a simultaneous
state change in an agent from N0.
• No agent should change state in synchrony with another agent. Because syn-
chronous transitions represent interaction, this would violate the rule that
agents interact only indirectly, via environments.
• An agent may only invoke an update rule in an environment to which it is
bound. The binding constraints in the system configuration define allowed
topologies of interaction (i.e. who is allowed to interact with whom), and
violation of these introduces behaviors not specified by the model.
• Synchrony is used to encode message-passing of a rule name and parameters
from an agent to an environment, modification of environment state based on
that rule and parameter list, and simultaneous message-passing of a return
value from an environment to an agent. Thus, no agent or environment should
transition in synchrony unless the labels they are transitioning over encode the
same rule name, parameters, and return value.
Before continuing to formal notions of the above soundness rules, we must define
the well-formedness requirements for the component agent LTS N0 and environment
LTS N1:
Definition 27. The agent LTS N0 and environment LTS N1 are well-formed if:
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• N0 = async(a0, ...an), where ai is a single agent component.
• N1 = async(e0, ...en), where ei is a single environment component.
• All agents change state during an invocation: ∀(x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T a ∈ L1 ↔
x0 6≡ y0
We can now formalize our soundness requirements into a series of theorems
about the behavior of M with respect to its components. The requirement that M
have no ‘new’ edges is split into several related theorems. First, we can establish
that all transitions in M which change the state of the environment component are
synchronous with a transition in the agent component.
Theorem 1. M.T contains no asynchronous environment transitions.
Proof. Assume there exist asynchronous environment transitions. That is, there is
a non-empty subset of E ⊆ M.T such that E = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|x0 ≡ y0 ∧ x1 6≡ y1}.
Since E ⊆ M.T , the label a ∈ M.A. Since R ⊆ M.A, either a ∈ R, or a /∈ R. If
a ∈ R, then formula F1 from Definition 24 holds. Since F1 holds, (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T By
our claim, x0 ≡ y0. But a ∈ R is a synchronization label, and (by well-formedness)
¬∃a ∈ N0.A (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T ∧ x0 ≡ y0. Two states cannot be simultaneously
equivalent and not equivalent, so it must be that a 6∈ R.
If a /∈ R, then formula F2 from Definition 24 holds. By our claim, x1 6≡ y1. But
if formula F2 holds, x1 ≡ y1. Again, two states cannot be simultaneously equivalent
and not equivalent. So it must be that a ∈ R, but we have already shown that this
is impossible. Since a cannot be both an element of R and not an element of R, we
must conclude that the claim is false and the set E is empty.
Using this result, we can establish that all state transitions over the agent
component of M ’s state space are drawn from N0.T :
Theorem 2. The agent component of all transitions in M.T is an edge in N0.T
Proof. Assume this is not the case, and that there is a non-empty set E ⊆ M.T
where E = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|(x0, a, y0) 6∈ N0.T ∨ x0 ≡ y0}.
First assume (x0, a, y0) 6∈ N0.T . Since E ⊆ M.T , the label a ∈ M.A. Since
R ⊆M.A, either a ∈ R, or a /∈ R. If a ∈ R, then formula F1 holds. But if F1 holds,
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then (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T . So it must be the case that a 6∈ R, and F2 holds. But if F2
holds, (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T . So it must be the case that a 6∈ R, which we have already
shown to be impossible. Thus, we must conclude the assumption is false.
If (x0, a, y0) ∈ N0.T , then it must be the case that x0 ≡ y0. But by Theorem 1,
this is impossible. Therefore it must be that (x0, a, y0) 6∈ N0.T . But we have already
proven this is impossible, so the claim must be false and E must be empty.
At this point, we have proven that all transitions in M.T which modify the
state of the agent LTS are drawn from N0.T , and that all environments transition
in synchrony with agents. Thus, every transition in M.T is sound with respect to
agents, as every transition in M.T is also in N0.T with respect to the agent state
space. All that remains to is show a similar mapping for transitions in M.T which
modify the state of the environment LTS:
Theorem 3. All transitions in M.T which have an transitioning environment com-
ponent are semantically equivalent to an edge in N1.T
Proof. Assume there exist transitions in M.T which have a transitioning envi-
ronment component, and that the transition is not semantically equivalent to an
existing edge in N1.T . Then there is a non-empty subset E ⊆ M.T where
E = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|∀a′ ∈ N1.A¬cmp(a, a′) ∧ x1 6≡ y1. Since R ⊆ M.A, ei-
ther a ∈ R, or a /∈ R. If a ∈ R, then formula F1 holds. But if F1 holds,
∃a′ ∈ Acmp(a, a′) ∧ (x1, a′, y1) ∈ N1. So it must be the case that F2 holds. But
if F2 holds, x1 ≡ y1. So a ∈ R, which we already showed to be impossible. Thus the
claim must be false, and E must be empty.
With this result, we have established that M is sound with respect to the
addition of new edges that introduce behavior not previously present. What remains
is to ensure that the semantics of interaction discussed above hold in the composed
system. First, and trivially, we can prove the absence of agents transitioning in
synchrony.
Theorem 4. M.T contains no synchronous agent transitions.
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Proof. Trivial. Follows directly from the well-formedness requirement that N0 be the
asynchronous composition of all agents in the system.
We also require that interactions are limited to those agents and environments
which have been bound via an instance of the binding constraint given by the user.
Theorem 5. M.T contains no synchronous transitions between an agent and envi-
ronment which are not in the binding instance generated by the configuration picker.
Proof. Assume there are synchronous transitions between unbound agents and
environments. Then there is a non-empty subset E ⊆ M.T such that E =
{(x0x1, a, y0y1)|x0 6≡ y0 ∧ x1 6≡ y1 ∧ ∀a′ ∈ N1.A¬bind(a.i, a′.i). Since E ⊆ M.T ,
the label a ∈ M.A. Since R ⊆ M.A, either a ∈ R, or a /∈ R. If a ∈ R, then formula
F1 holds. Since F1 holds, ∃a′cmp(a, a′). But if cmp(a, a′) holds, bind(a.i, a′.i) This
contradicts our claim that ∀a′ ∈ N1.A¬bind(a.i, a′.i), so it must be the case that
a 6∈ R.
If a 6∈ R, then formula F2 holds. By our claim, x1 6≡ y1. But if F2 holds, then
x1 ≡ y1. So it must be that a ∈ R, but we have already shown that this is impossible.
Thus, we must conclude that the claim is false and the set E is empty.
Now that we have proven that only the specified components are communicating,
we must ensure that the communication is itself correct, that is, the messages which
are sent must be the same as those which are received.
Theorem 6. M.T contains no synchronous transitions between bound agents and
environments whose labels do not have matching messages.
Proof. Similar to the previous. Assume there are synchronous transitions between
bound agents and environments whose labels do not have matching messages. Then
there is a non-empty subset E ⊆M.T such that E = {(x0x1, a, y0y1)|x1 6≡ y1 ∧∃a′ ∈
N1.Abind(a.i, a
′.i) ∧ a.r 6≡ a′.r}. Since R ⊆ M.A, either a ∈ R, or a /∈ R. If a ∈ R,
then formula F1 holds. Since F1 holds, cmp(a, a
′) holds. But if cmp(a, a′) holds,
a.r ≡ a′.r This contradicts our claim that a.r 6≡ a′.r, so it must be the case that
a 6∈ R.
If a 6∈ R, then formula F2 holds. By our claim, x1 6≡ y1. But if F2 holds, then
x1 ≡ y1. So it must be that a ∈ R, but we have already shown that this is impossible.
Thus, we must conclude that the claim is false and the set E is empty.
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With these theorems, we have shown that asymmetric composition correctly
captures the semantics of interacting agents and environments in Verficare.
4.3.2 Complexity of Verification
In this section, we discuss the complexity of verifying a requirement via an
explicit-state reachability search, in which the state space is systematically explored
beginning at an initial state. Because labels have semantics associated only with
composition, they may be ignored in the composed LTS. This collapses the multi-
graph formed by the transition relation of the LTS into a standard directed graph,
which may be searched using standard model checking and graph traversal techniques
3. We do not consider the cost of checking a requirement written in a particular logic,
only the cost of exploring the state space of the model itself. Because labels are no
longer needed, we can treat the state space as a simple graph:
Definition 28. Let G = (V,E) be an initially empty directed graph, and M =
asym(N0, N1) be an asymmetrically composed LTS. Insert a vertex v ∈ V for ev-
ery state in M.S. Define the adjacency relation E = {(s, s′)|∀s, s′ ∈ M.S ∃a ∈
M.A M.T (s, a, s′)}
We can bound the size of |V | and |E| as follows.
Theorem 7. |V | = 2n where n is the number of bits needed to represent one state
in the system.
Proof. By trivial construction. Every variable k in the system has a range of m
values, which may be encoded in dlog2me bits. Since n = k ∗m bits are needed to
represent one system state, there are 2n unique bit strings and thus 2n possible states
in the system.
This is the expected state space explosion, in which the number of states scales
with the Cartesian product of all possible variable valuations.
3Translations from a transition function to other formalisms are discussed in Section 5.1
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Theorem 8. |E| ≤ |N0.T |
Proof. This follows directly from Theorems 2 and 1. The former proves that every
edge in M.T which modifies the agent state space is drawn from N0.T , and the latter
proves that the environment state space transitions only in synchrony with an agent.
Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping from N0 to M.T , and |M.T | ≤ |N0.T |. By
Definition 28, there is an onto mapping from transitions in M.T to edges in E, thus
|M.T | ≥ |E|. Since |E| ≤ |M.T | ≤ |N0.T |, then by transitivity |E| ≤ |N0.T |.
The relationship between Theorems 7 and 8 is worth exploring. The state space
explosion problem persists, in that a large amount of space is needed to store the
state space which will be explored. However, the number of edges in the graph scales
only with number of transitions in one of the two components, the agent LTS N0.
Intuitively, recall that N0 already contains every possible state of each agent. Then
the environment LTS effectively filters the transition relation, by eliminating those
transitions over invocations which have incorrect return values given the state of the
environment at that point in execution. We still pay the price for environments in
space, but not in time, since we need only explore the states in the space that can
be reached from an initial model state:
Theorem 9. Let R ⊆ V be the set of reachable states in G. Then |R| ≤ |N0.T |+ 1
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 8. The size (in nodes) of the largest connected
component of a graph is maximally bounded by the longest cycle-free path through
that component. As |E| edges exist and (by Theorem 8) |E| ≤ |N0.T |, the longest
possible path length, and thus number of nodes in that component, is |E|+ 1.
Combined with the discussion in Section 2.3.1 on the impact of non-determinism
in agent and environment LTS, an interesting time/space tradeoff emerges for users
of Verificare. Non-determinism may be concentrated in agents and minimized in envi-
ronments. Models written like this would utilize try, select, and invoke to capture
non-deterministic behavior. They would minimize the the number of parameters in
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environment rules and the number of rules sharing a name in environments. As a
result, the blow-up in state space due to non-determinism is minimized. However,
it also increases the size of |N0| in the composed LTS, as each agent may assume
a larger set of possible variable valuations. This increases the possible size of the
reachable search space, and thus the amount of time required to traverse that space
while model checking. While the absolute size of the search space may be smaller,
more of it may be accessible during verification.
Conversely, non-determinism could be minimized in agents and shifted into
environments via larger rule parameter spaces and overlapping rule names. This will
likely cause a larger state space explosion (if the number of bits required to represent
a parameter list is higher than that required to represent the return value). However,
the number of reachable edges in the final verification graph is independent of |N1.T |.
Thus, the state space will require more memory, but less of it will be explored during
verification.
Adaptive Invariants and Complexity While not included in the above analysis
(which focuses on soundness), the Verificare system compiler also implements the
constraints specified by any adaptive invariants supplied by the user, which restrict
the reachable state space (see Section 3.1.3. An adaptive invariant is a formula φ in
the restricted form of Alloy used for writing the system configuration (see Section
4.2), which is defined over the state variables in M . For brevity, we represent the
transition relation predicate in Definition 24 as ϕ. Then enforcement of the invariant
is implemented by setting M.T = ϕ ∧ φ(x1y1). That is, for a transition to be added
to M , its post-state must satisfy the adaptive invariant . While this may reduce the
reachable state space, it comes at the cost of computing the value of φ each time
an element would be added to M.T . Unsurprisingly, computation of the truth of an
invariant scales polynomially in the number of universal and existential quantifiers
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in φ (as all variables in the quantified set must be iterated over) and linearly in the
number of explicit quantifiers (as a specific variable is being identified).
A fine-grained analysis of the time/space tradeoff associated with adaptive in-
variants if difficult due to the dependency of its efficacy on a specific model. There
are four clear dimensions over which an adaptive invariant can be profiled: the size of
the state space, the size of the subset of that state space that is quantified over, the
complexity of the formula, and the proportion of otherwise-reachable states that are
eliminated by its application. Unless these dimensions are well-understood by the
model designer, adaptive invariants should be used to enforce soundness based on
domain knowledge (e.g. eliminating queue overflows as a source of counter-examples)
rather than to give ‘hints’ to the verifier. Such hints can easily be more of a hindrance
than a benefit.
4.3.3 Implementation
We conclude with a brief note about implementation of the system compiler.
It is built in Haskell in order to easily interface with the process compiler, which
uses the LTS assembly language described in Section 2.3. This language builds in-
dividual LTS via application of a series of monadic combinators encoding language
semantics over a State monad that contains the context necessary to build a tran-
sition system incrementally. Once the program describing the LTS is complete, the
transition system can safely be removed from the monad and composed with oth-
ers via the standard synchronous and asynchronous composition operators which we
implemented as part of the language’s supporting framework. This, the algorithm
can be directly implemented as a comprehension over the transition functions of each
composed LTS.
While our current implementation does not explore this possibility, Haskell’s
lazy evaluation of values may offer an avenue for optimization of the memory used
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during composition. Under this paradigm, computation of a value is deferred until
that value is actually necessary. Any expression which returns a value actually returns
a thunk, which is the computational state necessary to compute that value once it is
needed. This could be used to implement eager composition which maintains a pool
of edges from the transition functions of N0 and N1. Periodically, the composition
operator could be called over these pools to pair synchronous actions and add them
to M.T . So long as these sets could be iterated over in such a way that their entire
contents are not necessary to compute a value, it may be possible to avoid keeping
the entire state space of each LTS in memory. Of course, this is a purely heuristic
optimization. Transition relations have no orderings over elements, and it is always
possible that, e.g., all synchronous actions in N0 will be put into the pool before any
synchronous actions are encountered in N1. Exploration of this optimization is part
of our planned future work.
Chapter 5
Specifying and Verifying Requirements
5.1 Specification Calculi and Model Checking
In order to check whether a requirement holds over a system model, it is neces-
sary to formally write the requirement in a specification calculus or logic. This gives
the requirement a concrete semantics which is amenable to automatic verification.
Specifically, given a finite formal model M and a requirement φ written as a well-
formed logical formula whose variables quantify over the states in M , model-checking
is the process of determining φ |= M . Because M is a finite model, determining if
φ holds is at worst linear in the size of M : simply check each reachable model state
against φ, and return true if and only if φ holds in each state. Unfortunately, the
space complexity of M is equal to the Cartesian product of all possible variable valu-
ations. If, e.g., a model’s state consisted of an array of 32 boolean values, that model
would have 232 unique states. This problem is referred to as state-space explosion,
and occurs in some form for all formalisms which have been used for model checking
(Baier et al., 2008). For this reason, model checking relies heavily on optimizations
and heuristic strategies for state-space generation and exploration.
Because no one formalism is immune to state-space explosion, the choice of
which formal structure should be used in verification is often made based on require-
ment semantics. Depending on the range of behaviors and modalities which must
be checkable, different logical calculi have been developed to formalize them. Each
of these is most naturally verifiable over particular data structures. In this section
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Fig. 5.1: A Kripke Structure for LTL
we provide a brief overview of the specification calculi that Verificare currently has
translation facilities for, as well as the model checking techniques used to automati-
cally search for a counter-example to that requirement. All of these calculi but the
last are instances of temporal logics, which are designed to allow formal R about the
evolution of a system over time by introducing discrete temporal quantifiers over
basic propositional logic. For a thorough survey of temporal logics and their rela-
tionship to model checking, see (Baier et al., 2008). The final specification calculus,
Alloy, is a relational logic built on constrained relationships between uninterpreted
atoms.
Linear Temporal Logic Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) defines time as an infinite
linear sequence of states, beginning at a well-defined initial state and continuing from
pre-state to post-state. Formally, LTL formulas are defined over a cycle through a
Kripke structure M = (S, i, T, A, L) where S is a set of states, i ∈ S is an initial state,
T ⊆ S × S is a transition relation such that ∀s ∈ S ∃s′ ∈ S (s, s′) ∈ T , A is a set of
atomic formulas, and L : S → P (A) is a labeling function mapping states to sets of
atomic formulas which are true in that state. Note that due to the requirement that
every state in this structure has some post-state, finite execution sequences are not
well-defined. For system models in which such a final state does exist and represents
correct behavior, a a self-loop of the form (s, s) can be added to T .
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〈φ〉 ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ→ φ | Xφ | Gφ | φUφ
Fig. 5.2: LTL Grammar
pi |= p↔ p ∈ L(pi0)
pi |= ¬φ↔ pi 6|= φ
pi |= φ0 ∧ φ1 ↔ pi |= φ0 ∧ pi |= φ1
pi |= φ0 ∨ φ1 ↔ pi |= φ0 ∨ pi |= φ1
pi |= Xφ↔ pi1 |= φ
pi |= Gφ↔ ∀i > 0 pii |= φ
pi |= Fφ↔ ∃i > 0 pii |= φ
pi |= φUϕ↔ ∃i > 0 pii |= ϕ ∧ ∀j1 ≤ j < (i− 1) pij |= φ
Table 5.1: LTL Satisfaction Semantics
Figure 5.1 is a simple example of such a a Kripke structure. Consider the path
S1S2S3S1. Conventionally, a path is labeled pi and its elements are denoted with
subscripts, e.g. pi0 = S1, pi1 = S2, etc.. Note that this is not the only infinite path
through the system: S1 itself represents another infinite path due to the self-loop. In
fact, by interleaving transitions over these two paths an infinite series of executions
can be generated. The semantics of LTL are defined over all paths in the model,
that is, ∀pi0pi1...s.t.pi0 = i ∧ ∀i(pii, pii+1 ∈ T . Figure 5.2 presents the syntax of LTL,
and Table 5.1 provides the a brief satisfaction semantics where pi is a path and ϕ
is a formula in LTL. A thorough analysis of LTL, its syntax, semantics, and its
relationship to model checking is available in (Huth & Ryan, 2004).
Note that G and F are derived convenience operators, only U and X are neces-
sary to fully specify an LTL system. Intuitively, each operator maps to a statement
about the current and future states along a past:
• Gϕ - ϕ always holds in all states.
• Fϕ - ϕ eventually holds in some state.
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• ϕ0Uϕ1 - ϕ0 holds in all states prior to the state in which ϕ1 holds, which must
exist. After ϕ1 holds, future states are unconstrained.
• Xϕ - ϕ holds in the next state.
These may be combined with one another to derive common requirement pat-
terns:
• GEϕ is a liveness or recurrence requirement, which states that something good
(ϕ) will infinitely recur, i.e. in all states, there is always a future state where
the formula will be true).
• G¬ϕ is a safety requirement, which states that a bad thing will never happen.
• FG¬ϕ is a stability property, stating that eventually something never again
happens.
• FGϕ is a convergence or steady-state property, stating that eventually some-
thing will always be true for all future states.
LTL requirements can be checked using explicit-state model checking (EMC),
which verifies requirements over transition systems by conducting a reachability check
over a graph (often treated as an automaton) encoding the model. Each state is
treated as a node in the graph, and each element of the transition relation is treated as
an edge. Given an initial state and a property ϕ to check, m |= ϕ is true if and only if
ϕ holds on all nodes reachable from the initial system state. Because of this structure,
EMC excels at verification of models of infinite-execution, finite-state systems. An
execution is a sequence of states, beginning at an initial state and continuing (possibly
non-deterministically) based on application of the transition relation to the current
(most recently generated) state. Because the system state has a finite representation,
any infinite execution must eventually return to an already-visited state. This creates
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〈φ〉 ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ→ φ | AXφ | EXφ | AFφ | EFφ | AGφ | EGφ | A[φUφ] |
E[φUφ]
Fig. 5.3: CTL Syntax
a correspondence between infinite execution sequences and cycles in the space graph
(Baier et al., 2008). In such systems the model can be augmented with a set of
accepting states, of which all infinite executions must pass through at least one
element of. This augmented graph is formalized as a Buchi automaton, which enables
easy verification of LTL properties. All formulas in LTL (and, in fact, any ω-regular
language) can also be converted to a Buchi automaton (Gerth et al., 1995). By
synchronously composing the requirement automaton with the model automaton,
model checking devolves into checking for deadlocks (i.e. states with no outgoing
transitions) in the composed system (Holzmann, 2005).
LTL can also be checked using bounded model checking (BMC). For some prop-
erty ϕ, M |= ϕ is checked by creating a SAT instance through unrolling of transition
relation T for k steps. Paths are encoded as constraints over sequences of states, and
ϕ is encoded as constraints over paths. BMC tends to outperform other techniques
like EMC in systems that have large state spaces but can be verified using a small
bound (Biere et al., 2003). A supporting observation, the small-scope hypothesis,
points out that a large number of real-world bugs can be found using this broad but
shallow approach (Andoni et al., 2003).
Computation Tree Logic Computation Tree Logic, unlike LTL’s single infinite
path, defines time as an infinite branching tree of possible future states. Each infinite
execution is a path originating at the root of this tree and progressing downward.
That is, CTL is defined over an infinite tree of LTL paths comprising all paths pi in
the Kripke structure defined above. The tree is rooted at the initial state i ∈ S and
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for each node j, its children are defined as jc = {s ∈ S|(j, s) ∈ T}. The tree in this
sense represents the infinite unrolling of the transition relation. CTL inherits LTL’s
path operators (Global, Future, etc.) and augments these with the path quantifiers
A and E, denoting all paths and the existence of some path respectively. CTL’s
syntax is presented in Figure 5.3. Its semantics are fairly straightforward, and will
not be analyzed here. For an in-depth discussion of them, see (Huth & Ryan, 2004).
Recall that LTL is implicitly quantified over all paths. This should not be
taken to imply that CTL is more expressive than LTL, as it requires that every
path quantifier is paired with a path operator. LTL (essentially) uses a single path
quantifier over a range of path operators. This prevents certain LTL formulas from
being expressed in CTL (e.g. FGϕ). Similarly, formulas which mix path quantifiers
have no LTL equivalent (e.g. AGEFϕ) (Huth & Ryan, 2004). LTL and CTL do
share a common subset, but are not directly comparable in expressive power.
Symbolic model checking (SMM) is used to evaluate properties written in CTL
over a model. Rather than an explicit graph, SMM works over sets of transitions
between sets of states. Each state in the model is treated as a boolean variable, and
the transition function is defined as a boolean formula whose satisfying valuations
correspond exactly to the pre- and post-state pairs in the original transition function
(Baier et al., 2008). The transition formula is implemented as a Binary Decision
Diagram, a form of directed acyclic graph in which terminals represent valuations
of the formula (0 or 1), non-terminals represent variables, and edges represent a
valuation of that variable (0 or 1). BDDs compress a formula by removing redundant
sub-formulas (i.e. formula’s whose truth value does not change the truth value of the
parent formula) and combining isomorphic sub-graphs. Since verification is done over
the structure of the BDD, this compression effectively allows simultaneous checking
of sets of states (Huth & Ryan, 2004). SMM scales better than EMM for systems
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with large state space, and has been used to verify systems with 1030 states in minutes
(McMillan, 1993).
PCTL* Probabilistic CTL* is a powerful logic which augments temporal connec-
tives with probabilities instead of relying on the notion of non-determinism. Standard
CTL* is the combination of CTL and LTL, allowing free mixing of path quantifiers
and operators. PCTL* introduces a new semantics over the Kripke structure rep-
resenting a model: it is now treated as a Markov chain, with edges labeled with
probabilities and the requisite constraints over the sum of transition probabilities
from each state. In addition to the operators inherited from CTL and LTL, PCTL*
introduces a new operator: P[i,j]ϕ, where ϕ is an LTL formula and [i, j] is an interval
in [0, 1]. It is interpreted as a Boolean predicate: if the probability of the subformula
is within the bound then the formula evaluates to true, otherwise it is false. For an
extensive treatment of PCTL* and its implications for probabilistic model checking,
see (Baier et al., 2008).
Verification of PCTL* is conducted in two steps. First, a reachable state space
which ignores probabilistic quantifiers is created using standard EMC and/or SMM
techniques. The statespace is then treated as a Markov model, where edges are
labeled with either probabilities or transition rates. Numeric solvers are used to
compute properties of the Markov models (e.g. steady-state probabilities), which
determine the truth value of probabilistic quantifiers (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011a).
Alloy The Alloy language is defined over relations between uninterpreted sets of
atoms. Because it is discussed in depth in Section 4.2, we mention it here only for
completeness. Unlike temporal logics, Alloy does not provide a distinct semantics
for event orderings. Models are a set of relational constraints over a user-defined
domain of discourse, and a model instance is a mapping of domain elements to
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relations. Because models are simply a series of constraints, there is little separation
(mathematically) between a model and its requirements, which are also expressed as
constraints over the same domain. Alloy uses the Kodkod relational model finder
to compile a model to an instance of Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) in Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF) (Torlak & Jackson, 2007). The SAT instance is then passed to
an off-the-shelf SAT solver, which performs the verification. If a satisfying instance is
found, Alloy translates the boolean equation back into a mapping of domain elements
to relations, and guarantees that this mapping satisfies all requirements.
5.2 The Need For Multiple Calculi
Real-world systems that require verification, whether distributed systems, em-
bedded devices, cryptographic protocols, or another high-assurance system, are often
sufficiently complex that their key properties span multiple specification calculi. Con-
sider the, for example, the mobile SDN modeled in Section 3.2. LTL could be used
to capture temporally dynamic network safety properties (e.g. all queues eventually
empty, all packets entering the network eventually leave the network) as well as prop-
erties related to controller correctness, e.g. the controller always eventually returns to
its top-level packet-processing loop. Properties related to rates of occurrence, e.g. the
rate of packet drops, the rate of network-wide floods, etc., however, require PCTL* to
formalize. Similarly, static per-state network reachability properties, e.g. blackholes,
forwarding loops, and connectivity, are best expressed in Alloy or Fist-Order Logic.
Obviously, for a set of requirements spanning n specification calculi it is in-
feasible to write n models of the same system. Historically, there have been two
approaches to solving the need for multiple calculi: creation of common unifying
semantics (Smith & Derrick, 2001; Smith, 2002; Boute, 2004; Chen & Liu, 2004;
Willemse, 2004) and automatic distillation of a model into one or more simpler rep-
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resentations (Katz & Grumberg, 2002; Moscato et al., 2007; Grumberg & Katz, 2007).
The first approach can be used to create highly flexible, expressive formal languages
for specifying requirements. This is exemplified by PCTL*: it encompasses LTL,
CTL, and probabilistic quantifiers into a single unified calculus. This power and
flexibility comes at the cost of verification complexity, however. Model checking of
PCTL* formulas are polynomial in the size of the model and doubly exponential in
the size of the formula (Bianco & De Alfaro, 1995). LTL, comparatively, is singly
exponential in the size of the formula and linear in model size, while CTL is linear
in both model size and in formula size (Schnoebelen, 2002) 1.
The second approach, and the one taken by Verificare, uses automated tech-
niques to distill a formal model into a minimal representation whose semantics are
likely to be within the expressive power of many logical calculi. This minimal repre-
sentation can then be compiled into multiple models in the formal languages used by
tools capable of verifying different logical calculi. Note that this approach contrasts
with the former approach: it is focused on the model rather than the calculi, and
it attempts to minimize the expressive power needed to capture model semantics.
This approach satisfies the need for multiple calculi by automating compilation of a
single model into a variety of models suitable for input into tools capable of checking
different calculi. While the former approach would solve the presence of LTL and
CTL formulas by using CTL*, for example, this approach would simply create two
models. One would be given to an LTL verifier (e.g. SPIN), while another would be
given to a CTL verifier (e.g. NuSMV).
1The reader should keep in mind that model size continues to scale exponentially with the range
of state variables in the system, however. State-space explosion is a separate problem from the
complexity of verifying logical formulas.
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5.3 An Automatic Translation Framework for LTS
In this section we present the modular translation framework used by Verificare
to check requirements spanning multiple calculi. This system takes as input the sim-
plified LTS generated by the compiler, and outputs one or more models written in the
language(s) of off-the-shelf verification platforms. In the process, tool-specific edge
annotations (which are supplied by the user as part of a VML model) are removed
from edge labels. If no annotations are present, the resultant unlabeled system is a
non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA), i.e. a a finite set of states and a transition
function mapping states to states. Any language at least as expressive as Boolean
logic is sufficient to encode such an NFA. States can be translated to boolean vari-
ables, and the transition function to a binary formula, using standard techniques
in finite model theory (Torlak & Jackson, 2007; Baier et al., 2008) 2. This enables
a write-once-verify-many functionality, in which a single VML model can be auto-
matically translated to and simultaneously verified with multiple tools, all of which
support different requirement calculi. We first provide an overview of the transla-
tor’s architecture, followed by an in-depth explanation of its core components. We
follow with implementation notes on the two translator plugins that we have already
developed: one for the SPIN LTL model checker and one for the PRISM PCTL*
model checker. Finally, we conclude this section with remarks on the soundness of
multi-model verification and possible future optimizations.
5.3.1 Overview and Architecture
Figure 5.4 presents a schematic overview of the translator, which is implemented
in Java. As can be seen int eh figure, there are two broad components to the system:
2In practice, neither of the two implemented translator plugins require reduction to a Boolean
formula, as their modeling languages permit guarded commands and equality checking. This is
sufficient to encode a transition as conditional assignments to variables
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Fig. 5.4: Translator Architecture
a translation framework which encapsulates the reading and processing of the LTS
emitted by the compiler, and a plugin framework which encapsulates the language-
specific features of an off-the-shelf verifier. Each plugin is expected to implement
two methods: buildContext creates the static context necessary to represent state
variables and build a model in the representative tool, and is called once on plugin
initialization. The addEdge function consumes a standardized representation of a sin-
gle labeled transition from pre-state to post-state, and emits a tool-specific encoding
of that edge into the model under construction.
This design is motivated by two critical issues: isolation of the LTS format from
translator plugins, and efficient translation to the back-end language. The former
is necessary to enforce separation of the compiler’s output format (which may be
optimized or changed over time), and the expected LTS interface used by each plugin.
Without this separation, every back-end plugin might require re-implementation if
the file structure used by the compiler is modified. We implement this separation
using a standardized Edge representation, which represents a single element of the
LTS transition function containing a Plain-Old-Java-Object (POJO) encoding a pre-
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state, a string containing edge annotations (if any), and a POJO representing a
post-state. Because the specific state variables will vary between models and thus
cannot be known at compile time, this class (referred to as the State POJO) is created
dynamically at LTS load-time using the bytecode generation. Edge objects are passed
to plugins in a streaming fashion via the LTSReader class, which efficiently iterates
through the compiler-provided LTS and returns a single element of the transition
function at a time. This minimizes memory overhead by keeping the majority of
LTS state on disk (or network, or other filesystem abstraction).
The second, and more complex, issue is enabling efficient translation from a
generic LTS to a language-specific NFA. Because the State POJO is generated at
load-time, its elements cannot be directly addressed in source code. Instead they
must be accessed indirectly, by iterating over all fields in the object. This capability is
normally provided by the Java Reflection API, but reflection is known to be costly in
terms of access time overhead (citation). Because the State POJO must be accessed
on a per-edge basis, reflection is not a viable choice for indirect field access. Instead,
we again leverage bytecode generation to emit tailor-made accessor bytecode for each
State POJO.
We have used this architecture to implement plugins for the PRISM and SPIN
model checkers, enabling checking of requirements formalized in LTL, CTL, and
PCTL*.
5.3.2 Translator Components in Depth
Generating Model States An important aspect of the translation framework
is isolation of the compiler’s output (which may change format and organization)
from the verifier-specific translator plugins. This isolation is provided by the State
POJO bytecode generator, the Edge class, and LTSReader interface. Currently, the
compiler emits two files encoded in JSON format: a type environment containing
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all variable names and ranges used in the model, and the LTS itself. The type
environment is used to initialize the State POJO, an empty (at compile time) Java
object which represents a single state (i.e. all variables and their values) in the model.
Because of Java’s static type system, dynamic generation of objects after compilation
is not straightforward 3. Fortunately, this problem has been well-studied in the Java
community. We used the Javassist bytecode library (Chiba, 1998) and classloader
to intercept loading of the (empty) State class, and replace it with dynamically
generated bytecode representing a State class with exactly those fields which are
declared in the type environment.
Isolating Model Representation Once the State class is initialized with a type
environment, a class implementing the LTSReader interface provides a simple Edge
iterator to verification plugins. An Edge represents a single element of the LTS
transition relation. It consists of two State POJOs pre and post, as well as a string
representing an edge label. Since the compiler removes all Verificare-specific label
semantics, edge labels at this point consist purely of user-provided annotations or
empty strings. In order to enable modular access to edges in the compiled LTS,
we use the LTSReader interface to require that an implementing class provide a
hasNext() and next() method. The algorithm used to actually access the compiler-
provided LTS may vary by reader. We have currently implemented two readers: a
streaming version which accesses the LTS file on disk one edge at a time, and an
indirect version which maintains a table of states in memory and a table of edges
between state pointers. The former minimizes memory use at the cost of high disk
I/O, while the latter minimizes redundant state descriptions but must be stored in
3This should not be taken to mean that dynamic objects are difficult. It is trivial to create an
object with an array whose size it determined at runtime, for example. It is not trivial to add an
array field to an object which does not declare it in its source code, however.
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memory. Other readers may easily be developed and added to the translator suite
by implementing the interface.
As mentioned previously, the compiler currently outputs an LTS encoded in
JSON. This format was chosen for its wide off-the-shelf support with respect to
parsing and encoding libraries, allowing implementation to focus on Verificare-specific
aspects of the code. This comes at a cost, however, as JSON is an uncompressed,
human-readable format. An alternative binary representation would allow both faster
parsing and a smaller storage footprint. A strong candidate is the Binary Coded
Graph format developed by the CADP project, which has an existing suite of tools to
support translation to and from binary representations of Kripke sturctures (Garavel
et al., 2011).
Efficiently Accessing the LTS Due to the large number of edges in any non-
trivial LTS, efficient reading of their pre- and post-states is a necessary function of
any translator. While this is straightforward if the structure of the State POJO is
known in advance, the fact that it is dynamically generated necessitates a level of
indirection. Traditionally, this is handled by the Java Reflection API, which provides
methods for inspecting and accessing the structure of an object (e.g. iterating over
all methods and fields). Unfortunately, reflection is a well-known source of execution
overhead due to its reliance on dynamic type resolution (Green, 1998). We use
an lightweight alternative, in which a string-based field getter is written into the
State POJO during bytecode generation. This function consumes a field name as an
input parameter, and returns a string containing the value of that parameter. The
translator maintains a list of field names which can be iterated over, enabling easy
access to the State POJO’s fields while avoiding reflection.
121
Building A Plugin Because the expressive power needed to represent an NFA is
so low, building a plugin for Verificare requires only a few basic translations. The
VerifPlugin interface defines two methods that must be provided by a plugin:
• buildContext() should create a verifier-specific static context sufficient to rep-
resent all model variables. This may require flattening of arrays if the language
does not support them, syntactic translations from fields in the State POJO to
the tool’s input language, etc.. The method is executed once, after the State
POJO has been initialized but prior to processing of any LTS edges. The two
existing translator plugins use the Java Reflection API to analyze the fields of
the State class and perform the necessary translations 4.
• addEdge(Edge e) expects a single Edge object, which contains a pre- and post-
State POJO as well as a string representing any edge annotations. This method
should translate the edge into a tool-specific syntax representing transition
from one state to another. Annotations relevant to that tool should also be
processed, if any are supported.
Current Plugins We have currently implemented two plugins for Verificare: one
for the SPIN LTL model checker (Holzmann, 2005), and one for the PRISM PCTL*
model checker (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011a). The former is one of the longest-
maintained model checkers, with a substantial development community and yearly
workshop. The core formalism in SPIN is the proctype, which represents a concur-
rent process and is compiled into a Buchi automaton. The latter is a newer tool which
provides automatic verification of probabilistic properties defined against a variety of
formalisms. The plugin supports two of these: Deterministic- and Continuous-Time
4While reflection is not recommended during edge translation, buildContext is only called once.
Any overhead is minimal compared to the cost of translating the LTS to an NFA.
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SPIN
@spin:progress Liveness label. Indicates that the annotated
state(s) must be retChapter Introduction TB-
Durned to infinitely often.
@spin:end Termination label. Indicates the the annotated
state(s) are valid final states in a terminating pro-
cess.
PRISM
@prism:r-F Transition rate labels. Indicates that the anno-
tated state(s) will transition at rate F, where F is
a floating-point number.
@prism:p-F Transition rate labels. Indicates that the anno-
tated state(s) will transition at with probability F,
where 0 ≤ F ≤ 1
Table 5.2: Plugin Annotations for SPIN and PRISM
Markov chains 5. Both tools’ modeling languages support guarded commands and
integer and boolean datatypes, allowing complete translation of VML data structures
into the respective modeling languages. The annotations supported by each tool, and
a brief description of their usage, is presented in Table 5.2.
5.3.3 Soundness of Split-Requirement Verification
While the translation from a VML model to the LTS representation is sound
(as shown in Section 4.3.1), the splitting up of requirements between verification can
impact soundness in certain cases. Specifically, if a genuine counter-example does
exist, it is possible for other false positives to be found. We point out that if no
counter-examples do exist, then as long as the back-end verification tools are sound,
no counter-examples will exist in our system either.
5Other formalisms supported by PRISM include Markov Decision Processes and Probabilistic
Timed Automata. Defining models using these formalisms requires language-specific features that
are not implementable as annotations, however.
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Theorem 10. Soundness of model checking is preserved during requirement splitting
if there are no counter-examples.
Proof. Trivial, follows directly from the soundness of the verification tool. A set of
requirements can always be checked one at a time. If no counter-examples are found
for checking a requirement, then adding more requirements should never introduce
new counter-examples to the original requirement.
However, if at least one counter example is found, then other (false) counter-
examples may be found.
Theorem 11. If at least one genuine counter-example exists in the model, other false
counter-examples may be found.
Proof. By construction. Given an LTS M and two requirements φ and χ in different
calculi, assume that verifier v0 is checking φ |= M and v1 is checking χ |= M .
Denote the reachable subset of the state space under which both requirements hold
as N ⊆ M . If in fact φ |= M and χ |= M , then there are no traversable edges
(s, a, s′) ∈M.T such that s′ 6∈ N which are reachable from the initial state. However,
if φ 6|= M , then v0 will detect a counter-example which contains some s; 6∈ N . v1
will not, as φ is not written in a checkable calculus for that verifier. Instead, v1 will
check χ on N ∪ M.T (s′)∗, where ∗ denotes repeated application of the transition
relation. That is, v1 will explore a larger state space than v0, including states which
are reachable only due to a pre-existing bug that v0 has detected. If some state
in that larger region triggers a counter-example, v1 will report this as genuine, this
generated a false positive.
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Chapter 6
Related Work and Contributions
Formal verification tools use a variety of techniques to produce mathematically
justifiable claims of (in)correctness with respect to a discrete system model and a
property to be checked. Dynamical and hybrid system modeling techniques are also
amenable to verification, but use substantially different formal methods (e.g. solving
sets of differential equations). See (Morrison, 2012) and (Goebel et al., 2009) for
excellent surveys of dynamical and hybrid systems, respectively.
Because discrete system models may be Turing-Complete (e.g. in the case of
software verification), it is undecidable in the general case to algorithmically verify
whether a property holds while remaining both analytically sound and complete.
Given a system s, a model of that system m written in a formal language or logic, and
a property ϕ expressed as a logical formula quantified over the state of s, soundness
can be defined as m |= ¬ϕ→ s |= ¬ϕ. That is, any counter-example to the property
which is found in the model also exists in the actual system. Completeness is defined
as s |= ¬ϕ→ m |= ¬ϕ. That is, any counter-example to the property which is found
in the actual system also exists in the model.
Undecidability is addressed in one of two ways. Interactive techniques such as
the Coq (Bertot & Caste´ran, 2004) and Isabelle/HOL (Paulson & Wenzel, 2002) the-
orem provers sacrifice automation but maintain both soundness and completeness.
They act as interactive mathematical tools which assist human operators in proving
whether m |= ϕ. Automated techniques such as model checkers sacrifice complete-
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ness, but maintain both automation and soundness. These tools cannot prove the
nonexistence of a counter-example, but guarantee that if a counter-example to that
property is found, then it is a genuine violation of the property. Verificare and its
related work are instances of automated verification tools. These systems rely on
intelligent exploration of a state space of possible model configurations (e.g. states
in a transition system or valuations of logical variables). This space is necessarily
finite, so any system configuration not in the model’s state space will not be verified.
Following is a taxonomy of these tools and a discussion of Verificare in the
context of its related work. More detailed comparisons between individual thesis
components and other work are made in their respective chapters.
6.1 Taxonomy
We define five dimensions over which automated verification systems are cate-
gorized. Domain-Aware systems leverage known semantics of the problem domain
to improve the average-case complexity or soundness/completeness of verification.
Extensible systems allow new functionalities (e.g. verification of new requirement
calculi) to be added to the system by third-parties. Incremental systems allow mod-
els to be defined gradually, starting with a simple model and adding functionality
over time. Modular systems support models as a series of inter-connected black boxes
with well-defined interfaces. Finally, calculus-oblivious systems decouple the formal
structure of the model from the requirement calculus used to verify its properties.
Table 6.1 presents a taxonomy of relevant verification systems with respect to these
categories.
Domain Awareness Domain-aware systems are those which use knowledge of
the problem domain to improve the average-case complexity (Kazemian et al., 2013;
Canini et al., 2012; Khurshid et al., 2012) or soundness/completeness (Mai et al.,
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Verification System Domain-
Aware
Extensible Incremental Modular Calculus-
Oblivious
Alloy (Jackson, 2011) N Y Y Y N
Anteater (Mai et al., 2011) Y Y N N N
Asmeta (Gargantini et al., 2008) N Y N N N
EasyCrypt (Barthe et al., 2011) Y Y N N N
CADP (Garavel et al., 2011) N N N Y N
HSA (Kazemian et al., 2012) Y N N N N
MODEST (Hartmanns, 2012) N Y N Y Y
NetPlumber (Kazemian et al., 2013) Y N N N N
NICE Canini et al. (2012) Y N N N N
NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 2002) N N Y Y N
OsMoSys (Moscato et al., 2007) N Y Y Y Y
ProVerif (Blanchet et al., 2010) Y N N N N
PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011b) N N N Y N
SAL (De Moura et al., 2004) N Y N Y N
Spin (Holzmann, 2005) N N N N N
UPAAL (Behrmann et al., 2006) N N N Y N
Verificare Y Y Y Y Y
Veriflow (Khurshid et al., 2012) Y N N N N
Veritech (Grumberg & Katz, 2007) N Y N Y Y
Table 6.1: A taxonomy of verification systems
2011; Kazemian et al., 2012; Barthe et al., 2011; Blanchet et al., 2010) of model
verification. Generally these tools permit only a limited range of models, and are
designed to check specific types of requirement that are common in that problem
domain (e.g. reachability in networks). In terms of soundness, domain-awareness
constitutes a sound translation from a domain-specific formal structure (e.g. a net-
work topology) and set of properties to be checked to a verifiable formal structure
(eg a SAT instance) and associated logical formula. Anteater (Mai et al., 2011)
and Header Space Analysis (Kazemian et al., 2012) both soundly and completely
translate network topology graph, an encoding of routing rules, and a reachability
predicate to a SAT instance. Soundness, in this case, is with respect to the satisfia-
bility of the SAT instance: if it is satisfiable, that valuation of variables constitutes
a symbolic packet (all symbolic packets, in the case of HSA) which can be routed
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from the source to the destination, as specified in the reachability predicate. Com-
pleteness is defined as the lack of a satisfying instance corresponding to the actual
nonexistence of a packet which can be routed from source to destination. In the
domain of cryptography, ProVerif (Blanchet et al., 2010) and EasyCrypt (Barthe
et al., 2011) both leverage formal verification tools to soundly (but incompletely)
prove properties of cryptographic protocols. ProVerif uses a cryptographic variant of
the Pi process calculus (Ryan & Smyth, 2011) to enable translation of cryptographic
protocols into Hoare triples, which can be verified via logical resolution. In this case,
soundness is defined with respect to an adversarial knowledge model: if an instance
is found via logical resolution in which the adversary’s application of inference rules
allows derivation of a secret, that instance constitutes an actual attack on the proto-
col. EasyCrypt uses a related concept, in which cryptographic protocols are modeled
as a series of games, starting at security goals and proceeding through a series of
derived games to security assumptions. EasyCrypt relies on a translation from its
language of games to probabilistic relational Hoare logic, which can be checked using
off-the-shelf SMT solvers.
Domain-aware systems may also use knowledge of problem semantics to opti-
mize the average-case verification complexity. The NICE model checker (Canini et al.,
2012) is designed to verify that OpenFlow controllers are free of bugs expressible as
Python code fragments defined over model variables. In practice, this constitutes all
safety (i.e. state-specific) properties and some liveness (i.e. path-specific) proper-
ties. NICE uses symbolic execution of the controller to determine equivalence classes
between packet headers, and performs explicit-state verification over one packet per
equivalence class. Veriflow (Khurshid et al., 2012) uses equivalence classes between
packets (defined with respect to forwarding actions taken by routers) to perform in-
cremental verification of network invariants, expressed as predicates about A prefix
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graph’s properties. The prefix graph datastructure encodes each dimension (bit) of
packet header routability, and traverses it in a manner similar to explicit-state model
checking. NetPlumber (Kazemian et al., 2013) also allows incremental verification of
a network by checking rule updates against equivalence classes. It operates over an
HSA headerspace, and creates equivalences between packet headers via abstraction
into a symbolic routing graph. This graph consists of sources, sinks, and nodes rep-
resenting routing rules. These rules filter the symbolic packets flowing from sources
to sinks. Adding or removing rules thus only requires re-verification of flows passing
through that region of the graph.
Tools which are not domain-aware support a wider variety of possible models at
the cost of only being able to optimize average-case performance over purely syntactic
properties of formal models, e.g. symmetry breaking predicates (Torlak & Jackson,
2007) in SAT instances or partial-order reduction in explicit-state model checking
(Holzmann, 2005). Models written in that language are compiled to an automatically
verifiable formalism. This formalism may be chosen to capture a particular problem
semantics (Garavel et al., 2011; Hartmanns, 2012; Behrmann et al., 2006), to enable
translation to other verification tools (Grumberg & Katz, 2007; Gargantini et al.,
2008; Moscato et al., 2007), or to enable verification of a particular specification
calculus (Holzmann, 2005; De Moura et al., 2004; Cimatti et al., 2002; Jackson, 2011).
In the first case, two domains of interest dominate. Concurrent communicating
processes, in which asynchronous blackboxes interact with one another via shared
state, are often used to reason about concurrency (e.g. race conditions, interleaving
of executions, deadlocks, etc.) in distributed systems. CADP (Garavel et al., 2011)
is an integrated suite of tools to analyze such concurrent processes. It originally
used the LOTOS process calculus (whose semantics are defined over petri nets), but
has since been extended with a variety of other formalisms. It supports verification
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of requirements in branching time logics (e.g. CTL). In verification of real-time and
cyber-physical systems, concurrency must often be augmented with probabilistic and
continuous-time behavior. Tools which support formal notions of continuous time
and stochastic behavior ((Behrmann et al., 2006; Hartmanns, 2012)) use modeling
languages based on process calculi whose semantics are defined over stochastic timed
automata. MODEST (Hartmanns, 2012) is a tool suite based on a process algebra
of the same name, which includes automatic translators to PCTL* verification tools
and simulators. UPAAL (Behrmann et al., 2006) is a similar tool which supports
verification and simulation of models defined using a process algebra over networks
of timed automata.
In the second case, tools can provide a modeling language defined over a meta-
formalism designed to enable automated translation to and from different existing
verifiers. Veritech (Grumberg & Katz, 2007) uses a common description language
(CDL) defined over finite transition systems. It does not provide any verification
capabilities, but instead consists of a set of translators between existing formal no-
tations (including LOTOS, SPIN, SAL, and SMV) and the CDL. As these notations
do not have a common unifying semantics, Veritech translations are sound only
with respect to certain families of properties Katz (2001). OsMoSys Moscato et al.
(2007) is a platform for object-oriented multi-formalism modeling, based on an in-
heritance system between formalism types. Formalisms are defined using a series
of meta-description languages for specification of syntax and semantics. ASMETA
(Gargantini et al., 2008) is meta-formalism for abstract state machines, which de-
fines a common modeling notation for use by individual back-end tools. It provides
a concrete and abstract syntax for abstract state machine definitions, as well as an
interchange format based on XML.
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Finally, tools which are not domain aware may provide modeling languages
whose semantics are defined over a formalism amenable to verification of a particular
specification calculus 1. SPIN (Holzmann, 2005) allows verification of LTL require-
ments via reduction of models and requirements to Buchi automata. SPIN is an
explicit-state model checker which uses two primary optimizations to improve aver-
age case complexity: partial-order reduction of the state space and bit-state hashing
of individual states. The is a former is a type of symmetry-breaking, in which two or
more sub-graphs are equivalent with respect to the property being verified. The lat-
ter hashes individual seen states to reduce memory overhead, at the cost of soundness
due to hash collisions. SAL (De Moura et al., 2004) provides access to both LTL and
CTL by running multiple model checking algorithms. A symbolic BDD-based checker
is used to analyze CTL properties. Both explicit-state and bounded model checking
algorithms are provided for checking LTL requirements. SAL also provides support
for completeness of LTL verification, via bounded model checking augmented with
k-induction using an SMT solver. NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 2002) is a symbolic model
checker which uses both BDD-based and BMC-based algorithms to check LTL and
CTL requirements. CTL is checked using the standard approach (see 5.1, while LTL
is converted to a tableaux of falsifying behaviors that are synchronously composed
with the model prior to verification (Clarke et al., 1994). PRISM (Kwiatkowska
et al., 2011b) is a model checker for PCTL*. Models are compiled to probabilis-
tic timed automata and verified using quantitative abstraction refinement (QAR)
(Cerny et al., 2013). QAR computes monotonically increasingly precise bounds on
probabilistic reachability properties, providing ‘anytime’ verification whose accuracy
is proportional to its runtime. Finally, Alloy (Jackson, 2011) is a model checker for
the Alloy specification language, a combination of set theory, first-order logical, and
1For a discussion of the various requirement calculi and their mechanisms of model checking, see
Section 5.1
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relational calculus. It is discussed more in Section 4.2. Alloy, while not by default
domain-aware, can be augmented with domain-aware model constraints and formal
structures. It provides a syntax for defining invariants over a state space and com-
posing formal structures (specifically, relations over sets of uninterpreted atoms) that
allows model components to be defined once and included in future models.
Extensibility Extensible tools provide support for the addition of new calculi for
verification, translators to and from different formalisms, and other augmentations
by third parties after the tool’s release. This is especially important for systems
which are not domain-aware, and are thus intended to act as general formal modeling
environments. New calculi and techniques are regularly developed, and easy integra-
tion with these allows a tool to become more flexible over time. Extensibility has
two dimensions: multi-formalism approaches that rely on a unifying meta-formalism
(Moscato et al., 2007; Grumberg & Katz, 2007), and multi-solver approaches that
rely on a translation layer from a common intermediate representation to models
and formalisms supported by other tools (Gargantini et al., 2008; Hartmanns, 2012;
Garavel et al., 2011; De Moura et al., 2004).
Multi-formalism extensibility is obviously powerful, but must often sacrifice (or
defer the proof of) soundness due to incomparable semantics between formalisms.
OsMoSys (Moscato et al., 2007) relies on a meta-modeling language to define mod-
els as interconnected sets of sub-models. Each sub-model has an inheritance-based
typing, and ’wrappers’ can be written to convert sub-model types into the formal
language used by a back-end solver. The intent is to enable a model to be composed
of multiple formalisms, which communicate via translations of state components from
one to the other. It is left to the implementors of individual formalisms to provide
sound and complete mappings to and from that formalism. Veritech (Grumberg &
Katz, 2007) uses a Common Description Language (CDL) based on (possibly infinite)
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state transition systems with edge labels denoting pre-conditions on transition. The
tool is intended to be used as an intermediate representation between compilers for
different formalisms. Since their semantics may not be comparable, CDL-mediated
translation can only provide limited soundness guarantees (Katz, 2001).
Multi-solver extensibility is based on providing a standardized interface to a par-
ticular formal structure. Asmeta (Gargantini et al., 2008) is a framework for Abstract
State Machines, which generalize finite transition systems over arbitrary datastruc-
tures. It provides a high-level executable specification language in both concrete and
abstract syntaxes. Tools which can operate over ASMs can then write a transla-
tor from the abstract syntax of Asmeta to their internal formal model. Translators
currently exist to provide ASM simulation and testing (Gargantini et al., 2008) as
well as symbolic (Arcaini et al., 2010) and explicit-state model checkers (Farahbod
et al., 2007). CADP (Garavel et al., 2011) is a suite of tools based around the
Open/CEASAR architecture (Garavel, 1998), which provides a standardized repre-
sentation of labeled transition systems. The architecture provides a graphical model
of transition systems, with arbitrary edge labels which may encode specific semantics.
While it originally only supported models written in the LOTOS process calculus, 14
formal languages (including the pi-calculus, SDL, and FSP) are now translatable to
the Open/CEASAR architecture. On the back-end, 45 verification and analysis tools
have been written which operate over the notation used by Open/CEASAR. Each
tool is based on a particular edge semantics, which defines the subset of transition
systems for which it can provide sound verification. Modest (Hartmanns, 2012) is a
process calculus-based language and framework for stochastic timed automata. Like
CADP, it relies on a highly expressive over-arching formalism with a standardized
notation, over which sub-classes of formalism can be defined and used by specific
verification back-ends. Unlike CADP, this formalism is designed to capture notions
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of time-varying and stochastic behavior that arises in real-time and cyber-physical
systems. In practice, formal sub-classes are defined over the semantics of time (agnos-
tic, discrete, continuous, exponentially-distributed, etc.) and the treatment of state
transitions as non-deterministic or probabilistic. Modest’s tool set currently includes
model checkers for PCTL* and TCTL (CTL extended with clock constraints). SAL
(De Moura et al., 2004) provides a modeling language and standardized representa-
tion for working with finite transition systems. While the formalism overlaps with
that of CADP, SAL’s abstract syntax is designed to be accessed as an API, with
extending tools defined with respect to that syntax (rather than over a graphical
structure). Furthermore, it restricts transition systems to be finite, and therefore
amenable to state-space exploration techniques.
Finally, tools which reduce problems to instance of Boolean satisfiability are
frequently extensible in terms of solver choice due to the standardized DIMACS
(for Discrete Mathematics & Science, 2012) format used to represent SAT instances.
NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 2002), Alloy (Jackson, 2011) and Anteater (Mai et al., 2011)
allow provide DIMACS output for SAT instances.
Incremental Modeling Verification tools which support incremental modeling al-
low system models to be built in a bottom-up manner. These tools permit verification
of under-specified model components, abstraction of components into constraints on
the model state space, gradual addition of new components to the system over time,
etc.. Alloy (Jackson, 2011) provides this facility as a natural consequence of its lan-
guage: models consist of a universe of sets of uninterpreted atoms, and constraints
over that universe. Invariant constraints can be added as Alloy facts, which can be
used to model guarantees about the state of the system which come from external
sources or components. Predicates between pre- and post-states can also be used
to add functionality over time, by defining that functionality as a relation from an
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initial state to a resultant state. Asmeta (Gargantini et al., 2008), and abstract state
machines in general, support a notion of incremental modeling via abstraction refine-
ment. ASMs are an executable specification language, which can be used to create
an initial ground model. Successively more complex models (i.e. those having more
functionality) can be built by refinement of the initial model, defined as a mapping
from states in the initial model to states in the refined model. Soundness must be
proved over this mapping for each step of refinement.
Modular Tools which support modular modeling allow models to be created as a
series of black boxes connected by well-defined interfaces. The internal state and im-
plementation of each black box is hidden, i.e. changes made to that implementation
will not necessitate changes to other component implementations. A weak notion of
modularity is inherited by any system which is based on process calculi (Hartmanns,
2012; Kwiatkowska et al., 2011b; Behrmann et al., 2006; Garavel et al., 2011) and/or
transition systems (Gargantini et al., 2008; Garavel et al., 2011; Cimatti et al., 2002;
De Moura et al., 2004). These formalisms are compositional with respect to syn-
chronous, asynchronous, and partially-synchronous composition operators. In order
to soundly support this semantics, the internal state of each component is neces-
sarily opaque to other components. The notion of a well-defined interface (which
is a language-level, rather than formalism-level, property) is lacking in these tools,
however. Only OsMoSys (Moscato et al., 2007) currently provides full modularity
via an object-oriented modeling language and meta-language for defining interfaces
between formalisms and sub-models.
Calculus-Oblivious Finally, Calculus-Oblivious tools decouple the formal repre-
sentation of the model (e.g. a graphical transition system) from the requirements
being checked over it (e.g. LTL or CTL formulas). CADP (Garavel et al., 2011), via
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the Open/CEASAR architecture, provides this facility. Models in CADP are graphi-
cal transition systems, where edges are labeled with uninterpreted strings. Back-end
tools can verify the model with respect to semantics defined over these strings, en-
abling a variety of logical specification calculi. Modest (Hartmanns, 2012) provides
an equivalent facility for stochastic timed automata. Asmeta (Gargantini et al., 2008)
is a calculus-oblivious notation for abstract state machines.
6.2 Thesis in Context
Domain-Awareness Verificare is not inherently domain-aware, but, like Alloy (Jack-
son, 2011), can be augmented with domain-specific components and state-space con-
straints. Environments (which mediate communication between stateful blackbox
agents) can be tailor made to represent particular problem domains (e.g. noisy
queues, shared memory, mailboxes, blackboards, networks, etc.) and used in fu-
ture models representing a system in that domain. Furthermore, adaptive invariants
can be used similarly to Alloy’s facts. These are interpreted by the compiler as
ground truth, and will confine state space exploration to the regions in which all
adaptive invariants hold. Guarantees from systems outside of the modeling context
but present in the domain (e.g. packet ordering, absence of queue overflows, etc.)
can be modeled in this way.
Extensibility Verificare is extensible in the single-formalism, multiple-solver sense. Its
translation architecture is similar in structure and intent to that of CADP (Garavel
et al., 2011): the output is a graphical representation of a labeled transition system,
with uninterpreted strings encoding arbitrary edge label semantics. Any verification
tool which can work with transition graphs can be added to Verificare’s tool suite
by writing a plugin from states and edge labels to the tool’s modeling language.
Edge semantics expected by these tools can be added to models via annotations if
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using VML. In addition, languages other than VML could be defined in an extensible
way. These languages would still have to support Verificare edge semantics (agents
invoking rules in environments), but are otherwise unconstrained as long as they
provide a list of agent and environment LTS to the system compiler.
Incremental Modeling There are two forms of incremental modeling supported in Ver-
ificare. First, components can be verified on their own with respect to all possible
system inputs before being added to the larger system. This allows component-
specific requirements to be checked before the entire system is developed. Secondly,
components can be represented abstractly as adaptive invariants . These guarantees
represent the effect of the component on the system, and can be used in two ways.
First, adaptive invariants can be gradually refined over multiple verification runs to
discover what the component ought to do in order to preserve system-wide require-
ments. For example, system-wide eventual consistency might be found to hold only if
a replication component maintains a certain replication threshold. This is similar in
intent to abstract refinement in Asmeta (Gargantini et al., 2008). Secondly, adaptive
invariants can be used as requirements on what an unimplemented component must
do. In this case, they act as a condition on system correctness: if the component
does provide the guarantee, then a set of properties hold with respect to the system.
In this usage, they resemble facts in Alloy.
Modularity Verificare provides modular model construction through its use of opaque
components (as in process-algebraic approaches) interacting via well-defined channels
defined by signature interfaces. The second component (signatures) distinguishes it
on a language level from process algebras. The fact that channels (environments)
between agents are themselves programmatic distinguishes it from process algebras
on a semantic level, which generally limit communication to FIFO queues and shared
variables (Baier et al., 2008). Verificare is arguably less modular, however, than the
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fully object-oriented OsMoSys (Moscato et al., 2007) approach. There is not currently
an inheritance system defined for agent, environments, and signatures. This is a rich
area for future work.
Calculus-Obliviousness Verificare is calculus-oblivious for all calculi that can be de-
fined over graphical models of transition systems. It is similar to CADP in this
respect, which is unsurprising given their comparable translation systems. Edge
labels in Verificare are treated as uninterpreted strings, which are processed by tool-
specific translator plugins. These labels are add manually as annotations over control
flow structures in VML, which is distinct from CADP’s process-algebraic approach.
While Verificare’s approach enables the same model to have multiple semantics (e.g.
both probabilistic and non-deterministic) depending on which translator is verifying
it, this can impact soundness (i.e. generate false positives) in the presence of gen-
uine counter-examples to requirements. See Section 5.3.3 for a formal analysis of this
property.
Intangibles In addition to the dimensions above, Verificare provides certain intangible
benefits that are rarely, if ever, present in any of the related work: levers to manage
state space and the facility to build libraries of model components, requirements,
and invariants. Levers to manage state space take the form of adaptive invariants,
and trade-offs associated with non-determinism. Adaptive invariants constrain the
reachable state space (thus reducing verification time) but come at the cost of higher
compilation time. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2. Non-determinism,
which arises from interaction of agents with environments, can be concentrated ei-
ther in agents by having large spaces of return value and small spaces of update rule
parameters, or in environments by doing the opposite. This has the effect of de-
creasing verification time at the cost space, or vice versa, respectively. The trade-off
is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
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no other tool in the related work provides explicit access to time/space trade-offs
with respect to model design. Furthermore, Verificare’s compositional approach to
modeling allows sub-components to be written once and re-used many times, and
even incorporated into libraries. The same is true of requirements and invariants
defined over the state of these components. This enables a separation of concerns,
in that experts in a particular domain can contribute code which can be used by
non-experts. Again, this facility is not explicitly present in other tools. Alloy comes
closest, as it allows model definitions to be imported into other models. There is no
guarantee of composability, however.
Summary Overall, Verificare’s LTS notation and translation framework are compa-
rable in function to CADP’s. Unlike CADP’s input languages, VML draws heavily
on object-oriented concepts (objects, methods, and interfaces), but is lighter-weight
than OsMoSys in that the objects are all representable in the same formalism and
there is no notion of inheritance. Finally, the use of constraints over a state-space
(as opposed to assertions to be checked) to encode domain-specific properties or to
incrementally build models is drawn from executable specifications like Asmeta and
relational modeling languages like Alloy. Unlike these tools, Verificare applies these
constraints to explicit state space exploration rather than abstract refinement and
Boolean formulas, respectively. This is similar in intent to abstract refinement in
Asmeta and other abstract state machines languages.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Software-Defined Networking has emerged as a powerful, programmatic tool
for large-scale distributed systems. The network controller in such systems if a full-
fledged reactive software process running on an independent machine, which analyzes
packets from the data plane and emits rule updates to one or more routers on how to
handle such packets in the future. The risk associated with programmatic networks,
of course, is that software bugs in the (often Turing-Complete) controller can lead
to unexpected and hard-to-reproduce network configuration errors. Existing tools to
enforce the absence of, or detect the presence of, such bugs are predicated on the
assumption that the controller exists in isolation, receiving inputs only from the data
plane and emitting information only to the data plane.
A relatively new class of systems, which we call SDN-Enabled applications,
violate this assumption by making the controller a fully interactive component in a
larger system (via, e.g., an API that is exported to other software layers). In these
systems the correctness of properties to be checked cannot be defined with respect
to the SDN alone. We show by example that the approach taken by Verificare, and
the toolset provided by it, is well-suited for verification of SDN-Enabled systems.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis offers two primary contributions. First, it provides a compositional
modeling framework with features that are infeasible or impossible using existing
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monolithic verification tools. Compositional models can be combined with one an-
other and have sub-components modified, added, or removed without requiring any
implementation changes to the rest of the system. This enables a separation of con-
cerns by letting domain experts focus on modeling the model sub-components that fit
their area of expertise (e.g. Cyber-Physical Systems, High-Performance-Computing,
and networking), which can then be composed together into a complete system. The
only requirement for this approach is that a system can be represented as a collec-
tion of active agents (i.e. processes) communicating over shared environments (i.e.
datastructures). SDN-Enabled applications are naturally suited to this model, and
easily represented as such. Furthermore, adaptive invariants can be defined over the
composed system which encode assumptions about possible system behaviors. These
are used to restrict the verification state space, as opposed to requirements that are
checked over the state space. Adaptive invariants can be used to abstract compo-
nent implementations into the guarantee they provide, represent services that are
present but not modeled (e.g. SaaS applications), or to encode domain-specific facts
about the system like physical limitations on transmission rate. No existing tool for
verifying dynamic systems provides this capability. Finally, the agent/environment
structure can be exploited during verification to make the number of reachable sys-
tem states dependent only on agent complexity, and independent of environment
complexity. This can substantially reduce the time required to verify requirements.
Secondly, Verificare provides a tool chain beginning at a compositional modeling
language, VML, and ending with a translation framework to off-the-shelf verification
tools. VML allows agents and environments to be swapped out or internally modified
without necessitating changes to any other model components. This is critical for
SDN-Enabled systems, which not only share many sub-components like SDN switches
and buffered network queues, but may have components whose internal implemen-
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tation is unknown (e.g. software as a service) but whose interface is well-defined.
The use of interface-like abstractions for communication also enables composable
model components, such that the topology of interaction (which component can
communicate with which others via a shared environment) can be modified, with
new components added, old components removed, and existing components moved
without requiring modification of any component models. This ensures that changes
to system architecture (e.g. the addition of a new service in a distributed system)
will not impact the implementation or correctness of existing components.
Models written in VML are automatically compiled to a minimal, calculus-
oblivious formalism, which can be translated to any language at least as expressible
as Boolean logic. During the translation, the adaptive invariants specified by the
user and the agent/environment structure is used to prune the size of the output
formalism. This ensures that all verifiers operate over a minimal model whose time
to check is as small as possible.
Finally, Verificare provides a calculus-oblivious translation framework for sup-
porting existing verification tools. It uses a plugin-oriented architecture, in which the
compiled model is accessed via a standardized API. Plugins for off-the-shelf verifica-
tion tools can be written against this API and used to translate a Verificare model
into a tool-specific language. Because the formalism output by the compiler can
be represented in a language as simple as Boolean logic, a wide variety of existing
tools are valid targets for translation. This enables VML models to be verified with
respect to a wide variety of possible requirements, spanning multiple calculi that en-
code entirely different semantics. New plugins can be added at any time, expanding
the suite of available tools and logics that can be used.
142
7.2 Open Research Directions and Future Work
Verificare is a large project spanning multiple areas of active research, and
can be extended along several directions. In terms of minimizing the state space
generated by a model, VML could be augmented by abstract interpretation and
dataflow analysis to project a minimal model into the underlying LTS. In terms
of language accessibility and extensibility, a richer suite of primitive and derived
datatypes would enable users to focus more on system behavior and less on syntactic
considerations. Optimization of resource usage during compilation could be improved
by taking advantage of Haskell’s lazy evaluation, potentially reducing the memory
overhead of asymmetric composition. Finally, Verificare could be extended with a
library of common domain-specific adaptive invariants and requirements that could
be selected and used with any model containing the components that they are defined
over.
Static Analysis of VML VML models, and the LTS assembly language that
they compile into, are defined over a state space of variables, each of which has a
range of possible values. When specific requirements are being checked, however, not
all system variables may be relevant to those requirements. Data- and control-flow
analysis of VML models with respect to the variables quantified over by requirements
could allow extraneous sets of states to be eliminated prior to composition, reducing
the size of the resultant state space. Similarly, abstract interpretation of control
flow branches can be used to identify equivalences between possible sets of variable
values, allowing the compiler to reduce the range of that variable to an element of
each equivalence set (e.g. if the only test on x is x > 5, and its type is int(0,10),
then it could safely be re-typed as int(5,6)).
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Richer Datatypes and Objects Verificare currently supports only booleans,
bounded integers, and arrays thereof. Extension of these with user-defined type-
defs, enumerated constants, and arrays spanning multiple types would simplify both
internal state manipulation and the signatures over which agents and environments
interact. In addition, support for objects (i.e. encapsulated data declarations and
methods defined over them) would allow for reusable data structures that could be
included in component definitions. While datatype enrichment is primarily a pre-
processing stage, further investigation into the impact of objects on state space size
and generation complexity is warranted.
Optimized Composition As briefly discussed in Section 4.3.3, Haskell’s lazy ver-
ification defers computation of a value from an expression until that value is needed.
This could be used to implement a form of eager asymmetric composition that builds
synchronous transitions on-the-fly, during generation of the component LTS. While
worst case-complexity will not be impacted, it is worth investigating under what
circumstances memory overhead could be reduced.
Library of Invariants and Requirements Finally, the fact that model compo-
nents in Verificare are re-usable across models means that adaptive invariants and
requirements defined over state variables of those components can also be defined
once and used many times. A library of such components, as well as their possible
requirements and adaptive invariants , could substantially increase both the accessi-
bility of Verificare and allow for exploration of different system scenarios by adding
and removing pre-defined adaptive invariants . A library can be used to discover
unexpected model requirements (e.g. by progressive tightening of an invariant) as
well to test against common error states without having to define those oneself (e.g.
bounded packet loss and forwarding loop). In this case, the user need not be a domain
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expert in order to perform system verification. As long as an expert did define those
requirements at some time in the past, they can be automatically checked against
the model.
Appendix A
VML Grammar
〈root〉 ::= 〈import〉 〈signature〉 〈typedef 〉 〈component〉 〈config〉
〈signature〉 ::= ‘signature’ 〈ident〉 ‘<’ 〈tdecl-list〉 ‘>’ 〈eol〉 〈method-list〉
〈import〉 ::= ‘import’ 〈ident〉
〈tdecl〉 ::= ‘T’ 〈natural〉
〈tdecl-list〉 ::= 〈tdecl〉 ‘,’ 〈tdecl-list〉 | 〈tdecl〉
〈method-sig〉 ::= 〈ident〉 〈ident〉 ‘(’ 〈ident-list〉 ‘)’
〈method-list〉 ::= 〈method-sig〉 〈eol〉 〈method-list〉 | 〈method-sig〉
〈typedef 〉 :: = ‘typedef’ 〈ident〉 ‘:’ 〈eol〉 〈decl〉
〈decl〉 ::= 〈vartype〉 〈ident〉 [‘[’ 〈natural〉 ‘]’] [‘=’ 〈init-val〉 ‘]’ 〈eol〉
〈decl-list〉 ::= 〈decl〉 〈eol〉 〈decl-list〉 | 〈decl〉
〈init-val〉 ::= 〈bool〉 | 〈integer〉
〈vartype〉 = ‘int’ ‘(’ digit ‘,’ digit ‘)’
| ‘bool’
| ‘const int’
| ‘const bool’
| ‘sig’
| 〈utype〉
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〈utype〉 ::= 〈ident〉
〈ident〉 ::= 〈letter〉 〈ichar〉
〈ident-list〉 ::= 〈ident〉 ‘,’ 〈ident-list〉 | 〈ident〉
〈component〉 ::= 〈cmpt-type〉 〈ident〉 ‘:’ 〈eol〉 〈cmpt-body〉
〈cmpt-type〉 ::= ‘agent’
| ‘environment’ ‘<’ 〈ident-list〉 ‘>’
〈cmpt-body〉 ::= 〈agent-body〉 | 〈env-body〉
〈agent-body〉 ::= 〈decl-list〉 〈stmnt-list〉
〈stmnt〉 ::= ‘for’ 〈ident〉 ‘in’ 〈ident〉 ‘:’ 〈stmnt-list〉
| ‘for’ 〈ident〉 in ‘(’〈integer〉‘..’〈integer〉‘)’
| ‘loop:’
| 〈annot〉 〈eol〉 ‘if’ 〈term〉 ‘:’
| 〈annot〉 〈annot〉 〈eol〉 ‘select:’
| 〈assign〉
| 〈invoke〉
| 〈try〉
〈stmnt-list〉 ::= 〈stmnt〉 〈eol〉 〈stmnt-list〉 | 〈stmnt〉
〈assign〉 ::= 〈ident〉 ‘=’ 〈expr〉
〈invoke〉 ::= 〈ident〉 ‘.’ 〈ident〉 ‘(’ 〈term-list〉 ’)’
〈annot〉 ::= ‘@’ 〈ident〉
〈try〉 ::= ‘try’ 〈ident〉
〈env-body〉 ::= 〈decl〉 〈rule〉
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〈rule〉 ::= 〈annot〉 〈eol〉 ‘rule’ 〈ident〉 〈ident〉 ‘:’ 〈eol〉 ‘pre:’ 〈formula〉 〈eol〉 ‘post:’
〈post-cnd-list〉 ‘return:’ 〈ident〉
〈post-cnd〉 ::- 〈assign〉 | 〈invoke〉 | ‘none’
〈post-cnd-list〉 ::= 〈post-cnd〉 〈eol〉 〈post-cnd-list〉
| 〈pst-cnd〉
〈term〉 ::= 〈ident〉
| 〈bool〉
| 〈integer〉
| 〈formula〉
〈formula〉 ::= 〈formula〉 〈bin-op-f 〉 〈formula〉
| 〈unary-op〉 〈formula〉
| 〈term〉 〈bin-op-t〉 〈term〉
| 〈contains〉
| 〈bool〉
〈expr〉 ::= 〈expr〉 〈arith-op〉 〈expr〉
| 〈integer〉
〈term-list〉 ::= 〈term〉 ’,’ 〈term-list〉 | 〈term〉
〈operator〉 ::= 〈arith-op〉 | 〈binary-op〉
〈contains〉 ::= 〈ident〉 ‘in’ 〈ident〉
〈forall〉 ::= ‘forall’ 〈ident〉
〈exists〉 ::= ‘exists’ 〈ident〉
〈unary-op〉 ::= ‘!’ | 〈forall〉 | 〈exists〉
〈bin-op-f 〉 ::= ‘&’ | ‘|’ | ‘==’
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〈bin-op-t〉 ::= ‘<’ | ‘<=’ | ‘>’ | ’¿=’
〈arith-op〉 ::= ‘+’ | ‘-’ | ‘*’ | ‘/’ | ‘%’
〈nzero-digit〉 ::= ‘1’ | ‘2’ | ‘3’ | ‘4’ |‘5’ |‘6’ |‘7’ | ‘8’ | ‘9’
〈digit〉 ::= ‘0’ | 〈nzero-digit〉
〈natural〉 ::= 〈nzero-digit〉 digit
〈integer〉 ::= ‘0’ | [‘-’] 〈natural〉
〈letter〉 ::= ‘a-Z’ | ‘A-Z’
〈ichar〉 ::= 〈letter〉 | 〈digit〉 | ‘ ’
〈bool〉 ::= ‘true’ | ‘false’
Appendix B
LTS Assembly Language Glossary
• addToStateSpace adds a new state to an existing set of states.
• allByType returns a list of all values which that type of variable could assume.
• eval evaluates an expression and returns its value.
• filterByTypeEnv removes all state variables from a set of states which are
not declared in the type environment.
• incCtrl increments the control pointer on the state given as a parameter.
• normCtrl sets the control pointer in a set of states to the highest control
pointer in that set.
• runBlock executes the given series of combinators.
• updState assigns the specified value to the specified variable in the specified
state.
• zip is the standard functional operator over two lists, which returns a list of
pairs of each element sharing an index.
149
Appendix C
VML to LTS Assembly Language
VML LTS AL
agent name block build name block
environment name [(pre,
invocable)]
build name
loop
select [(pre, invocable)]
for i in n0..n1: block for i n0 n1 block
loop block loop block
try i try i
select [(pre, block)] select [(pre, block)]
v = i assign v i
if exp block if exp block
v = x.name params invoke v Type(v) name params
v = x.name params invoke v Type(v) name params
rule name params pre post return invocable name params post
return
150
151
References
Al-Fares, M., Radhakrishnan, S., Raghavan, B., Huang, N., & Vahdat, A.
2010, in NSDI, Vol. 10, 19–19
Andoni, A., Daniliuc, D., Khurshid, S., & Marinov, D. 2003, Unpublished
Arcaini, P., Gargantini, A., & Riccobene, E. 2010, Abstract State Machines,
Alloy, B and Z, 61
Baier, C., Katoen, J.-P., et al. 2008, Principles of model checking, Vol.
26202649 (MIT press Cambridge)
Barthe, G., Gre´goire, B., Heraud, S., & Zanella-Be´guelin, S. 2011, in Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6841, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
2011 (Springer), 71–90
Behrmann, G., David, A., Larsen, K. G., et al. 2006, in Quantitative Eval-
uation of Systems, 2006. QEST 2006. Third International Conference on,
IEEE, 125–126
Benson, T., Anand, A., Akella, A., & Zhang, M. 2011, in Proceedings of the
Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technolo-
gies, ACM, 8
Bertot, Y., & Caste´ran, P. 2004, Interactive theorem proving and program
development: Coq’Art: the calculus of inductive constructions (springer)
Bianco, A., & De Alfaro, L. 1995, in Foundations of Software Technology and
Theoretical Computer Science, Springer, 499–513
Biere, A., Cimatti, A., Clarke, E. M., Strichman, O., & Zhu, Y. 2003, Ad-
vances in computers, 58, 117
Blanchet, B., Cheval, V., Allamigeon, X., & Smyth, B. 2010, Proverif: Cryp-
tographic protocol verifier in the formal model
Boute, R. 2004, in Integrated Formal Methods, Springer, 441–460
Braga, R., Mota, E., & Passito, A. 2010, in Local Computer Networks (LCN),
2010 IEEE 35th Conference on, IEEE, 408–415
152
Canini, M., Venzano, D., Peresini, P., Kostic, D., & Rexford, J. 2012, in
NSDI
Cerny, P., Henzinger, T. A., & Radhakrishna, A. 2013, in Proceedings of
the 40th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of
programming languages, ACM, 115–128
Chandy, K. M., & Misra, J. 1988, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company
Chen, Y., & Liu, Z. 2004, in Integrated Formal Methods, Springer, 402–420
Chiba, S. 1998, in Proceedings of OOPSLA98 Workshop on Reflective Pro-
gramming in C++ and Java, 174
Cimatti, A., Clarke, E., Giunchiglia, E., et al. 2002, in Computer Aided
Verification, Springer, 359–364
Clarke, E., Grumberg, O., & Hamaguchi, K. 1994, in Computer Aided Veri-
fication, Springer, 415–427
Cousot, P., & Cousot, R. 1977, in Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGACT-
SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming languages, ACM, 238–
252
Crocker, D., & Overell, P. 2005, Augmented BNF for syntax specifications:
ABNF
Das, S., Parulkar, G., McKeown, N., et al. 2010, in Optical Fiber Communi-
cation Conference, Optical Society of America, OTuG1
De Moura, L., Owre, S., Rueß, H., et al. 2004, in Computer Aided Verifica-
tion, Springer, 496–500
Farahbod, R., Gla¨sser, U., & Ma, G. 2007, in Proceedings of the 14th Inter-
national ASM Workshop (ASM07), Citeseer
Farhangi, H. 2010, Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, 8, 18
Ferguson, A., Guha, A., Liang, C., Fonseca, R., & Krishnamurthi, S. 2013,
in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM ’13, Hong Kong, China
Floodlight, P. 2013, Floodlight
for Discrete Mathematics, C., & Science, T. C. 2012, DIMACS Challenges
Foster, N., Harrison, R., & Freedman, M. 2011, ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 46,
279
153
Foundation, O. N. 2013, OpenFlow Switch Specification
Garavel, H. 1998, in Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis
of Systems (Springer), 68–84
Garavel, H., & Hautbois, R.-P. 1993, in Proc. of the first AMAST Interna-
tional Workshop on Real-Time Systems, Citeseer
Garavel, H., Lang, F., Mateescu, R., & Serwe, W. 2011, in Tools and Algo-
rithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (Springer), 372–387
Gargantini, A., Riccobene, E., & Scandurra, P. 2008, in Software Engineering
Advances, 2008. ICSEA’08. The Third International Conference on, IEEE,
373–378
Gerth, R., Peled, D., Vardi, M. Y., & Wolper, P. 1995, in Proceedings of the
Fifteenth IFIP WG6. 1 International Symposium on Protocol Specifica-
tion, Testing and Verification, IFIP
Goebel, R., Sanfelice, R. G., & Teel, A. 2009, Control Systems, IEEE, 29, 28
Green, D. 1998, The Java Tutorial Continued: The Rest of the JDK (TM).
Addison-Wesley Pub Co
Grumberg, O., & Katz, S. 2007, International Journal on Software Tools for
Technology Transfer (STTT), 9, 119
Gude, N., Koponen, T., Pettit, J., et al. 2008, ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 38, 105
Gutz, S., Story, A., Schlesinger, C., & Foster, N. 2012, in Proceedings of the
first workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks, ACM, 79–84
Handigol, N., Heller, B., Jeyakumar, V., Mazie`res, D., & McKeown, N. 2012,
in Proceedings of the first workshop on Hot topics in software defined
networks, ACM, 55–60
Handigol, N., Seetharaman, S., Flajslik, M., McKeown, N., & Johari, R.
2009, ACM SIGCOMM Demo
Hart, D. G. 2008, in Power and Energy Society General Meeting-Conversion
and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, 2008 IEEE, IEEE,
1–2
Hartmanns, A. 2012, in FDL, 44–51
154
Hartmanns, A., & Hermanns, H. 2009, in Quantitative Evaluation of Systems,
2009. QEST’09. Sixth International Conference on the, IEEE, 187–196
Hoelzle, U. 2012, Open Networking Summit, 17
Holzmann, G. 2005, The SPIN Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual
(Boston: Addison-Wesley)
Huth, M., & Ryan, M. 2004, Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and
reasoning about systems, Vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press Cambridge,,
UK)
Jackson, D. 2002a, ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Method-
ology, 11, 256
—. 2002b, ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
(TOSEM), 11, 256
—. 2011, Software Abstractions: Logic, Language, and Anlysis (The MIT
Press)
—. 2013, Alloy: A Language and Tool for Relational Models
Jafarian, J. H., Al-Shaer, E., & Duan, Q. 2012, in Proceedings of the first
workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks, ACM, 127–132
Kars, P. 1996, in Proc. Second SPIN Workshop
Kassler, A., Skorin-Kapov, L., Dobrijevic, O., Matijasevic, M., & Dely, P.
2012, in Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks (Soft-
COM), 2012 20th International Conference on, IEEE, 1–5
Katta, N. P., Rexford, J., & Walker, D. 2012, in Workshop on Cross-Model
Design and Validation (XLDI)
Katz, S. 2001, in FME 2001: Formal Methods for Increasing Software Pro-
ductivity (Springer), 419–434
Katz, S., & Grumberg, O. 2002, in Integrated Formal Methods, Springer,
145–164
Kazemian, P., Chang, M., Zeng, H., et al. 2013, in USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI)
Kazemian, P., Varghese, G., & McKeown, N. 2012, NSDI, Apr
Khurshid, A., Zhou, W., Caesar, M., & Godfrey, P. 2012, ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 42, 467
155
Kripke, S. A. 1963, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16, 83
Kwiatkowska, M., Norman, G., & Parker, D. 2011a, in 23rd International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification (Springer), 585–591
Kwiatkowska, M., Norman, G., & Parker, D. 2011b, in LNCS, Vol. 6806,
Proc. 23rd International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
(CAV’11), ed. G. Gopalakrishnan & S. Qadeer (Springer), 585–591
Kwiatkowska, M., Norman, G., & Sproston, J. 2003, Formal Aspects of Com-
puting, 14, 295
Lantz, B., Heller, B., & McKeown, N. 2010, in Proceedings of the Ninth ACM
SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, ACM, 19
Laverty, D. M., Morrow, D. J., Best, R., & Crossley, P. A. 2010, in Power
and Energy Society General Meeting, 2010 IEEE, IEEE, 1–6
Lindahl, M., Pettersson, P., & Yi, W. 1998, in Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems (Springer), 281–297
Mai, H., Khurshid, A., Agarwal, R., et al. 2011, ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 41, 290
Matias, J., Jacob, E., Sanchez, D., & Demchenko, Y. 2011, in Cloud Comput-
ing Technology and Science (CloudCom), 2011 IEEE Third International
Conference on, IEEE, 672–678
McKeown, N., Anderson, T., Balakrishnan, H., et al. 2008, ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 38, 69
McMillan, K. L. 1993, Symbolic model checking (Springer)
Morrison, F. 2012, The art of modeling dynamic systems: forecasting for
chaos, randomness and determinism (DoverPublications. com)
Moscato, F., Flammini, F., Lorenzo, G., et al. 2007, in Proceedings of
the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodolo-
gies and tools, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics
and Telecommunications Engineering), 51
Narayan, S., Bailey, S., Daga, A., et al. 2012, in High Performance Com-
puting, Networking, Storage and Analysis (SCC), 2012 SC Companion:,
IEEE, 1625–1628
Niranjan Mysore, R., Pamboris, A., Farrington, N., et al. 2009, in ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Vol. 39, ACM, 39–50
156
OpenDaylight. 2013, OpenDaylight
O’Sullivan, B., Goerzen, J., & Stewart, D. B. 2008, Real world haskell
(O’Reilly Media, Inc.)
Paulson, L. C., & Wenzel, M. 2002, Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-
order logic, Vol. 2283 (Springer)
Pisa, P. S., Fernandes, N. C., Carvalho, H. E., et al. 2010, in Commu-
nications: Wireless in Developing Countries and Networks of the Future
(Springer), 170–181
Porras, P., Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., et al. 2012, in Proceedings of the first
workshop on Hot topics in software defined networks, ACM, 121–126
PRISM. 2013, Randomised Self-Stabilising Algorithms
Qin, Z., Do, N., Denker, G., & Venkatasubramanian, N. 2014, in International
Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)
Reitblatt, M., Canini, M., Guha, A., & Foster, N. 2013, in Proceedings of
the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Hot topics in software defined
networking, ACM, 109–114
Ryan, M., & Smyth, B. 2011, Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing
Security Protocols, 5, 112
Schnoebelen, P. 2002, Advances in Modal Logic, 4, 393
Sherwood, R., Gibb, G., Yap, K.-K., et al. 2009, OpenFlow Switch Consor-
tium, Tech. Rep
Sherwood, R., Chan, M., Covington, A., et al. 2010, ACM SIGCOMM Com-
puter Communication Review, 40, 129
Shin, S., & Gu, G. 2012, in Network Protocols (ICNP), 2012 20th IEEE
International Conference on, IEEE, 1–6
Shin, S., Porras, P., Yegneswaran, V., et al. 2013, Internet Society NDSS
Skowyra, R., Bahargam, S., & Bestavros, A. 2013a, in High Performance
Extreme Computing Conference (HPEC), 2013 IEEE, IEEE, 1–7
Skowyra, R., Lapets, A., Bestavros, A., & Kfoury, A. 2013b, in Proceedings
of the 2nd ACM International Conference on High Confidence Networked
Systems (HiCoNS 2013), Philedelphia, PA, USA
157
Smith, G. 2002, in Integrated Formal Methods, Springer, 267–285
Smith, G., & Derrick, J. 2001, Formal Methods in System Design, 249
Somenzi, F., & Bloem, R. 2000, in Computer Aided Verification, Springer,
248–263
Stabler, G., Rosen, A., Goasguen, S., & Wang, K.-C. 2012, in Proceedings
of the 6th international workshop on Virtualization Technologies in Dis-
tributed Computing Date, ACM, 53–60
Sydney, A. 2013, PhD thesis, Kansas State University
Thomas, L. 2013, Java APG
Torlak, E., & Jackson, D. 2007, in Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems (Springer), 632–647
Trinh, T., Esaki, H., & Aswakul, C. 2013, IEICE Transactions on Communi-
cations, 96, 56
Vestin, J., Dely, P., Kassler, A., et al. 2013, ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile
Computing and Communications Review, 16, 42
Voellmy, A., Agarwal, A., & Hudak, P. 2010, Nettle: Functional Reactive
Programming for OpenFlow Networks, Tech. rep., DTIC Document
Voellmy, A., Kim, H., & Feamster, N. 2012, in Proceedings of the first work-
shop on Hot topics in software defined networks, ACM, 43–48
Wang, J., & Leung, V. C. 2011, in Information Networking (ICOIN), 2011
International Conference on, IEEE, 114–119
Wang, R., Butnariu, D., & Rexford, J. 2011, in Proceedings of the 11th
USENIX conference on Hot topics in management of internet, cloud, and
enterprise networks and services, USENIX Association, 12–12
Willemse, T. 2004, in Integrated Formal Methods, Springer, 343–362
Zave, P. 2008, in Principles, Systems and Applications of IP Telecommuni-
cations. Services and Security for Next Generation Networks (Springer),
256–279
158
Curriculum Vitae
Richard William Skowyra
EDUCATION
• Ph.D Computer Science, Boston University, 2014
• M.S. Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2009
• B.S. Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 2007
PUBLICATIONS
• Skowyra, R., Bahargam, S., & Bestavros, A., in High Performance Extreme
Computing Conference (HPEC), 2013 IEEE, IEEE, 1-7
• Skowyra, R., Casteel, K., Okhravi, H., Zeldovich, N., & Streilein, W., in Re-
search in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (Springer) (RAID), 2013, 82-102
• Skowyra, R., Lapets, A., Bestavros, A., & Kfoury, A. in Proceedings of the
2nd ACM International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems
(HiCoNS 2013), Philedelphia, PA, USA
• Lapets, A., Skowyra, R., Bestavros, A., & Kfoury, A. 2013, in Developing Tools
as Plug-ins (TOPI), 2013 3rd International Workshop on, IEEE, 19-24
• Skowyra, R., Lapets, A., Bestavros, A., & Kfoury, A., Reusable Requirements
in Automated Verification of Distributed Systems, Technical Report BUCS-
TR-2013-002, 2013, Boston University
• Lapets, A., Skowyra, R., Bahargam, S., Bestavros, A., & Kfoury, A., Towards
Accessible Integrated Formal Reasoning Environments for Protocol Design,
Technical Report BUCS-TR-2012-016, 2012, Boston University
• Skowyra, R., Bestavros, A., & Goldberg, S. 2011, The Zenith Attack: Vulner-
abilities and Countermeasures, Technical Report BUCS-TR-2011-015, 2011,
Boston University
